JB_024_222.xml

Title: [1822 Oct. 10 Tripoli Securities against]

Description: 1822 Oct. 10

Tripoli Securities against Misrule

2o

Preliminary Explanations

?. Remedy - [...?]

no objection

Whatsoever may be the chance which the here proposed remedy possesses /affords/ of being productive of the wished /desired/ effects, the smalness of it affords not any ground of objection to it: for under a Monarchy such being the nature of the case as not to admitt of any other, the option is - this or none. The great difficulty is in obtaining the concessions. Should that point be accomplished, its efficacy to no inconsiderable degree need not be despaired of. True it is - Abundant indeed are the instances which history affords of concessions having the same object. None in which the promises made /engagements taken/ by those concessions have not been grossly and continually violated. Still however there seems sufficient reason to think, that without this safeguard weak as it was the instances of oppression would have been still numerous and afflictive. By The Charters by /in/ which the concessions were expressed, afforded a fixt /determinate/ denomination and standard of reference for the several grievances a rallying point for complainants /sufferers with their complaints/. If even in these cases /shapes/ the paper when employed as /in the character of/ a breast plate of defence against the Monarchical sword was not altogether without /destitute/ of efficacy still less need its efficiency be despaired of in the present case - for in none of these instances was /has/ /had/ any such attention /care/ been employed /applied/ to the making the most of the only possible remedy as will be seen employed here /here be visible/ in the system of arrangements here proposed.

JB_041_179v.xml

Title: [1822 Oct. 28 Tripoli. Securities against]

Description: 1822 Oct. 28

Tripoli. Securities against Misrule

2o Preliminary Explanations

?.2. Misrule Shapes

Violation of political or other secrets.

Superseded?

On the present occasion, first under consideration will come misrule in its

purely private shapes as above These are those which are most apt to make their

appearance and of which the bad effects are more /most/ prominent and most

readily apprehended

Next to these will /After these for the corresponding and opposite reason/ are

those which are [...?] a mixt or half private /half as well as/ public nature

As to those which are of purely public nature, on the present occasion they will

not come into /under/ consideration at all. For to those the appropriate remedy

will be of a different kind - namely a system of national representation having

for its object the applying a bridle to arbitrary power in the hand of the

sovereign.

The private shapes here particularly noticed are not the only ones in which

Misrule is apt to manifest itself. They are however those in which it is most

apt to manifest itself. As to the others, by the existing laws provision

/security/ of some sort /shape/ or other in relation to them will have been made

- and if for applying to those the security /sort of securities/ here proposed

to be provided for those here selected, any need should present itself, the

present sample /set/ /groupe/ will serve to shew the mode in which such

application may be made.

JB_024_219.xml

Title: [1822 Nov. 26 Tripoli. Securities against]

Description: 1822 Nov. 26

Tripoli. Securities against Misrule.

50

Preliminary Explanations

Securities against Misrule: being Ordinances and other Arrangements proposed to be established in the State of Tripoli, with a view to their serving in that character.

Preliminary Explanations: shewing what the nature of the case admitts of being done or attempted to be done in such a country in this view, without producing or endeavouring to produce any change in the form of Government.

Misrule is bad Government: it comprehends whatsoever is opposite to good Government. A Government is good, in proportion as it is contributory to the greatest happiness of the greatest number: namely of the members of the community in which it has place.

No government having any where had place that had for its main object any other than the greatest happiness of those among whom the powers of government have from time to time been shared, all governments that have ever had existence have had more or less of bad in them. Of all governments the worst have necessarily been those in which the powers of government have all of them been in the hands of one - because in that case each government has had for its object the greatest happiness of that one member: and to that object the happiness of all the other members has of course been made a continual sacrifice.

Take any government whatsoever, for rendering it less bad than it is, whatsoever means are capable of being proposed or so much as thought of are reducible to one or other of two heads: 1. arrangements by which a change will be effected in the form of the government: 2. arrangements by which a check will be applied to the power of the ruling functionary or functionaries, without any such change.

Arrangements which belong to the first of these heads constitute a separate subject of consideration: the set of arrangements herein proposed under the notion of serving with more or less effect in the character of Securities against misgovernment otherwise called misrule, require not any such changes: they are grounded on the supposition on which they are grounded is - that by one means or other, without any such change, the ruler or rulers may by one means /consideration/ or other be induced to lend their power to the purpose of giving to them the sanction of law.