date

[lxxxiv. 13] 1821 Decr. 4 Codification
[lxxxiv. 13]

1821 Decr. 4

Codification Proposal

penult

?.5. Draughtsman Single

/Appendix?/

The influence of these several causes of inaptitude in diminution of the aggregate of appropriate aptitude on the part of the [...?], /author of the sort of draught in question,/ will be more or less different according to the situation occupied by him with reference to the power [?] of government.: He may invested with power or not: If he be not, his situation is that of a subordinate servile [?], acting under the direction and in subjection to the will of the person or persons on whose ultimate pleasure /ordainment [?]/ the maker of the draught will depend. If he be /his situation be that of one/ invested with power, the event in question being the result of the exercise of sovereign power, his power and thence his situation in respect of power will be different according as the government is that of a Monarchy, or that of a Commonwealth

If it be a Monarchy his situation may be that of the Monarch © the ruling one, or that of a Member of the subordinately ruling few.

If it be a Commonwealth his situation will be that of a Member of the supremely ruling few

If the Commonwealth be a Representative Democracy, the supreme power is /stands/ [...?] divided into two branches: the ”operative• and the ”constitutive•; the constitutive is such with reference to those by whom the supreme operative power is possessed and exercised: it consists in the placing and displacing or replacing those by whom that same supremely operative power is possessed and exercised: if the Commonwealth be a pure Aristocracy, these two branches of supreme power are possessed and exercised by the same hands.
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  • Title: [[lxxxiv. 14 1821 Decr 4 Codification]
    Description: [lxxxiv. 14

    1821 Decr 4

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    ?.5 Draughtsman Single

    A Monarch may without difficulty be conceived capable of officiating in the character of draughtsman of such a draught. A man with wings is as easily conceivable as a man without wings.

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    Description: 1823 Feb. 12.

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