date

[clxvii. 123] Removed 6 Aug. 1821
[clxvii. 123]

Removed 6 Aug. 1821

Part 11 Lett. 1

1820. Aug 18.

Rid yourselves of Ultramaria

Letter 11. Ultramarian aversion.

New lights exclude blend submission.

Thus much as to every sort of arrangement, by which, in any determinate shape, supposing it submitted to, any promise of advantage to Spain, could, as above, be afforded. But, to all such promise of affording arrangements, would be added - unavoidably added - a multitude of others, by no one of which, even for a moment, any such promise could be afforded: arrangements, covering in their totality, immense and continually encreasing expanse in the field of legislation.

For conveying a sufficiently correct and extensive conception of these causes of unmixt evil, a single sample will suffice, and, in the case of Appeals, this sample will presently meet your eye.

All this (it may be said) was submitted to before the change: why then (it may be asked) should it not continue to be submitted to after the change: all this was submitted to at the hands of as bad a government as ever existed: why then should it not be submited to at the hands of a so much better one? all this was submitted to under a government in which the people in question had no share: why then should it not be submitted to under a government in which they have so large a share?

The argument is not unplausible, and the endeavour has been to give to it the most advantageous shape of which it is susceptible. The argument is not unplausible: still, its own refutation, I can not help thinking, can scarce fail of having been suggested by it. The union being so highly detrimental to the interest of the people in the two countries, the more popular and in every respect better the new government, the more certain it is that an arangement so detrimental to them in both countries will not continue: and as it is on the people of the now dependant country that the evil will press with the greatest force, it is with them that the resistance will be seen to commence; a resistance for which such unexampled facility is (it will be seen) afforded by the very excellence of the new government. in addition to that which is afforded by its distance from the seat of supreme command. /authority/

While it kept all hands in shackles, the former government kept a gag in every mouth, a bandage over all eyes. By the present Constitution, these same instruments of tyranny shackles, gag, and bandage - are all cast forth: not less compleatly in the one hemisphere than in the other. By the terms of Article 371, "All Spaniards have liberty to write, print, and publish their political ideas, without any necessity for a license, examination or approbation, previous to publication, subject to the rstriction and responsibility established by law". By the terms of Article 373, "Every Spaniard has a right of Memorial to the Cortes, or the King, to claim the benefits of the observance of the Constitution." Under the former Government all Spanish America was kept hermetically sealed against all foreignors: thence, "against all such instruction as might be derived from them. Under the existing Constitution on payment of certain duties, the ports are, or are about to be, open to all foreignors."

+See Sittings of the Cortes Aug. 1820.
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