date

23 April 1808 Reasons for the Work
23 April 1808

Reasons for the Work

A. Note the distinction between the import of the term ground of demand, when employed to denote the text of law in the abstract without designation of the particular contents, and the import of the same term, where employed to denote some particular ground of demand, viz. the collative event &c, consti[?] - established in that character by that same portion of law.

Where the terms, collative or ablative event &c., are employed, observe always what the right is with reference to which the event is collative or ablative: whether a right exercisible at large, i.e. without application to the Judge, or a right merely to a particular judicial service to be rendered by the Judge. Upon this distinction turns the difference between the case where a man has a right to an individual thing, such as a house[?], a house &c, without need of making application to the Judge, and the case where the right he has is nothing more than a right to demand, at the hands of the Judge, a certain service: for example, the conferring on him a right of the above description: say, in the first case, an absolute or exercisible right; in the other case, a judiciary right.

The right a man has to a sum of money owing to him is never in any other state than that of a judiciary right as above described.
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  • Title: [28 April 1808 §.4. I. Reasons]
    Description: 28 April 1808

    §.4.

    I. Reasons for the Work

    §.4. Demand the sole instrument

    3. True it is, that forasmuch as it may happen to the effect of the collative incident or state of things of which the positive part of the demandants efficient cause of right is composed, to be defeated by the existence of some ablative event, so may it to the effect of such ablative incident or state of things, to be defeated by some other incident or state of things, the effect of which on that account may with relation to the collative or investitive incident in question be termed re-investitive: and so on indefinitely, through a chain of opposite and alternating incidents of any length.

    4. But of such reinvestitive incident the possible existence, as it might be, so it ought to be, foreseen and provided for in and by the instrument of demand, and the designation of it subjoined to the designation of the ablative incident to which it applies: the ablative incident (it may be said) has not had place unless accompanied or followed by the reinvestive incident by which the ablative effect of it is destroyed.

    5. In fact, whether in the case supposed, any separate mention need be made of any distant incident in the character of a re-investitive incident, will frequently depend upon the structure of the language, and upon the words employed accordingly for the designation of the collative incident, so that according to the mode of designation pursued, the re-investitive incident may either be brought forward in the first instance, or kept back till the ablative incident makes its appearance, and then subjoined to it, and as it were placed behind it.
  • Title: [22 April 1808 J.B. to H. of Commons]
    Description: 22 April 1808

    J.B. to H. of Commons

    Reasons for the Work

    The demand is incompleat unless it staes ground of demand in[?] [...?] [...?] the service demanded, grounds of demand or right viz. existence of some collative event, non-existence it its ablative one.

    Universally then, be the sort of right what it may, under Statute law every man is, at any given point of time, in possession of such right, in whose favour an event, or state of things, has antecedently to that point of time taken place, to which such portion of law has given the effect of conferring on him that right, and which, neither at that same point of time nor at any subsequent point of time, has any event or state of things had place, to which the same or any other portion of law has had the effect of divesting him of that same right.

    A benefit of any kind can not, in the shape of a right, be conferred on any person, in the character of a plaintiff or demandant, but a correspondent burthen, in the shape of an obligation, must at the same time be imposed upon at least one other person, viz. in the case of a suit at law, in the character of a defendant.

    Accordingly To warrant the Judge, therefore, in acceding to any such juridicial demand, it is not sufficient to him to know what that demand is - what the service is which is thus demanded at his hands; it is necessary also that he understand what are the grounds of that demand: and to be satisfied that such demand is properly and sufficiently grounded in point of fact, as well as in point of law: and accordingly that, in favour of the individual appearing in the character of plaintiff, or in favour of a class of persons of which the individual plaintiff is one, an individual event or state of things to which in favour of such individual or such class the portion of law referred to has given the effect of a collative event, or state of things with reference to the species of right in question, has taken place, since which no individual event or state of things has taken place, in which that same, or any other portion of law, has given the effect of an ablative or divestitive event or state of things with relation to that same right.
  • Title: [22 April 1808 J.B. to H. of Commons]
    Description: 22 April 1808

    J.B. to H. of Commons

    Reasons for the Work

    When in and by any such portion of statute law, a right is given to a person of this or that description in the character of a plaintiff, to a service of this or that description, at the charge of a person of this or that description in the character of defendant, to be rendered by the Judge, on demand so made by the plaintiff in such case to the creating and conferring of such right, it is not sufficient that a description be given of the nature of the service; a description must moreover be given of the case in which, in the character of the plaintiff, a person of the description in question possesses that right - has a right, or title, to demand such service. This description is no otherwise to be given than by the designation of the [sort of event or] state of things, or combination of circumstances, by which as often as it has place any person at large or any person of the particular description of persons in question, is caused to possess, is put in possession of that right.

    It will in cases to a very small extent, if any, happen, but that notwithstanding a man in virtue and consequence of some such event or state of things, as is above spoken of, would all other events and states of things out of the question be in possession, be in possession of this or that right, of the nature as above described, a right to demand a service to this or that effect at the hands of the Judge, yet on the supposition of, the taking place of, some other assignable event or state of things, he will not be in possession of such right. Hence to give a universally applicable description of the case of him who is in possession of a right of the description in question, or indeed any right, recourse must be had to some such terms as collative, in some cases, or investitive on the one part, and the corresponding and opposite terms, ablative, in some cases, or divestitive, on the other: the effect of one sort of event, or state of things, being to confer on a man the right in question, in other words to invest him with it: "the effect of another sort of[?] event, or state of things, being to take away from him the right so confirmed, to divest him of it: