date

30[?] April 1805 Evidence Ch
30[?] April 1805

Evidence

Ch.1. Ends

'.3. Procedure branches

Particular ends

'.3. Procedure its branches - Particular ends, branches of the general end.

No sooner is the office of Judge established, than a new set of rights spring up, such as without him could not have come into existence.

The money you have at this instant in your purse is yours: you have a compleat right to it. any person who without or against your consent, and without some special and extraordinary title, such as that derived from /constituted by/ a warrant from a Judge, should seize it and carry it off would committ an offence: he would have already committed an offence for /to/ which punishment and satisfaction are or at least ought to be, appointed by the law - by the substantive branch of the law. To prevent him, the law allows you to employ force: and if he can not be prevented otherwise, even such force (at least if the character in which he take it is that of a thief or robber, or[?] who accordingly /as such/ is conscious of his having no[?] right to take it) as shall terminate[?] in /be followed by/ his death /deprive him of life/.

To this money you have already a right - to compleat an already consummated right, conferred on /created and allotted to/ you already by the substantive branch of the law; a right which for its completion requires not any act to be done by the Judge. Under the circumstances above described the taking the money away from you is already an offence, without requiring any act previously done by the Judge, or any body else to render it so.
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  • Title: [26 April 1805 Evidence Ch.1]
    Description: 26 April 1805

    Evidence

    Ch.1. Ends

    '.3. Procedure branches -

    Particular Ends.

    Another /You have a right to another/ sum of money, to equal value, is due to you by Titius. But to what is it that in this instance you have a right - understand an immediate right? not to any individual determinate individual piece of money whatsoever: not to a single one of whatever pieces of money that may happen at the present time (not to speak of other times) to be in the purse of Titius. What you have a right to, as yet, and in the first instance is neither more nor less than a right to receive a certain service, to be performed in your behalf /rendered to you/ by Titius: viz: the service consisting in the conferring on you, in relation to any individual pieces of money at his choice, so that /as/ the aggregate of them be of the value in question, the same sort of compleat consummate right which you possess already in relation to the money already in your purse.

    What you have a right to is to return or employ as you might /may/ the money already in your purse, such money if any, as Titius in virtue of the service which by the supposition he is bound to render due, may in discharge of such an obligation, have enabled you to put into your purse.

    What you have moreover a right to is, in the event of his not having as yet rendered to you any such service, it being understood that the point of time is already passed before which he was /stood/ bound to have rendered it, a correspondent service to be rendered to you by the Judge: viz a service consisting in the taking such arrangements as shall have the effect either of compelling Titius to render to you in relation to a number of pieces of money at his choice to the value in question, the service of collation above described, or, at the ultimate expence of Titius (viz: /for example/ by the seizure and sale of goods of his to that amount) causing some other person to render to you that service.

    [Footnote:] If /Let/ Titius have ever so much money in his purse, you can not without committing an offence, so much as take or attempt to take any the smallest part of it.
  • Title: [26 Apr. 1805 Evidence Ch.1]
    Description: 26 Apr. 1805

    Evidence

    Ch.1 Ends

    '.3. Procedure branches

    Particular Ends

    Testator[?] is just dead, bequeathing /having bequeathed/ to you by his will, a certain horse now living /feeding/ in a field attached to his house, and having appointed Fiduciarius[?] Executor of such his will. To this horse you have a right, but of what sort? Not a compleat connsummate right; only an inchoate and as yet imperfect one. What you have an immediate right to is the sort of service on the part of Fiduciarius that will be rendered to you by delivering to you the horse, and thereby by enabling you to keep the horse in a field of yours and make such use of him as you may think fit. If without his having rendered to you that service, you were to attempt to take away the horse, he might under the protection of the law, as above make the same resistance to you, as if you were to attempt without his consent to take the value in money out of his purse.

    What you have moreover a right to is as before, in the event of his not having delivered over to you the horse before the point of time, before which in virtue of the law relative to Executorship he was /stood/ bound to render you that service, a corresponding service to be rendered to you, as above by the Judge. By Fiduciarius your inchoate right in relation to the horse might and should have been converted /turned/ /compleated/ into a consummate one; he failing, the same conversion may, and at your instance /demand/ Fiduciarius after due opportunity allowed[?] him having no sufficient[?] reason to allege to the contrary &[?] ought to be rendered to you by the Judge.
  • Title: [28 June 1804 Procedure 14]
    Description: 28 June 1804

    Procedure

    14 (8)

    Note

    Ends

    Ch.1

    '.3. Particular Main Ends

    Note to 10(b)

    (b) This third end, (it may be objected) is comprehended in the second: to exhibit it in the character of a distinct one, is therefore a violation of the rules of good logic.

    I answer - In jurisprudence the classificator not being, as in botany, chemistry, medicine and other branches of physical science, free to create his own terminology - his own stock of verbal signs, as the nature of the things signified, unfolds itself to view, but obliged to take up for the most part in great measure with the stock which usage has put into his hands, the scientific rules of logical division will in many cases be unavoidably to be sacrificed /made to give way/ to the established nomenclature.

    Accordingly In the case on the carpet, here it is, that the right to receive satisfaction is a right to receive a service of a particular kind at the hands of the Judge: an inchoate right, which like every other inchoate right, requires the hand of the Judge to give it effect and convert it into a consummate right: and that in this consideration, the end of procedure thus detached from the two others might have been included under the second.

    But this branch of the aggregate body of inchoate rights has this circumstance to distinguish it from all others /is distinguished from all others by this/: viz: that it presupposes the previous existence, and springs as it were out of the bosom, of receding injury: like the [...?] in the parable out of the lion's carcase, it is out of the strong /the offensive/ that the sweet cometh forth in this instance. The commission of the art by which some right - some consummate right /already consummate right/ - was violated - of the act by which by the prohibition put upon it by the appropriate substantive law has been converted into an offence, operates as the investitive event, conferring on the party injured the right to receive at the hands of the Judge tht sort of service by which when rendered, satisfaction for the injury will have been received by the party, administered by the Judge. A claim of satisfaction on the score of injury therefore neither of the nature of a penal suit only, and[?] of a non-penal suit only, but partakes of both.