date

28 Aug. 1806 Evidence Whether
28 Aug. 1806

Evidence

Whether one psychological fact can be redutionary of another?

1. Fear. (i.e. pain of apprehension) of consciousness

1. Confusion of mind of [...?] conscienceness: Answer confusion of mind in fear which for its source the circumstance of the cause[?] suspected, or any other source of danger.

II. Motive, of Intention

2. Motive of intentionably[?]? Not immediately; but exposure to the action of such and such a motive: but there is physical evidence.

III. [...?] of Motive

3. Intentionably, of motive? - Yes, in case answer as above.

IV. Of position, of Intention

4. Habitual enmity, sexual desire i.e. habitual disposition to experience pain & pleasure of it - circumstantial evidence of intentionality: viz: intention to do the acts tending to the gratification of the above propensities.

V - Falshood or Reticence, of Fear

5. Non-response, False response &c. The psychological fact of which they are immediately evidentiary, is fear: fear of some evil to result from the disclosure. But this fear may have had other causes [...?] of /than the/ particular guilt[?] in question.

VI. Consciousness, of the past agency in question.

Fallaé[?], by confusion is surely produced by religion

6. Self insinuative[?] consciousness is not absolutely conclusive evidence of the act. Consider case of religious insanity.

7. So in theft. consciousness i.e. belief of want of little may be conscious. A man may steal his own goods believing them to be anothers.

#3

At each link in the chain of causality, the indication is liable to be fallacious. Therefore the probative force will be less and less as the number encreases[?].

In the indication of the probative force Of the several species of circumstantial evidence there can be little or nothing said[?]. The evidentiary property /quality/ of the evidentiary fact would not exist, if the existence of it were not generally obvious. What the legislator can do in the way of instruction for the Judge is little more than the bringing the whole mass of doctrine together, for the purpose of affording him that /to him comprehensive view at the commencement of his [...?]/ of the subject - that sense of intellectual power which is so useful to the right discharge of his functions, and which otherwise might for some time be wanting /deficient/.

Taking any one of these points of facts by itself, the probative force will be apt to strike the reader at first sight as being incompleat. Accordingly it is seldom without a concurrence of several articles of circumstantial evidence there the answer will present itself as strong enough to be conducive.
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