date

1823. Feb. 22. Greece. J.B. to Greek Legislators
1823. Feb. 22. Greece. J.B. to Greek Legislators Dependence strict

Legislators! let not words /names/ © let not vulgar errors deceive you Not in

independence, but in dependence, so it be rightly placed, is the great security

for good government. Dependence, so it be rightly placed, can not be too strict

As for independence supposing it to exist which it does not, it is anarchy.

Dependence as it is your bounden duty, so is it your only true glory ©

dependence on your Constituents: on that dependence depends /proportioned/ to

its strictness is/ your probity. Not the [...?] but the [...?] of their will

should be yours If to you it belongs to make a will for them, it is only because

it is out of their power to come together in such sort as upon each occasion to

form a will for themselves.

Strict and Entire as your dependence should be on the will of these your

masters, so should be dependence of the Executive power wheresoever /in

whatsoever hands/ lodged on your legislative on you, the possessors of the

legislative. So should the dependence of all local legislative bodies on your's

the universal one. So throughout the Executive department should be the

dependence of every /each/ inferior on every superior grade: the stricter the

dependence of all upon you and thence through you upon your masters, upon the

common masters of you all. Such is that chain of service by which and by which

alone universal and perfect freedom is constituted.
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