date

[lxxxiv. 157] 1822 Feb. 6 Codification
[lxxxiv. 157]

1822 Feb. 6

Codification Offer.

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Of the sinister sacrifice the chief instruments may stand expressed in these four words © namely 1. Force. 2. Intimidation 3. Corruption. 4. Delusion

Force namely physical force incidentally and in case of necessity and to the extent of that necessity, applied is an instrument essentially necessary to /the use of which is of the essence/ every government: to a government which has for its object the greatest happiness of the greatest number not less than to a government which has not for its object the happiness of any more /other/ than the ruling one.

The like may be said of intimidation: namely fear of punishment: from which is inseparable in case of necessity, and to the extent of the necessity, the actual infliction of punishment

Not so corruption. By corruption understand the application of the matter of reward to any sinister purpose

In every mixt Monarchy that is ever presented to view by that appellative there has been a set of men depicted by and acting under the name and in the character of representatives of /of the people and actually delegated by/ a portion more or less considerable of the people and professing to act as trustees for the people supporting to the best of their power the interest of the people. In a mixt Monarchy, by corruption is meant a breach of that same trust produced by the possession or expectancy of the external instruments of felicity in some shape or other at the hands of the Monarch or of one another in consideration of such breach

In the case of a pure Monarchy, there being no persons /functionaries/ appearing and professing to act in the character of trustees of and for the people, there is no demand no room for corruption in that its ordinary sense © if by corruption be meant depravity or mischief done /destruction wrought/ in any other way to the happiness of the greatest number /people/ there is indeed corruption plenty: but in this case corruption is not used in the same sense as in a mixt Monarchy containing a body of men professing to be Representatives of the body
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    So again as to Delusion. In a pure Monarchy there is indeed delusion plenty: instruments of felicity operating in that character /as instruments of delusion/ upon the minds upon the imaginations of the subject many. But in a pure Monarchy there is no such demand for no such need of delusion as in a mixt Monarchy. By force and intimidation with or without corruption suffice for the production of the effect
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    1 or 3 In a mixt Monarchy, as above, the function and use of those of the public functionaries that are trustees of and for the people is - to operate as a check and controul upon the power of the Monarch. In this case it is to the prejudice of the people, and of the people only that any breach of trust on the part of this class of functionaries as such, a breach of trust by whatsoever means - corruptive influence or any other can operate.

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