date

18 May 1805 Evidence Introd
18 May 1805

Evidence

Introd.

With the ends of procedure, the legitimate ends, coincide also though here again not compleatly, the ends of justice: ends of judicature, we have been seeing, falls short of the mark: ends of justice, we shall see outstretching it. At the hands of the system of procedure The dictates of justice are understood to require, in so far at least as the prescriptions of substantive law are understood to be not repugnant to the dictates of natural justice (all this a matter of language and of usage) the fulfilment of the prescriptions of substantive law: and in so far the legitimate ends of procedure coincide with and are accompanied by the ends of justice. But, as /like/ the prescriptions of adjutive[?] law are compared in common /popular/ language and conception with the dictates of justice, so also are the prescriptions of substantive law themselves: and with /as to/ the /such of the/ ends of justice as correspondent to those dictates of justice with and by which substantive law is confronted and tried, the term /expression/ ends of procedure is it evident, no longer parallel and synonymous the coincidence no longer holds.
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