3

C

Of Falshoods in general

instrument were at the time at which they purport to

have been under as much signs of his ideas as of he himself had

made them: for instance that the individual A. B. who is now on

the 1st of Jan: 1780 is making the counterfeit writing as was on the 1st

Jan. 1770 the individual Y. Z. and that being so he did on the said

1st Jan. 1770 make those characters which in truth he is now making on the

1st of Jan. 1780. The averment respecting the act thus asserted to

have been done,

this averment, I say when coupled with the averment respecting

the personality, is that which narrows if to a short

and particular period period of time: viz the the

period of time falsely affected to have been occupied

in the making of the characters which are falsely asserted to

have been making at that time.

There is one circumstance that may make the propriety of the

account given of this analogy between forgery and personation appear

suspicious. This is that in the case of personation one is apt to

suppose there must be some little resemblence between the person

counterfeiting and the person he counterfeits in order to give the offence

a possibility of success. Whereas it is evident that forgery

may be committed and commonly is committed without any the

least constancy between those two persons. In

personation therefore
Similar Items
  • Title: [2 C Of falsehoods in general]
    Description: 2

    C

    Of falsehoods in general

    the fact which in the first instance is falsely around must be a particular

    kind of fact relative to the personality of a certain individual: in simple

    falshood it has as need to be any particular fact, but may

    be any fact whatsoever.

    The distinction between forgery and personation

    - between forgery and personation

    turns upon two points. In the

    personation the averment requesting this personally of the

    individual has reference to every period of his existence from his

    birth to the time of committing the offence inclusively. For instance that

    the individual who is now standing in such a spot of such a Court of

    Justice

    this day the 1st day of Jan y 1780 is

    the same individual who on the 1st

    day of Jan y 1750 was born of such a

    woman at such an hour minute and second of that day and consequently has

    been so during all the intermediate time. In forgery the

    respecting the personality of the individual has reference to only one

    very narrow and limited period of his existence: viz: that which has

    been

    taken up in making the characters which confirm the

    instrument in question, or what comes to the same thing in

    exhibiting those signs which are understood to direct his excusing it

    that is to declare that this sign confirmed in the instrument
  • Title: [4 C Diff Of Falshoods]
    Description: 4

    C

    Diff

    Of Falshoods in general

    therefore A.B.may affect himself to be Y.Z. without any absolute

    certainty of being detected improbability of succeeding. But in

    forgery it may be said this cannot be. The Forger A.B. has not the most

    distant resemblance to Y.Z. How then can he with any possibility of success

    represent himself as being the same person with Y.Z. More than that, the

    act of forgery is

    day on which the

    characters are actually is the 1st of Jan y 1780. In avers the day on

    which they are making whereas the day on which he avers

    them to have been making is the 1st

    of Jan y1770. How thencan he

    with any possibility of not being detected assert that

    he is the same person with another man whom he has not the least

    resemblence to, and whose for person may be as well known

    to them to whom he is making the declaration as any mans person can be:

    and how can he with any possibility of not being detected assert that the

    1st day of Jan y 1770 is the same day with the

    1st day of Jan y 1780

    The case is that at the time the forger A.B. is averring himself to be the

    person Y.Z. neither he not Y.Z. are seen. No person

    at all is seen doing the act, it is not seen who the act belonged to:

    the act itself is not seen. The person by whom

    really the act

    is really doing, can not at the

    juncture of time at which he is doing it be

    made to undergo that comparison with the person by whom

    it is falsely asserted to have been done, by

    which it would appear that they are two different

    persons. All that is seen is the characters

    which
  • Title: [1818 Aug. 28. Parl. Reform Bill]
    Description: 1818 Aug. 28.

    Parl. Reform Bill

    Text Note ult o

    ยง.14. Penal Securities

    8

    {In the one case the misdeed can not have place without the existence of a correspondent and strong desire: in the other case it may have existence without any such desire.

    In the case of forgery, fraudulent personation and perjury this distinction is observed in practice: for without persuasion of the existence of the consciousness in question /this evil/ no man would concurr in /give his concurrence to/ a conviction: in the case of forgery and personation it is implied; in the case of perjury it is, to wit by the word wilful directly asserted in direct terms. But with these exceptions, the disregard paid to it is general: the consequence is that while many a man who ought to suffer is exempted, many a man who ought not to suffer suffers.}

    {For this distinction pregnant as it is with such important consequences, the demand runs through the whole field of penal law. Generally speaking, the eyes of the lawyers of the Roman School have been open to it, generally speaking the eyes of the lawyers of the English School have been closed /shut against/ blind to it: and to this blindness may be traced many of those enormities /atrocities/ with which all eyes that are not closed by sinister interest interest-begotten prejudice, authority-begotten prejudice or indigenous weakness, are afflicted.}