date

26 April 1805 Evidence Ch.1
26 April 1805

Evidence

Ch.1. Ends

'.3. Procedure branches -

Particular Ends.

Another /You have a right to another/ sum of money, to equal value, is due to you by Titius. But to what is it that in this instance you have a right - understand an immediate right? not to any individual determinate individual piece of money whatsoever: not to a single one of whatever pieces of money that may happen at the present time (not to speak of other times) to be in the purse of Titius. What you have a right to, as yet, and in the first instance is neither more nor less than a right to receive a certain service, to be performed in your behalf /rendered to you/ by Titius: viz: the service consisting in the conferring on you, in relation to any individual pieces of money at his choice, so that /as/ the aggregate of them be of the value in question, the same sort of compleat consummate right which you possess already in relation to the money already in your purse.

What you have a right to is to return or employ as you might /may/ the money already in your purse, such money if any, as Titius in virtue of the service which by the supposition he is bound to render due, may in discharge of such an obligation, have enabled you to put into your purse.

What you have moreover a right to is, in the event of his not having as yet rendered to you any such service, it being understood that the point of time is already passed before which he was /stood/ bound to have rendered it, a correspondent service to be rendered to you by the Judge: viz a service consisting in the taking such arrangements as shall have the effect either of compelling Titius to render to you in relation to a number of pieces of money at his choice to the value in question, the service of collation above described, or, at the ultimate expence of Titius (viz: /for example/ by the seizure and sale of goods of his to that amount) causing some other person to render to you that service.

[Footnote:] If /Let/ Titius have ever so much money in his purse, you can not without committing an offence, so much as take or attempt to take any the smallest part of it.
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    Testator[?] is just dead, bequeathing /having bequeathed/ to you by his will, a certain horse now living /feeding/ in a field attached to his house, and having appointed Fiduciarius[?] Executor of such his will. To this horse you have a right, but of what sort? Not a compleat connsummate right; only an inchoate and as yet imperfect one. What you have an immediate right to is the sort of service on the part of Fiduciarius that will be rendered to you by delivering to you the horse, and thereby by enabling you to keep the horse in a field of yours and make such use of him as you may think fit. If without his having rendered to you that service, you were to attempt to take away the horse, he might under the protection of the law, as above make the same resistance to you, as if you were to attempt without his consent to take the value in money out of his purse.

    What you have moreover a right to is as before, in the event of his not having delivered over to you the horse before the point of time, before which in virtue of the law relative to Executorship he was /stood/ bound to render you that service, a corresponding service to be rendered to you, as above by the Judge. By Fiduciarius your inchoate right in relation to the horse might and should have been converted /turned/ /compleated/ into a consummate one; he failing, the same conversion may, and at your instance /demand/ Fiduciarius after due opportunity allowed[?] him having no sufficient[?] reason to allege to the contrary &[?] ought to be rendered to you by the Judge.
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    Description: 30[?] April 1805

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    '.3. Procedure its branches - Particular ends, branches of the general end.

    No sooner is the office of Judge established, than a new set of rights spring up, such as without him could not have come into existence.

    The money you have at this instant in your purse is yours: you have a compleat right to it. any person who without or against your consent, and without some special and extraordinary title, such as that derived from /constituted by/ a warrant from a Judge, should seize it and carry it off would committ an offence: he would have already committed an offence for /to/ which punishment and satisfaction are or at least ought to be, appointed by the law - by the substantive branch of the law. To prevent him, the law allows you to employ force: and if he can not be prevented otherwise, even such force (at least if the character in which he take it is that of a thief or robber, or[?] who accordingly /as such/ is conscious of his having no[?] right to take it) as shall terminate[?] in /be followed by/ his death /deprive him of life/.

    To this money you have already a right - to compleat an already consummated right, conferred on /created and allotted to/ you already by the substantive branch of the law; a right which for its completion requires not any act to be done by the Judge. Under the circumstances above described the taking the money away from you is already an offence, without requiring any act previously done by the Judge, or any body else to render it so.
  • Title: [11 Nov 1813 Jug Util or Articles]
    Description: 11 Nov 1813

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    1

    II

    Ch. Punishm t misseated or Atonement

    7

    §.1. Mis-seated

    Of whatsoever application is made of the matter of good, the use, the beneficent effect, and proper object and end in view is the good—i.e. either the pleasure or the example or the cause of either produced or likely to be produced in the breast of the person to whom it is applied. He it is who if application of it be made to him, is benefited and enjoys: he it is who, if application of it be not made to him, is prejudiced and suffers. To him therefore /accordingly/ it is due: he is the person to whom it is due. He, if the application of it not made to him, has just ground for complaint: wrong is done to him, injury is done to him: of the injury done to him the amount of the value of this good is the measure. Marginal note: ‘Justice, un-penal called civil justice requires that such application of it to him be made.’

    The cause why application of it ought to be made to him—this cause is it but being party to a compact in and by which a promise was made that application of it should be made to him?—it is then due to him by compact: it is due to him on the score of debt: of debt created by such compact.

    The compact in question is it of that particular sort in which in return for service rendered or to be rendered by him to Titius Titius engages to render to him endless service, say the sort of service which consists in putting him in possession of a certain sum of money? That service the performance of which was the object of the promise made by him being rendered, he has earned, he has deserved the money. The money he of course wishes to have: and according to the principle of utility, it is right and proper that he should have it: for he has deserved it: he has served for it: for it he has rendered such his service.