date

1823 Feb. 10 Greece. Constitution Observations
1823 Feb. 10 Greece. Constitution Observations Introduction ?.4. Sinister

sacrifice © its modes

On the other hand such is the blindness and power of self©partiality that while

occupied in the establishment of arrangements the most decidedly adverse to the

universal interest and the most decidedly favorable to his own particular

interest nothing is more common than for a man to have succeeded and with very

little difficulty in persuading himself in the persuasion /impregnating himself

with the persuasion/ that the arrangement by which by the supposition a

sacrifice has been made of the universal interest to such his particular

interest has in fact been beneficial to the universal interest: for in this case

the effect of the self©partiality will be to keep the mind steadily turned

toward all arguments which tend to establish in it that convenient persuasion

and as steadily turned away from those of which the tendency is to shake it.

The principal shapes in which sacrifice is made of the universal interest to the

particular interest of ruling functionaries taken in the aggregate are

principally as follows

1. Attaching respectively to the most influential situation masses of power over

and above what the universal interest necessitates. Say viz in the first place

coercive power, in integrality, or in fractional parts Say creation of power in

excess Note that all power is established at the expence of all individuals

subject to it

2. Attaching also in excess to this same situation necessary of pecuniary

emolument in masses. Note that all pecuniary emolument bestowed on functionaries

is bestowed at theexpence of all who are made contributors to it.

3. Attaching to these same situations power of patronage excess of factitious

dignity. It will be shewn /seen/ presently that all factitious dignity is so

much having place in excess. Factitious dignity is bestowed at the expence of

all who are not invested with it. And every fresh mass of factitious dignity is

bestowed at the expence of all those who are already invested with it as well as

of all those who are not invested with it.

For the bestowal of factitious dignity where any pretence condenscension is

manifested, on the assigning of no apparent reason or pretence for it, the

pretence consists in its being given as reward for meritorious service
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    But, in so far as with relation to service in the shape in question dignity

    constitutes /is/ a reward apt in shape, natural dignity, without any factitious

    assistance or embellishment other than than that which consists in publicity is

    a sufficient and in comparison of all others accurately well©proportioned

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    the same thing for all who are invested with it, no factitious dignity can ever

    unless by mere accident be in /bear/ any thing like a correct proportion to

    service: and may to any amount and in practice may to any amount be seen to be

    conferred in such sort as to be altogether mis seated: bestowed upon those by

    whom no service to the universal interest has ever been or so much as pretended

    to have been rendered rendered in any shape: in such sort as to be, in respect

    of justice, on a footing exactly corresponding to punishment when inflicted on

    him by whom no offence has in any shape shape been committed.

    4. Attaching to these same situations power of patronage in excess Power of

    patronage is power of placing men in situations to which power of the coercive

    kind, or pecuniary emolument, or factitious dignity, or other power of

    patronage, severally or conjunctly are attached In this way by one and the same

    situation, desire on the part of two different functionaries is excited and

    gratified: the protege™áÚá and the patron the functionary placed /located/, and

    the functionary placing /locating/: the ”protege™áÚá• and the ”patron•.

    Correspondent to every mass of effective power as above is a mass of obstruction

    which if and when the obstruction proves effective /effectual/ is preventive

    power.

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    may be stiled a ”suspensive veto•

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    ¼(¼a¼)From the Roman Verb in the active mood present tense first person

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