date

[xxxiv. 297] 1824. Feb y. 27
[xxxiv. 297]

1824. Feb y. 27

Constitutional Code. For Greece

Ch. Sub-Legislatures

?. Observations

Federative System

3. The inconveniences from the want of a stronger bond of connection than the original one which was little more than that of an ordinary alliance were all along felt. By this feeling was at length produced the existing federative Constitution by which while to some purposes and in some points of the field of legislation they were united to other purposes, and on other points they were continued in a state of separation.

4. In that instance, in the case of a simple form of government the immense distance between some parts of the union and others would probably /might perhaps/ of itself be found an insuperable bar to good government, and though the complication and uncertainty inseparable from the demarcation of logical fields of service can not but have been productive of inconvenience to an amount more or less considerable, yet the good sense with which those lines of demarcation have been drawn, joined to the sense of the necessity of mutual forbearance have hitherto continued and in that instance may not improbably for ever continue to preserve the inconvenience from settling[?] to any serious magnitude

Very different in these points is the case of Greece:

1. In Greece no such formed habits of separate settled rule have place as yet, in any determinate number of breasts in any of the several portions of territory among which the union will have to be formed.

2. In Greece compared with the American territory in question the distance between the remotest portions that can be [...?] to join in the union is inconsiderable
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  • Title: [[xxxiv. 298] 1824. Feb y. 27]
    Description: [xxxiv. 298]

    1824. Feb y. 27

    Constitutional Code. for Greece

    Ch. Sub-Legislatures

    ?. Observations

    Federative System

    Circumstances however are not altogether wanting, by which the need of a deposition more or less considerable from a form of government so simple as the one exhibited by the present Code may not improbably be found indicated

    1. A principal one, and that of a nature obvious to every eye is the distance in point of place, and on account of winds still more in point of time between some of the islands with relation as well to each other, as to the main land.

    2. Another may perhaps be found in the differences between habits of thinking as between the inhabitants of one portion of territory and those of another. Only for remembrance sake is this circumstance mentioned, the facts not lying in any degree within the knowledge of the author of these pages.

    [...? ...? ...?] taken together it seems impossible, as things stand at present to say on what points it may be found expedient or necessary to apply more or less of relaxation to the closeness of the bonds which a government so simple as the one here proposed would apply /be applied/.

    This much however may it is hoped be asserted with a degree of confidence to which the imputation of ungrounded presumption will not it is hoped be found attached namely that by the view here given of the general[?] field of service and within this the several sorts of functions which belong to the nature of the case, the fixation of the several points of independence will be found facilitated.
  • Title: [[xxxiv. 300] 1824. March 13]
    Description: [xxxiv. 300]

    1824. March 13

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    Such being the advantage of simplicity, the practical conclusion seems to be this.

    Proceed in the first instance on the supposition of a simple form: the population of the

    whole country in its present and future state joining in the formation of government the

    same in all points for the whole extent of the territory the same in all points. Only as

    a measure of necessity Render it as to any point federative - in other words, concede to

    the inhabitants any portion of the territory a state of independence as to any points -

    only as a measure of necessity, and in proportion to that necessity: that it is to say

    only in case they case they give an absolute refusal to join with the rest on any other

    terms: and in that case the fewer and narrower the spots of independence the better

    At any rate abhorred be the thought of employing force of arms or menace to produce

    union in any instance. Take for a warning the tyranny of the Athenians over their

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    by Thucydides. Union or separation without protection being the only alternative is the

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  • Title: [[xxxiv. 299] 1824. Feb y. 27]
    Description: [xxxiv. 299]

    1824. Feb y. 27

    Constitutional Code. for Greece

    Ch. Sub-Legislatures

    Observations

    Federative System

    In case of modification, one of the points might perhaps be in the Administrative department, giving the location of the Sub Minister of this or that department - not to the Prime Minister but to the Sub Legislature of the District, especially if that district be an island or a cluster of nearly adjacent islands.

    This provision however should not extend to the Judiciary Department. To the magnitude of The advantage in respect of impartiality resulting from the [...?] state of the Judge in respect of family and other intimate connections, few it is hoped are the persons who will not be fully sensible. In the ages called the middle ages when Italy was in great part divided into little republics it was a point of known and widely adopted policy to choose for the head of the judiciary a person who was a foreigner and a stranger with reference to the republic in which he was chosen to serve.

    In the several Districts, and in particular in those composed of islands it /the term Local Legislatures/ might perhaps be more agreable to the nation than a term corresponding to Sub-Legislatures

    A minor difficulty would probably be that which regards taxation. In relation to this subject the options seem to lie between no more than two sorts of arrangements. Fixing the quota that each District or Member of the Union shall contribute, and as to the mode of contribution - the subject matter of taxation leaving the fixation to the inhabitants /people themselves/ the other is - the locating by the General Legislature functionaries for collecting the amount in the several districts, the amount being settled by a general tax applying to all the several members without distinction

    The first mode is that according to which the difficulty presents itself as being at the highest pitch: for when the fixation comes to be made, each would regard its quota as too high, and thus it is that whatever were the most equitable system of proportions, the probability is - that it would find itself rejected by a majority of the Assembly whatsoever were the composition of it, if it were a free one.