date

[xxxiv. 299] 1824. Feb y. 27
[xxxiv. 299]

1824. Feb y. 27

Constitutional Code. for Greece

Ch. Sub-Legislatures

Observations

Federative System

In case of modification, one of the points might perhaps be in the Administrative department, giving the location of the Sub Minister of this or that department - not to the Prime Minister but to the Sub Legislature of the District, especially if that district be an island or a cluster of nearly adjacent islands.

This provision however should not extend to the Judiciary Department. To the magnitude of The advantage in respect of impartiality resulting from the [...?] state of the Judge in respect of family and other intimate connections, few it is hoped are the persons who will not be fully sensible. In the ages called the middle ages when Italy was in great part divided into little republics it was a point of known and widely adopted policy to choose for the head of the judiciary a person who was a foreigner and a stranger with reference to the republic in which he was chosen to serve.

In the several Districts, and in particular in those composed of islands it /the term Local Legislatures/ might perhaps be more agreable to the nation than a term corresponding to Sub-Legislatures

A minor difficulty would probably be that which regards taxation. In relation to this subject the options seem to lie between no more than two sorts of arrangements. Fixing the quota that each District or Member of the Union shall contribute, and as to the mode of contribution - the subject matter of taxation leaving the fixation to the inhabitants /people themselves/ the other is - the locating by the General Legislature functionaries for collecting the amount in the several districts, the amount being settled by a general tax applying to all the several members without distinction

The first mode is that according to which the difficulty presents itself as being at the highest pitch: for when the fixation comes to be made, each would regard its quota as too high, and thus it is that whatever were the most equitable system of proportions, the probability is - that it would find itself rejected by a majority of the Assembly whatsoever were the composition of it, if it were a free one.
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  • Title: [[xxxiv. 298] 1824. Feb y. 27]
    Description: [xxxiv. 298]

    1824. Feb y. 27

    Constitutional Code. for Greece

    Ch. Sub-Legislatures

    ?. Observations

    Federative System

    Circumstances however are not altogether wanting, by which the need of a deposition more or less considerable from a form of government so simple as the one exhibited by the present Code may not improbably be found indicated

    1. A principal one, and that of a nature obvious to every eye is the distance in point of place, and on account of winds still more in point of time between some of the islands with relation as well to each other, as to the main land.

    2. Another may perhaps be found in the differences between habits of thinking as between the inhabitants of one portion of territory and those of another. Only for remembrance sake is this circumstance mentioned, the facts not lying in any degree within the knowledge of the author of these pages.

    [...? ...? ...?] taken together it seems impossible, as things stand at present to say on what points it may be found expedient or necessary to apply more or less of relaxation to the closeness of the bonds which a government so simple as the one here proposed would apply /be applied/.

    This much however may it is hoped be asserted with a degree of confidence to which the imputation of ungrounded presumption will not it is hoped be found attached namely that by the view here given of the general[?] field of service and within this the several sorts of functions which belong to the nature of the case, the fixation of the several points of independence will be found facilitated.
  • Title: [1825 Constitutional Code. Table 1]
    Description: 1825

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    Territory — name, situation, boundaries, divisions.

    Ch.II.

    Ends and Means

    Ch.III.

    Sovereignty, in whom.

    Ch.IV.

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    S.1. Constitutive, what, in whom. S.2. Powers, to

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  • Title: [1823. Feb. 27. Greece. J.B's Observations]
    Description: 1823. Feb. 27.

    Greece. J.B's Observations on particular Articles

    Judiciary

    Now as to the plan I would propose for a Judiciary.

    1. The whole territory of the state, say on the present occasion Greece, I would divide into Judicial Districts: the number, of course, not at present determinable: each such Judicial district into Judicial sub-districts, for the demarcation of which, extent of territory and of population should conjunctly be taken into account.

    For the sake of simplicity and uniformity, and for a further reason that will soon be visible, the limits of these several Judicial Districts should be the same as those of the several Election Districts, by each of which, a Member is sent to the Legislative Senate. The limits of the several Judicial Sub-districts, may perhaps be the same with those of the several Election sub-districts, into which it may be convenient that the Election districts be divided, for the purpose of collecting, at so many voting offices, the several parcels of votes, which are from thence to be transferred altogether to the Election district voting office, at which the aggregate number of the votes given in that district are collected, sorted, and counted. Whether, of any of these Judicial Sub-districts, there shall be any ulterior division into sub-sub-districts, must remain to be determined by particular local considerations. For these Judicial districts, the only source of division I should employ, is - the territorial; no such source as that which has so generally been employed, and which may be termed the logical or metaphysical: a source taken from the nature of the Judicial business done: no such division, for example as that between civil and penal suits or causes, or that between civil and ecclesiastical suits or causes between commercial and non-commercial suits or causes: no such division as that under English Law, and thence under the English-bred Law of some of the Anglo-American United States, between Law cases and Equity cases. Reason. From any such principle of division, spring two great evils: one is, needless and useless addition to the number of Judicatories: the other is, in the case of this or that suit or cause, doubt and contestation, to the cognizance of which of two or more Judicatories it appertains. To this general rule, a few exceptions, but to no very considerable extent in the aggregate, will be of necessity suggested by the peculiar circumstances in which some classes of public functionaries find themselves placed.

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