date

[lxxxiv. 147] 1822 Feb. 6 Codification
[lxxxiv. 147]

1822 Feb. 6

Codification Offer

Appendix 4¼o or Separate

?.5. Admission Universal

Members Unapt

Development

In a settled /Except in a rare and shortlived/ state of things, under no form of government that of the Anglo©American United States excepted, or one not essentially different from it, is it possible that by the aggregate power of the body on whom the sanctionment of the work in question depends the greatest happiness of the greatest number should be the object to the attainment of which the exercise of that power will have been directed, they are sure to be /to a certainty/ under the dominion of a particular and sinister interest: to the force of this sinister interest this open mode of legislation is /will act as/ the most efficient and indispensable bridle.

Towards the directing the rule of action towards that exclusively justifiable end what is possible is that under /in/ a favorable conjuncture a body of law having for its end in view that same object may by means of this open system be presented to the universal notice of the greatest number /whole people/: in which case, those among whom the power of legislation is shared may, by fear of the ill opinion and resentment of the greatest number be engaged to adopt such universally beneficial measures, as if left to themselves no one of them would have originated.

The favorable conjuncture in question is this.© When, after a long course of misrule under a government having for its object the greatest happiness of a ruling one, or a ruling few, or a mixt body composed of the ruling one with a coordinately or subordinately ruling few a new set of men by means of the support given to them or expected to be given to them by the great body of the subject many, have come into possession of the aggregate powers of government: exercising them at the same time in

such
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