date

13 March 1808 Letter V §.6
13 March 1808

Letter V

§.6. Reasons

Ends of Justice

But the functions of the substantive branch being distinguishable into three principal divisions - giving indications of the cases in which rights shall be considered as created and possessed, and satisfaction as for correspondent wrong shall eventually be administered - of the cause[?] in which, at the requisition of a party, rights shall be conferred on him by the Judge - and of those in which at the instance of a proper person, punishment, for the more effectual prevention of wrongs shall be administered, the one object just mentioned as constituting the main end of the system of procedure will admitt of three correspondent divisions: from which result three specific or more particular ends - and all of them equally direct - 1. administration of satisfaction where due: 2. collation of rights (to be conferred by the Judge) where due: and administration of punishment where due.

These being proper ends of the system of procedure, judicial procedure may with equal propriety be termed proper ends of judicature: and these appear to be of the number of those ends which are commonly in view on the part of those who speak under the appellation of ends of justice.

To the results correspondent and opposite to the results designated by these ends, viz. non-administration of satisfaction where due - non-collation of rights where due, and non-administration of punishment where due, no one, it is supposed, will refuse the appellation of evils - injustice or modification of injustice - acts of injustice - evils opposite and correspondent to those several ends of justice.
Similar Items
  • Title: [13 March 1808 Letter V §.6]
    Description: 13 March 1808

    Letter V

    §.6. Reasons

    Ends of Justice

    Sufficient of every one fit to be executed

    (On this occasion two suppositions are all along implicitly involved, that the legislator himself be the lawful legislator, and that whatsoever he ordains to be done, is fit to be done and ought to be done. For the purpose of all investigations relative to the ends of judicature these points must be considered as already settled: on any other supposition the inquiry, by what means execution and effect may to the best advantage be given to those ordinances, would be a vain and useless one.

    (Non administration of satisfaction (as for wrong) where due - non-collation of rights where due - non-administration of punishment, where due - in the several modes of conduct thus described may be seen so many modes of wrongdoing, so many modifications of injustice, on the part of the Judge. To the results thus produced, the denomination of evils can not, consistently with the necessary supposition just mentioned, be refused: nor to any acts by which they have been produced, the determination of acts of in-justice.)

    From what has been said it appears - that the adjective branch of the law - the system of procedure has a proper and direct end belonging to it - viz. the giving execution and effect to the ordinances established by the main or substantive branch:

    - that the functions of the substantive branch being distinguishable as above into three divisions making regulations concerning the collation of rights, viz. 1. administration of satisfaction in relation to the corresponent wrongs in case of wrong. 2. making regulations concerning the collation of rights, where to render them compleat they require the intervention of the Judge:-

    /1 - giving indication of/

    /1 - describing the cases/
  • Title: [15 March 1808 Letter V §.6]
    Description: 15 March 1808

    Letter V

    §.6. Reasons

    Ends of Justice

    Here then we have nine ends of judicature and judicial procedure, in three knots, with three articles in each knot: the first knot composed of three positive ends; the two others, each of them of three negative. To compare them together we must proceed as arithmeticians do in some cases, and give to all a common shape or denomination; and that a negative one: consider as constituted by so many opposite and correspondent evils not only the two knots of negative ends, but the component articles in the knot of positive ends: designations accordingly, these last by the appellation of ends having for their correspondent and opposite evils, non-administration of satisfaction where due, non-collation of rights where due, non-administration of punishment where due.

    This much being promised, now comes the practical use to be made of it in the way of application.

    Looking at the evils correspondent and opposite to the direct and positive ends of justice viz. non-administration of satisfaction where due, non-collation of rights where due, and non-administration of punishment where due, we shall see, that of the two sides of which (except in the rare instances in which the Judge acts of his own motive) in every suit at law are to be found, viz. the plaintiff's and the defendant's, the plaintiff's is the only one to the prejudice of which the evils belonging to this knot can operate.
  • Title: [15 March 1808 Injustice is an appellative]
    Description: 15 March 1808

    Injustice is an appellative, the application of which is not confined to either side. But, in practice, the application of it does not seem alike divided and determinate in regard to every one of the nine articles contained in the above list of evils correspondent and opposite to the so often mentioned ends.

    In the case of those evils the seat of which is confined to the defendant's side, there is no room for doubt. That to the prejudice of him on whom undue obligations are imposed, in whatsoever nature those obligations may be, and on whatsoever score imposed, viz. punishment (the punishment being undue) satisfaction, as for wrong unduly administered to the benefit of a party stationed on the plaintiff's side, or unduly made collation of rights in favour of a party on that same side - but in any of these uses injustice has place as often as to the prejudice of an individual on the defendant's side undue obligations are imposed, are propositions the propriety of which does seem in any degree exposed to dispute.

    In the same case seems to be the propriety of the appellation when applied to two at least of the three evils correspondent and opposite to the nine direct ends of judicature: viz. non-administration of satisfaction when due, and non-collation of rights when due.