date

28 April 1808 J.B. to H. of Commons
28 April 1808

J.B. to H. of Commons/Evidence/

§.3.

I. Reasons for the Work

§.3. demand includes Defence

A burthen which a man /Damon[?]/ ought to be permitted to decline bringing upon himself, by his evidence, another man /Pythius[?]/ ought to be permitted to decline bringing upon him (Damon) by his (Pythius's) evidence! - Why? - For the same reason that every other man ought: and not only permitted but compelled.

A burthen which Damon ought not to be permitted to decline bringing upon himself by his evidence, Pythius ought not [be] permitted to decline bringing upon him by his (Pythius's) evidence. - Why? - For the reason above assigned: because if Damon were a murderer or an incendiary, and Pythius the only person capable of giving evidence of the crime, Pythius would, if thus excused, have the power of pardoning him.

2. If the judgment of the demandant himself, his right to the service demanded, is not compleat, which it can not be unless his efficient cause as above described be compleat, much less can it be so, or so much as appear likely to be proved to be so, in the belief of the Judge, of whom the service is demanded. What may very well happen, and what commonly enough does happen, is -that the demandant, the plaintiff, has not any such compleat information, nor consequently any such strong belief or persuasion concerning the negative part of his title (the efficient cause of his supposed right) as if concerning the positive: but unless both parts be included in his belief, he does not himself believe himself his supposed right to have a compleat efficient cause:- he does not believe himself to have a right.
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  • Title: [28 April 1808 J.B. to H. of Commons]
    Description: 28 April 1808

    J.B. to H. of Commons

    §.3

    I. Reasons for the Work

    §.3. Demand includes Defence

    §.2. In the instrument of demand ought to be included, viz. in the way of designation, a designation of all possible grounds or efficient causes of defence.

    1. To the service demanded at the charge of the Defendant the demandant (as per §.1. art. 10) can not have a just right, unless to his supposed right to such service there be a sufficient, and thence a compleat efficient cause. But (per §.1. art. │ │) such efficient cause can not be compleat, unless both its necessary parts be comprized in it; viz. not only the positive, but the negative.
  • Title: [28 April 1808 §.2. I. Reasons]
    Description: 28 April 1808

    §.2.

    I. Reasons for the Work

    §.2. State Ground of Demand.

    9. To a person making application in the character of demandant (or say plaintiff) no such judicial service can ever be rendered by a Judge, but at the charge of some other person, who, in so far as he either seeks to exempt himself from such burthen, or, is considered as about to be so, becomes subjected to it, is termed a defendant.

    10. On no man ought any burthen to be imposed by a Judge without sufficient reason: i.e. unless to the judicial service by which such burthen would be imposed on the Defendant the demandant has a just right, which he can not have unless his assumed right has a legally sufficient efficient cause.
  • Title: [22 April 1808 J.B. to H. of Commons]
    Description: 22 April 1808

    J.B. to H. of Commons

    Reasons for the Work

    The demand is incompleat unless it staes ground of demand in[?] [...?] [...?] the service demanded, grounds of demand or right viz. existence of some collative event, non-existence it its ablative one.

    Universally then, be the sort of right what it may, under Statute law every man is, at any given point of time, in possession of such right, in whose favour an event, or state of things, has antecedently to that point of time taken place, to which such portion of law has given the effect of conferring on him that right, and which, neither at that same point of time nor at any subsequent point of time, has any event or state of things had place, to which the same or any other portion of law has had the effect of divesting him of that same right.

    A benefit of any kind can not, in the shape of a right, be conferred on any person, in the character of a plaintiff or demandant, but a correspondent burthen, in the shape of an obligation, must at the same time be imposed upon at least one other person, viz. in the case of a suit at law, in the character of a defendant.

    Accordingly To warrant the Judge, therefore, in acceding to any such juridicial demand, it is not sufficient to him to know what that demand is - what the service is which is thus demanded at his hands; it is necessary also that he understand what are the grounds of that demand: and to be satisfied that such demand is properly and sufficiently grounded in point of fact, as well as in point of law: and accordingly that, in favour of the individual appearing in the character of plaintiff, or in favour of a class of persons of which the individual plaintiff is one, an individual event or state of things to which in favour of such individual or such class the portion of law referred to has given the effect of a collative event, or state of things with reference to the species of right in question, has taken place, since which no individual event or state of things has taken place, in which that same, or any other portion of law, has given the effect of an ablative or divestitive event or state of things with relation to that same right.