JB_084_060.xml

Title: [[lxxxiv. 60] 1821 Decr 15 Codification]

Description: [lxxxiv. 60]

1821 Decr 15

Codification Proposal

20

Appendix

Lawyers interest

Judges [...?]

In the one case it is the body, that is at the /every man's/ service of every man who will pay for it: in the other case it is the mind. But the injury to the mind /nobler part/ is in the one case much more definable [?] /determinate/ and certain than the injury to the body in the other

Thus stands the matter under the existing systems of law: systems under the least bad of which not the greatest happiness of the greatest number exclusively but the greatest happiness of the ruling few either exclusively or at any rate preferably have been the objects aimed at and pursued.

Under a system of law which shall have for its object the greatest happiness of the greatest number, it will be no more necessary or useful to resort for Judges to the order of Advocate for Judges, than to resort to the order of Courtezans /public women/ for wives. all©comprehensive and rationalized Code such as that in question being supposed established nothing would be more easy than to secure for that function /situation/ in every situation adequate appropriate aptitude in all its branches nothing would be easier than to place the particular interest of every man in that situation in a state of perfect coincidence with the universal interest, to prevent him from ever yielding to the suggestion of sinister interest. The same principle © the principle of effectual individual responsibility by which the claim [?] of [?] a single hand for the composition of the original draught of an all comprehensive and rationalized Code in preference to a greater number of hands applies to the situation of Judge in every Judicatory and to that of the /the/ head of the judicial department by whom the choice of the several individuals for the filling of that office is /shall/ made. in this way is provision made for appropriate intellectual aptitude and active talent in those several situations: for appropriate moral aptitude, singleness in the situation and thence individual responsibility, publicity of the proceedings carried to the highest pitch, and power given to the Citizens by whom the members of the legislative are placed and at frequently recurring periods made displaceable to exercise in this instance at pleasure [?] the power of displacing though without the power of placing added to it.. [...?] is the Minister of Justice to place in any other judicial district any such displaced Judge.

JB_084_153.xml

Title: [ÁÁ[lxxxiv. 153] 1822 Feb. 6]

Description: ÁÁ[lxxxiv. 153]

1822 Feb. 6

Codification Offer.

Appendix or Separate

??5 Admission Universal

Members unapt

Development

The sinister propensity has been brought to view: in every human this propensity has [...?]: in every human breast subject or not to exceptions which do not vary the result, it is irresistible

The case is that if the greatest happiness principle be admitted as the determining principle in comparison of an individual not possessing any share in the operative power of government, an individual possessing any such share, is as such, in a state of comparative /relative/ inaptitude with reference to the exercise of the function by which the original draught of the body of law in question would be composed /prepared/.

The following are the considerations on which a demonstration of the truth /the proof/ of this position may perhaps be seen given /found demonstrated/.

1. In every human breast, in the ordinary course of affairs self©regard is predominant: self©regarding affection, as well as social and dissocial

2 As in every other human breast, so in the breast of every individual bearing any part in the possession or exercise of any of the powers of which government is composed.

3. In every political community every member of the ruling few has two distinguishable interests © his share in the universal interest, and his own separate, particular and personal interest.

4. In so far as its action is in opposition to that of /in a direction opposite to that of/ the universal interest, every particular interest may with propriety be stiled a sinister interest.

5 Every interest belonging to a ruler as such, /To every ruler as such belongs/ and not coinciding exactly with his share in the universal interest is /may be termed/ a sinister interest.

6. If this is not good in the character of a universal rule at least is it in the character of a general one, and on all occasions unless in so far as a particular and adequate cause of exception can be shewn, it is by the greater number of instances not by the lesser that human conduct ought to be guided

JB_113_121v.xml

Title: [1821 June 10 Codification Offer]

Description: 1821 June 10

Codification Offer

'.7/8/. Foreigner why

On this occasion several circumstances there are which while they belong

essentially to the case, may be more or less in danger of being let slip out of

mens minds.

1.One is - the nature of the Constitution under which alone for an offer of this

sort any expectation of acceptance can reasonably be entertained: namely a

Constitution under which while the greatest happiness of the greatest number is

the all comprehensive and exclusively acknowledged end of it if in the election

of their operative rulers, the greatest number of the members of the whole

community have it in their power, by their suffrages on the occasion of each

election of their operative rulers to give or refuse to give effectual duration

to the several arrangements comprehended in the Code. Under such a Constitution,

Only on the supposition that, if penned in the first instance by a foreigner,

the draught would, after its revisal and completion, be approved by the majority

of such their Constituents, could allow the whole body of Representatives, or

any Committee of that body, find any adequate motive for committing the

preparation of the first draught to any such necessarily and universally

suspected hand.

Thus the matter stands in the case of a Government having for its object the

greatest good of the greatest number and consequently for its operative rulers a

set of persons chosen by that greatest number. Very different it is true is the

manner in which it stands in the case of a government having for its operative

ruler a Monarch, and consequently for its end in view the particular and then

sinister interest of that one individual. Under a Monarch the choice of a

Draughtsman would not be subjected with any such restrictions. The circumstance

on which the Code will in that case depend, as well for its permanence as for

its original establishment being - not the will of the greatest number,

depending as of course upon their conception of their interest, but the will of

the Monarch for the time being depending, as of course, upon his conception of

his interest, his faculty of choice is accordingly unbounded: and a foreigner,

by whose draught not only original acceptance, but unlimited permanence, might

be framed with as little difficulty as a native. As to any difference in respect

of approbation or disapprobation on the part of the members of the community,

call in this case not citizens but subjects, it is a circumstance foreign to the

case. Assured that their will would be without influence on the texture of the

laws, they will spare themselves the trouble of applying it.