date

1819 July 26 + To Erskine Lett
1819 July 26 +

To Erskine

Lett. 5. E.’s Reform

§.3. E’s earnests pernicious

1

1

§. | | Proposed disfranchisements and transferences of seats, bad in themselves and bad as earnests.

On the subject of this plan of partial and gradual disfranchisement, and transference of seats taken by itself /considered in itself/, I shall not attempt to detain your Lordship much longer: these letters being intended to be almost immediately followed by a little work in which that plan /measure/ will be particularly if not exclusively considered: /at present/ all I shall do at present is to state the positions, of which in so far as it is /they are/ not in my former work, the proofs will I hope be found in it.

1. In so far as the disfranchising system is proceeded with /made to take place/, the seats taken from the existing boroughs will be given either to the[?] contiguous Country Districts, or else to populous and at present unrepresented towns.

2. In so far as the transference is made to Country Districts, the change is more likely to be productive of difference than service to the universal interest: the class of men into whose hands the seats will then be thrown viz. the great landholders partly Peers and partly Country Gentlemen being /naturally/ in all those points of appropriate aptitude naturally under the present system of representation naturally and generally inferior to those by whom the seats in question are at present filled: meaning by appropriate aptitude {– meaning thereby} here as elsewhere appropriate probity, appropriate intellectual aptitude, and appropriate active talent.

N.B. In this it is assumed that the Election would in every instance be in the open mode as at present, and not in the secret mode namely by ballot

3. Of the transference of the seats to populous towns there seems little probability. But even supposing this plan adopted, I see more harm /evil/ than good in it. A pecuniary qualification would of course be made requisite: and at whatever sum it were placed, and whether any such qualification were appointed or no, the voter would for want of secresy, be placed at the command of those, whose interest is more or less likely to be in a state of opposition to the universal interest, though not so decidedly so as in the other case.
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    Remains the /any/ plan, according to which the seats of the extinguished boroughs would be transferred /transference would be made/ to the as yet unrepresented populous towns. Of this, untill the qualification required, and thence the numbers and condition and numbers of the voters be /Electors are/ determined no very /sufficiently/ precise conception can be formed of it, nor therefore any sufficiently precise judgment pronounced in relation to it. What is more, so extreme it should seem is the improbability of its being adopted, that the time and space necessary for the /any full/ examination of it can scarcely hope for payment.

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    But now on the other hand suppose that instead of being transferred to populous towns the seats are transferred to Country Districts, things in other respects continuing on the same footing as at present. What will be the consequence? Instead of opulent men of all /those of opulent or well connected or educated/ classes as it might happen, the hands these seats would pass into would be the hands of Country Gentlemen: Peers included: men who, as compared with opulent and well connected or educated men of other classes put together are in respect of all the several elements of appropriate aptitude taken together, in a peculiar degree, and for the reasons so often given, likely to be, not to say sure to be, in a high degree, and to a practically mischievous effect deficient.

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    2. Looking to Peerage, advancement in d o and Baronetage

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    pauperism or in contemplation/under any apprehension/ of becoming so would of course be subject on this as on other points be subjected: to the dominion of their respective employers, whether Magistrates or not would be subjected the votes of all such Electors as were respectively dependent for their employment, on such persons as at the time were their employers.

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