date

[lxxxiv. 9] 1821 Nov. 24. Codification
[lxxxiv. 9]

1821 Nov. 24.

Codification Proposal

10

?.5. Draughtsman Single

/Appendix/

Lawyers have double sinister interest: 1 as Lawyers, 2 as members of the Aristocracy; connected with the others.

One sinister interest there is, which is common to all countries and sure to have place in a body of this sort. This is the interest of the Lawyer class. It is their interest that the number of suits be as great as possible: it is their interest that the expensiveness of each suit be as great as possible. It is their interest that their influence in the event of each suit be as great as possible. That the number of suits may be as great as possible it is their interest that the purport of the law taken © the whole together be as little known as possible: that, to this end, over the greatest portion possible of the fields of law & judicial decision, no real law shall have place: and that the place of it be in each man's mind be supplied by an Article of imaginary law, composed of a conjecture, what, in case of litigation, the decision of the Judge will be: the Judge being, by the non©existence of real law, left at liberty to feign the existence of an imaginary law, framed by him on each occasion: feigned by him for the purpose of affording a warrant, for whatever decision happens to be best©suited to his purpose. It is their interest, that to this same end what patches there are of real law stuck upon the all©comprehensive ground of imaginary law may separately taken be expressed in words and phrases, as obscure and ambiguous as possible and in the whole together in masses as enlarged and confused [?] as possible.

To the same end it is their interest that the terms in which expression is given to that portion of the rule of action which is in the state of imaginary law, and thence to that which is in the state of real law should in as large a proportion as possible be either word of their own fabricating to which no idea can be annexed by those whose lot they dispose of, or of words in common use to which in their discourses they attach a meaning different from that which is attached to them in common use: in such sort that whoso attaches to them the meaning in common use and conducts himself accordingly, may fall into the snare /be deceived/, and be involved in litigation
Similar Items
  • Title: [21 Apr. 1808 Letter V Ch. Appeals]
    Description: 21 Apr. 1808

    Letter V

    Ch. Appeals

    There are ways in which on the [...?] of justice, it is desirable that in this stage as in the /every/ anterior stage, suits at law, termed in the aggregate litigation, [...?] be prevented, and to the [...?] extent possible.

    1. In so far as the suit has an [...?] [...?] for the cause, the uncertainty of the law /rule of action/ giving to it /providing it with/ a determinate form of words, for the expression of it, if as yet it has no such receptacle, [...?] reducing /transmuting/ it from out of the form of jurisprudence law imaginary law rule[?] statutory, the only real law: or if already it be in the form of real law and substituting to the ambiguous or obscure expressions in which the uncertainty has its seat[?], such as shall be clear and determinate /unambiguous/.

    2. In so far as the uncertainty has for its seat the question of fact, doing what depends on the legislator, and that[?] without Imprudence [...?] in other stages can be done towards giving notoreity to all such facts /matter of fact/ as an [...?] and fitted by their nature to [...?] as grounds either for individual demand or juridicial defences: ex [...?] [...?] the fact of his having entered into a contract to this new[?] effect of a mans having committed an offence if there is that description and so forth.

    3. In so far as the suit has in the stage in question [...?] that of appeal has for its cause any failure[?] if incompleted - in the case of the Judges want of appropriate harmony, want of intellectual skill discernment, want of the faculty of decision, want of [...?] /want of propriety[?]/, taking such measures as the nature of the case admitts of for as for instance of each Judge the marks[?] of the sword[?] [...?] thus desirable on the part of every Judge: partly by provisions[?] respecting the choice to be [...?] of [...?] for this office, partly by the application of by means of such apt space[?], guides and [...?] as the nature of the case admits of.
  • Title: [[lxxxiv. 45] 1821 Decr 14 Codification]
    Description: [lxxxiv. 45]

    1821 Decr 14

    Codification Proposal

    20

    Appendix

    Lawyers interest

    Interest of the greatest number in respect of the number of causes or suits at law

    In respect of the number of causes or suits at law, it is the interest of the greatest number of the community in regard to suits between individual and individual for redress of /remedy to/ wrongs by individual to individual, it is the interest of the greatest number of individuals /what the public interest requires, is,/ that the number of such wrongs committed should be as small as possible and that from this cause the number of suits should be as small as possible. But, the number of wrongs actually committed being given, it is their interest /what it requires is/ that the number of suits instituted should in case of refusal of redress by the wrongdoer, the wrong doer having it in his power to afford redress that is to say of such as are at once [?] just and necessary civil suits, be as great as possible.: on the other hand /side/ it is their interest /what is requires is/ that in those cases in which the wrongdoer has it in his power to afford redress, the number of suits continued by his Defence in a word unjust civil defences be as small as possible: and this not only in the case of those who are without considerable injury /suffering/ able to endorse /defray/ the expence /demand [?]/ of pursuit and defence, as in the case of those who are not: in the case of solvent as well as in that of non solvent litigants,

    [...?] /Next/ As to this same matter see what the The interest of the lawyer class requires, it is this, That of the suits which /in so far as/ on either side /will/ are capable of /out of the expence there exists a capacity of/ affording lawyers profit, be as great as possible: and that of those which are not capable of affording /would not afford/ lawyers profit the number be as small as possible.

    That accordingly for maximising /heightening/ the number of suits the aggregate number of wrongs committed be in the aggregate as great as possible: and thus that the number of suits which are on the plaintifs side just and necessary be as large as possible. that so among them the number of those which are capable of affording lawyers profit be as great as possible.
  • Title: [[lxxxiv. 66] 1821 Decr 16 Codification]
    Description: [lxxxiv. 66]

    1821 Decr 16

    Codification Proposal

    20

    Appendix

    Lawyer's interest

    To this same purpose that which Lawyers interest further requires, is, that so far as shall be consistent with a general opinion in affirmance of the aptitude of Judges, moral and intellectual together, not only the language employed by them should be as inapposite as possible, but the decisions pronounced by them should be as repugnant to the interest of the greatest number in respect of justice /as possible to common sense/. As The whole texture of the spurious kind of law in question being /consisting /consists/ of/ a series of inferences pretended to be drawn from the consideration of what decision may on each occasion be most contributory to the greatest happiness of the greatest, the consequence is © that the greater the degree in which they have actually been contributory to that end, the easier would it be for the subject citizen to reach them by conjectures founded /grounded/ on that supposition: and thus by forming a right anticipation of the eventually future decision in his case regulate his conduct accordingly, and give effect to his just rights or save himself from the burthen of undue obligations as the case may be. But the better©grounded and safer all such anticipation were by experience found to be, not only in case of litigation the less frequently would the burthens fall on him who has justice on his side, but the less need would there be for the subject©citizen to resort to the professional lawyer for the anticipations belonging to the case, instead of framing them himself: whereas suppose it universally established that by no such process has a man any chance of framing a right anticipation, the consequence is that on every occasion on which a suit at law may eventually be necessary, every man who has wherewithal to purchase the advice of a professional adviser will purchase it accordingly.