date

1823. Feb. 23 Greece. J.B. to Greek Legislators
1823. Feb. 23 Greece. J.B. to Greek Legislators Independence Division of power

Better? Yes: but why? Only because, and in so far as when a mass of power which

is thus independent of the people is thus divided, there is at all times a

chance of disagreement as between the possessors, and in so far as such

disagreement leads to /is productive of/ public discussion a certainty of a sort

of appeal on both parts to the people In this /in which/ case though the people

not being capable of acting in a body as the two contending parties are can not

make formal demands for themselves nor therefore obtain contracts as between

equal and equal, yet the two contending parties while contending or the

predominant one at the close of the contest, may feel or fancy itself under the

necessity of doing something even /though it were/ at its own expence for the

benefit of the people, or of the most influential part of it.

Thus it was that in the days of King John of England, the contest for power

between the King /Monarch/ and the Aristocracy terminated in that sort of paper

security so celebrated under the name of Magna Charta. At the close of this

contest as neither party could have contended with the other or could see any

prospect of contending with the other in future without the assistance that part

of the great mass of the people which were in the state of freedom as

contradistinguished from domestic or [...?] slavery: so the security such as it

was was extended to all such freedom. Now then taking the people in a body

consisting suppose of four millions it was better then that sort of security

whatever it was that was enjoyed /possessed/ as against depredation and

oppression at the hands of a single despot should be in possession of each one

of the number of two hundred thousand than that it should be confined to no more

than two hundred: and such /this/ was the utility of the division of power such

as it was that had place in that state of things compared with unity of power in

the hands of one single despot.
Similar Items
  • Title: [1823. March 1 Greece. Division]
    Description: 1823. March 1

    Greece.

    Division of power

    With the conflict between the King on the one part and the two branches of the Aristocracy on the other ceased all chance of ulterior benefit to the interest and condition of the people. Whatsoever real benefit had ever resulted to the people from that same division of power, became purely nominal, as soon as the contention between the parties sharing in it ceased. No sooner did that contention cease by the establishment of a new succession than a partnership between the formerly contending parties took its place: a partnership, the stock of which was at all times composed of such part of the property of the people as could be extracted from the owners on pretence of making provision for the expences of government. True it is that notwithstanding this bond of strength a sort of comparative weakness remained, in which the people have found a source of comparative advantage. To the single-headed despot by whom as in the Continent, all the powers of government would have been exercised succeeded in these islands a many-headed despot: and in the constitution of this beast of prey there is a sort of weakness which prevents him from driving on in the career of depredation and oppression, at a pace quite so rapid as that which has every where been kept up by a single-headed one. In this retardation consists the only real benefit derived from the above supposed or pretended sole and sufficient security for good government: for, sooner or later, the arrival of the vehicle at the bottom of the abyss is not less certain in the one case than in the other, unless in the mean time a government in the hands of the people should by some means or other be made to take place of a government in the hands of their natural and for ever implacable enemies.
  • Title: [1823 Feb¼y¼. etc Greece J.B. to Legislators]
    Description: 1823 Feb¼y¼. etc

    Greece J.B. to Legislators

    Nothing of this matter sent in this form. Quere what parts of it employed in the

    matter sent to Greece 4 March 1823 through Blaquiere.
  • Title: [1823. March 1. Greece. J.B. Observations]
    Description: 1823. March 1.

    Greece. J.B. Observations on particular Articles

    Division of power

    True it is, that where, between one functionary or set of functionaries and another, a power which is independent of that of the people, is shared out, a case there is, in which such division, in so far as it has place, has a tendency to be productive of effects beneficial to the interest of the people. This is - where the power so divided is the Supreme power in the State, say the power of legislation in the highest grade, and the mode of division such, that no valid act can be performed by the one of these authorities without the concurrence of the other. In this case the power is fractionized: the whole power is the integer, and each of them has a fractional part of it. Thus in the English Government the whole of this power is divided into three fractions: to the King belongs one, to the House of Lords another, to the House of Commons another: In the case of each of these two Houses, the fraction is moreover further fractionized: to each Member belongs a fraction of that of the House he sits in: which fraction is thus a sub-fraction of the whole. In a case of this sort, this same good tendency which does it depend upon? It depends upon those disagreements and those contests which in such a case are so natural, and have been so universally exemplified. Every such contest having for its subject matter the obedience of the people, each party has at times found itself under a necessity more or less urgent of courting the good will of the people. The consequence has been that when between the parties so contending a cessation of hostility and a compromise in some shape or other has had place, they have both of them found themselves under the necessity of concurring in the establishment of some arrangement from which the interest and condition of the people has received some more or less beneficial service

    Under the sense of this necessity it was that on the occasion of their contest with King John the Members of the great Aristocratical body of the time the Barons in the termination they put to that contest by the Charter which they succeeded in exacting from him, admitted the great body of the freemen into the benefit of some portion of the security, such as it was, which it professed to establish. But, what seems probable, is - that the portion of the population to which this security was on that occasion extended, formed in those days by far the smallest portion of the whole.

    Thus again on the occasion of that conflict which in the year 1688 substituted one race of Monarchs to another when the Aristocracy of the country obtained for itself, not only security against arbitrary power in the hands of the Monarch, but the confirmation of a share coordinate with his own in the power belonging to the legislative and judicial departments, they could not altogether avoid admitting the great body of the people to the benefit of some share of the security obtained for themselves in respect of person and property. For their own share they gave themselves that security which was afforded by the undisturbed possession of their till then disputed and precarious share in the Supreme power as above: As To the people, their Masters knew better than to give to them any such security: in place of it, what they gave them was - that tissue of vague, unobligatory and ineffective generalities called the Bill of Rights. From men so situated how could any thing better have reasonably been expected? By a genuine representation of the people, the power of the people would have been encreased, whereby that of those their rulers would immediately have been diminished, and peradventure ultimately abolished. The system of sham representation as if it had been the peoples only safeguard, was therefore most carefully, and in all its plentitude, preserved.