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15 March 1808
Letter
§.6. Reasons
Ends of Justice
[...?] this attached to both sides destructive[?] when delay is advantagious
hinted at but posted[?] off.
Looking in like manner at the evils correspondent to the first mentioned of the two groupes of negative ends of judicial procedure, viz. imposition of undue obligations corresponding and inseparably produced by administration of satisfaction where undue, imposition of undue obligations corresponding to and produced by collation of rights where undue, and imposition of undue obligations whether in the active or in the passive faculties of the individual on the score and in the name of punishment, we shall find, that the only side to the prejudice of which any article in the knot of evils correspondent to this groupe of negative ends of judicature can operate.
Looking in like manner on the evils correspondent to the last mentioned of the two groupes of negative ends, viz: vexation, expence, and delay, we shall find them not only overhanging the course of judicial procedure throughout its whole extent but throughout that whole extent inflicting its pressure upon the parties on both sides of that course.
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Title: [14 March 1808 Letter V §.6]Description: 14 March 1808 Letter V §.6. Reasons Ends of Justice 1. These[?] evils 2. The [...?] evils[?] which are the causes of [...?] Thus far the ends of justice admitt of being designated, and may with most simplicity, and therefore with most propriety, be designated by appellatives of a positive cast. Thus far, but not one step further: for to the best of these ends no further addition can be made, otherwise than by reversing the logical form of the appellative, and to the positive form above brought to view substituting throughout a negative. Evils there are, and in too great [an] extent and abundance, to which the course of Judicial procedure is in every instance liable to give birth. 1. When a benefit to an individual in the character of plaintiff is administered in the character of satisfaction, viz. as for wrong, is not due to him - whether because no wrong did on the occasion in question take place, or the individual on whom, by the Judge, it was charged, was unduly charged, with it, here, instead of satisfaction administered where due, see the power of the Judge employed in the imposition of obligations, burthensome obligations, unduly imposed on the individual at whose charge the benefit administered in the name of satisfaction was administered and enforced. 2. When the judicial service whereby the right which at the instance of a plaintiff was conferred on him by the Judge, was not due, has instead of collation of right where due, or as the power of the Judge employed as before in the imposition of obligations, unduly imposed, on the individual at whose charge and to whose loss, the benefit unduly bestowed on the plaintiff under the notion of his having a right thus to reason it was bestowed.
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Title: [23 Mar 1808 Ends of Justice]Description: 23 Mar 1808 Ends of Justice To match with these, the first parcel I found of ends of a necessarily negative description were - general end, avoidance of injustice to the prejudice of the defendant's side: particular ends, immediate ramifications[?] of the above general one - Imposition of such undue obligations by /viz. of such by the imposition of/ which if due satisfaction for wrong would have been administered to the plaintiffs 2. Imposition of such undue obligations by the imposition of which at the instance of the /a/ plaintiff punishment would have been administered, would have been inflicted on the defendant. Next to these, but in a line with /still in the same line with/ these were - evils, vexation, expence and delay; ends avoidance of superfluous vexation, avoidance of superfluous expence, avoidance of superfluous delay /expence and delay respectively/; evils, linked it /together/ as one[?] in the most intimate /by the closest bonds of/ connection, but not the less distinguishable. Here then were nine ends of justice well told, all of them in a negative dress, and all /none/ but the three first not susceptible of any other.
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Title: [10 March 1808 Letter V '.6]Description: 10 March 1808 Letter V '.6 [...?] Ends of Justice II. Ends correspondent and opposite to the /which/ ultimate collateral ends of justice /are correspondent and opposite/. 4. Imposition of burthensome obligations corresponding to and imposed by the administration of satisfaction, in so far as undue[?] [...?] by the administration of satisfaction as for wrong when no /[...?]/ wrong has been committed, or as the charges of some individual in the character of a defendant, on whom[?] whether by reason of his having had no part in the commission of the wrong, or on some other account, no such burthen ought to have ben imposed. 5. Imposition of burthensome obligation corresponding to and imposed by collation of rights, when undue: for instance by the act of a Judge [...?] by whom a [...?] who had no right has been admitted to a [...?] of /in/ the effects of a bankrupt or [...?] institute[?] to the prejudice of the several persons having right, and who[?] thereby are obliged to submitt to a correspondent less. 6. Administration of punishment when undue: viz. in the sum[?] of imputed delinquency: of delinquency, in some shape or other imputed to the defendant. In the Table of Offences, as above. Of these evils it can not with proposity[?] be said that they are correspondent and opposite to the direct ends of justice; at least not to the direct ends of judicature: for, whatsoever in other respects might in the consequences failed[?] as these consequences would be to [...?] society, still of the particular ends now in question, the avoidance and prevention might much more [...?] and compleatly be provided for by the abolition then by the continuance of the objectives of judicature.
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