date

1823 Feb. 16 Observations Observations
1823 Feb. 16

Observations Observations Judiciary Art. 85

Delivered in the form /Expressed in the words/ in which it is here expressed

this is neither /not/ an arrangement nor a principle It has no determinate

application No body of men can be assigned to which it has decidedly any

application.

By the legislative power does it mean the power of the body stiled the

legislative Senate? It should have kept to that expression then, and not have

changed it By the executive power does it mean the body stiled the Executive

Council? Here too it should have kept to that expression then and not have

changed it. Yet to these must it apply /have application/ or to nothing. This

being the case, now observe even one effect. The body called the Executive

Council having as above an equal share of legislative power with the body called

the Legislative Senate, the two bodies concurr suppose and by their joint power

enact a law. Giving execution and effect to this law does not suit the wishes[?]

of the persons whosoever they are who are invested with Judicial power in the

supreme grade. What is the consequence the law remains of necessity unexecuted.

Here then is another disguised Veto on the power of the appointed Deputies of

those of whom the supreme Constitutive power is composed. Here is a set of

functionaries in whose power it is to dissolve the government, and put anarchy

in the place of it: a set of functionaries who thus have it in their power to

unite their own power with all those whose wish it is that the Constitution

should have place /continue or exercise/ /be carried into effect/.
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    III. In the Grecian Constitution, Articles in which features of supposed inaptitude have been observed.

    First come Articles 9 and 10, concerning the so declared two component parts of the government: namely the body termed the Legislative Senate, and the body termed the Executive Council. In The appellations respectively given to these two bodies, there seems to be an inconsistency: and, on considering them in themselves, one of them namely the one stiled the Executive Council seems to be useless: and forasmuch as in the regard to political power, there can not be any portion which if useless is not also mischievous, hence it will be seen to follow, that, in the instance of the body here in question if it be useless it is worse, indeed much worse than useless.

    First as to the inconsistency of the denominations. To the body, intended as it should seem, to be composed of members chosen immediately by the people is attached the appellation of Legislative Senate. But no sooner are the functions of the body termed Executive Council brought to view, than it appears that to the Senate stiled Legislative no more than one out of two equal shares in the power of legislation in the highest grade, is given, the other share being given to the body stiled the Executive Council. The consequence is - that to the whole of that power, which, by the appellation of Executive given to it one should be disposed to regard as designed to be subordinate (the business of the Executive power as such being to give execution and effect to the will entertained and declared by the legislative) is added a share in that same superior power: So that here is a body of functionaries which is at the same time placed in subordination to and in coordination with another body to which by its appellation it is indicated as being purely subordinate. Moreover thus it is that so far from being in effect subordinate this declared subordinate is in effect greatly superior in power to its so declared superordinate, which effective superiority will be seen to have place most incontestably when the powers given to the so-stiled Executive Council are brought to view in detail, as they will be presently.
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    Mark now the secret perils, which every offspring of the wisdom of the so stiled Legislative Senate has to encounter and surmount before it can come into existence. Instead of birth comes abortion, if either to the so stiled Executive Council, that is to say to those out of its five Members, or to the President of the so-stiled Legislative Senate, or to the Principal Secretary of that same Legislative Senate, it has the misfortune to be an object of displeasure, or even of indifference.

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    One concluding point is yet behind. Be the arrangement what it may, in vain might it suit the views of a majority of the so stiled Legislative Senate; in vain might it suit moreover the views of four fifths of the five Members of the so stiled Executive Council. If the President of this same Council is not one of them, he has but to withold from the Act his signature and there is an end of it. For, by Article 57, "Every Act and decree of the Council is signed by the President, countersigned by the Principal Secretary and sealed by Seal of the State."
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