Evidence

23 July 1805

Perversion

Between the fabrication /sort of forgery/ attempted behind the custom, and the fabrication practiced upon the bench, there is again yet another difference. The source of profit is different in the two cases. In the case of the malefactor, recognised as such, the profit reaped by the secret, if any be reaped, is reaped from the individual false will in question, from the individual act by which that false will is /was/ /has been/ made. In the case of the Judge, and his practises in the iniquity, the source of profit is not confined to any one false will in particular, but the stream flows alike from all the suits in which with whatever success, at the instance of a false document, the making of any such false will is attempted to be procured.

Not that of itself /Of itself however/ this source of profit is not productive enough, to satiate /satisfy/ the rapacity of the man of law. In another place this has been shown to belong to the number of cases in which he has contrived to provide for himself two opposite fountains of decision, so circumstanced /situated/ that from which of them he will draw his decision, /on each given occasion/ his response of the suits will be drawn, shall, previously to litigation /[...?], that is to/ appear sufficiently and uncognisable. In the present case to fan the fountain of technical perversion as above delineated, he has contrived to keep up in a state fit for playing /of/ /constant readiness/, the fountain of real intention. To draw from the one or from the other source is equally open to the revered Juggler's choice. In addition to the profit (of which nothing is ever said, by any body,) praise, whichsoever of the two sources it shall please him to draw from, is equally secure. At the different fountains altered two different virtues, eager /in readiness/ to crown their receptive customers /votaries/: at the fountain of trial intention, Liberality: at the fountain of Technical Perversion, Constancy: Constancy whose motto is stare decisis: Constancy the [...?] handmaid of jurisprudential Science.
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    the will is always from - the

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    But even when doors are not shut and light is minimally

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