JB_012_072v.xml

Title: [1821. Novr. 10th. Codification Offer]

Description: 1821. Novr. 10th.

Codification Offer

Abridgmt.

'.9. Draughtsman gratuitous.

As, by the supposition, the sort of work in question is no other than an original

draught, subject to rejection and to unlimited alteration at the hands of the

Legislature, nor yet is there anything either incongruous or improbable in the

supposition that instead of a Committee of the Legislative body, the appointment

may be in the hands of a Member or certain Members of the Executive department.

Another course, is - to attach to this service remuneration in a pecuniary shape

to a determinate amount, receivable by one or some other determinate and thence

limited number of individuals, to be chosen in the way of election by the whole

of the legislative body: namely, either before the service rendered, and thence

in expectation of the receipt of it, or not till after the service rendered, and

thence in recompense for it.

Still, lodge it where you will, lodge it in one of these quarters or in another

- lodge it in any other - patronage is the instrument the work is done by and

patronage is in the unalterable nature of things a source and instrument of

corruptive influence. No correction is it susceptible of other than that which

has place in so far as the functionaries, in whose hands it is lodged, are

removable by the secretly /suffrages - the secretly and thence freely/ given

suffrages of the people. But in its application to this case in particular, the

remedy would have less virtue - less efficiency - than in any other. In this

case The degree /amount/ of their relative and comparative incapacity, would be

/on the part of the people will naturally be/ as the magnitude of this

all-comprehensive whole, compared with the magnitude of this or that particular

part, of the aptitude of which they are best qualified to judge.

III. The work suppressed, retarded, or by over haste deteriorated. Now comes in

the circumstance of time. Where factitious reward is the moving power, in the

chart /ocean/ of time, two opposite rocks - precipitation and delay - may be

seen opposing themselves: opposing themselves in such sort, that to prevent the

work from making shipwreck on the one or the other, no inconsiderable portion of

care and skill will be necessary: more than any which has been usually

exemplified or appears probable. In one case, the work will be produced, but in

such sort as not to be fit for use: in the other case, it may happen to it not

to be produced at all. Take, in

JB_012_081v.xml

Title: [1821. Novr. 10. Codification Offer]

Description: 1821. Novr. 10.

Codification Offer

Abridgmt

'9. Draughtsman gratuitous

be sufficiently manifest that, in the case in question, competition would have for its object - for its principal object at least - not the service but the reward - that, in the bestowing of the appointment, or of their vote and influence towards it, the patrons would have more regard, each of them, to his own good wishes in favour of his protegé, than to the goodness of the service. Of his own good wishes, neither perfect understanding nor perfect care would be in any danger of failing: not quite so sure can be - either the goodness of his judgment respecting a man's aptitude for the service, or his regard for that same service.

The factitious reward being thus announced, announcement of the natural reward,

as above described, would or would not be added to it: if not, the factitious

reward would alone be thought of : if yes, then, as will be seen presently, then

would the factitious reward be needless; and being, as above, pernicious, worse

than useless.

JB_024_425v.xml

Title: [1821 Nov. 8 Codification Offer Abridgmt]

Description: 1821 Nov. 8 Codification Offer Abridgmt '.9. Draughtsman gratuitous

1. Plans for obtaining proposed Codes by factitious reward, what, and why

ineligible.

By the application, factitious reward being in this case to be administered, the

case is thereby rendered a case of patronage: in a state of dependence, present

or recently past the persons looking for, or in possession of, the reward;

patron or patrons the person or persons to whose nomination or influence the

person or persons, in possession or expectancy of the appointment with the

reward attached, are or look to be indebted for it.

Every plan of appointment in which such patronage has place will be seen to be

ineligible. The following are the causes by which this ineligibility will be

seen to be produced.

1. The sinister interests and prejudices to the action of which the patron or

patrons in their situation stand exposed, have in '.5. been already brought to

view: to the action of these same causes of bad workmanship the dependant stands

necessarily exposed, together with any others which may happen to have

application in his own particular instance.

2. By the corruptive influence of patronage, the probability of appropriate

aptitude on the part of the workman, and thence on the part of the work, can not

but be greatly diminished.

3. Under the influence of this plan, the work in question will, according to the

mode of payment employed, be in all probability, if produced at all, either

inordinately delayed, or through precipitation deprived of more or less of the

aptitude which might otherwise have belonged to it.

4. By this mode of remuneration, the number of the works, which the legislature

might otherwise have had to choose out of, will unavoidably be narrowed.

5. To the evils of close workmanship as above, will thus necessarily be added

the encrease given in the present instance to the general evil of close

patronage, with its corruptive influence.

Such are the positions. Here follow the proofs.

1. That by the sinister interests in question the aptitude of the work in so far

as depends upon appropriate moral aptitude on the part of the workman can not in

this case fail of being impaired has been shewn already, as above.