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4 July 1807
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Letter V
Ch.4. Litigation promoted
§.4
21 Jan y 1808 Omitt this or preserve as being applicable chiefly to Bonâ fide Litigants?
Special Instructions for the application of the principle of uncertainty to the promotion of malâ fide litigation, the fruit of dishonesty on the defendants side.
Your business is to make as many suits as possible, each to lasting as long as possible, a suit ends as soon as either party thinks it more for his advantage to give it up than to go on with it. The thing to be aimed at is that whatever be the real chance of success on the plaintiff's side, it may appear to the plaintiff greater than it is, to the defendant less. Remember the tube which looked through with one end next to the eye makes the object greater than it is; with the other less. On the plaintiff's side his chance must never appear to him so small in value as not to be worth taking: this point secured, the less it is worth the better: because the less the real value of the plaintiff's chance, the less the difficulty of making it look below nothing on the defendant's side. In every case therefore it is necessary that a deception should press upon one side at least if not upon both. This deception is favoured by two principles in human nature, of which it will be your care to turn to the best account, the predominance of hope over fear. (called by A. Smith a man's confidence in his own good fortune) and the passion of revenge by which for the pleasure of subjecting the adversary to a loss a man is frequently induced to take a still greater loss upon himself.
The wrong will not be committed, nor consequently the suit for obtaining satisfaction commenced, unless in his own estimate the proposed wrongdoer has less to fear than to hope from the commission of it. What he has to fear consists of the consequences of ill success in case of litigation: these consequences will consist of an eventual burthen which in different shapes one or more of them - such as satisfaction, punishment, and costs. [Since for some, the check applied by the fear of a charge on the score of satisfaction is stronger than that imposed by the fear of a charge on the score of punishment: because to the mortification of being so much as added that of seeing the party injured gain it.] But an alleviation of the aggregate burthen in any one part, of the aggregate restraining burthen, might be made up by an equivalent aggravation of excess in any other. Your care must therefore extend to the whole.
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Title: [22 June 1807 (7) Letter V]Description: 22 June 1807 (7) Letter V II. Litig. II. Def t malâ fide These phenomen...[?] no serent[?]. Judge & Co: they have invested themselves of them accordingly. The less the check applying itself in restraint of litigation, under whatsoever name - burthen of satisfaction, burthen of costs or any other on either side (on the present occasion the defendant's side) is in value, meaning apparent value as it appears in the eyes of the litigant - in value, magnitude, certainty or uncertainty, proximity or remoteness, being taken into the account, the less its force and efficiency in such its character of a check: the greater, the greater. Whatsoever be the value which an object viewed from the Defendant's side of the suit possesses in the eyes of the Defendant (value being composed as above, of magnitude, certainty and proximity, multiplied into each other) that value will be different in the eyes of the plaintiff, the object being viewed from the plaintiff's side. If the given sum considered as about to come into the Plaintiff's pocket in the shape of gain the value will in the eyes of the Plaintiff, be greater than the real: and so in the case of the Defendant. If the same object considered as about to go out of the Plff.'s pocket in the shape of loss the apparent value will in the eyes of the Plaintiff, be less than the real: and so in the case of the Defendant. Such happily on the hole[?] for mankind is the constitution of human nature: hope is predominant over fear: the phenomenon has been noticed by Adam Smith and others.
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Title: [21 March 1807 Table II. Mischiefs]Description: 21 March 1807 Table II. Mischiefs of Delay in Judicatory I. Mischiefs present, thence certain, and co-eval with the Delay - I. To the prejudice of the Plaintiff's side 1. Denial of justice - thence In cases where the subject matter in demand is a determinate article of property, moveable or immoveable, loss of the use, together with the enjoyment and profit attached to it. 2. In case of money loss of interest - in the case of a non-trader, ordinary interest; in case of a trader, / extra-interest;/ commercial interest: rate equal to that of profit in trade. 3. Vexation; from the contemplation of the loss thus incurred. 4. Expence, according to the costs, natural and factitious, attached, under the system in question, to the pursuit of justice. II. To the prejudice of the Defendant's side. 1. Mischief on the score of Denial of justice, alone; but advantage. If the Defendant be in malâ fide, this advantage, though correspondent to the Plaintiff's disadvantage, is not equal to it; the absence of the article importing, to the Plaintiff, so much less: the presence, to the Defendant, so much gain: the enjoyment from which, the circumstances equal, is never equal to suffering from loss.+ +(See Bentham par Dumont, Traité de legislation[?] et pen.[?] Paris 1802. Tom.II. p.27. also pp. 308 to 351, in which the subject of satisfaction (for injury) is considered in all its branches) 2. As above, N o 1. 3. Vexation; if the Defendant be malâ fide, none: if in bonâ fide, considerable: to wit from the apprehension of an unfavourable result. 4. Expence, as on the Plaintiff's side. II. Mischiefs Contingent 1. Final loss by misdecision, from deposition of evidence. 2. On the score of testimonial, and in some instances real evidence, deposition of freshness, and thence of trustworthiness and persuasiveness on the part of the evidence. 3. Deposition in the character of matter of satisfaction, in the hands of the Defendant, applicable to the purpose of satisfaction for the benefit of the Plaintiff. 4. Death of the Plaintiff; to whom alone satisfaction can be rendered without losing the greater part of its virtue: thence deposition of satisfaction, pro tanto, even where it is not lost in toto, viz. by refusal of the law to afford it to his representatives: - a denial of justice, established under English jurisprudence to a deplorable extent. 5. Death of the Defendant; by whom the satisfaction should have been rendered: thence deposition of satisfaction, either through inability on the part of representatives, or through established denial of justice, as above. 6. Ulterior delay:- the necessity, or demand for which may have been produced by fresh incidents sprung up during the course of the [...?]; and so on, more and more delay, with out any certain limit. 7. Expence: the necessity of it imposed by the fresh incidents; as above. 8. Vexation, produced by the fresh delay and expence. 1. Final loss by misdecision; to the prejudice of the malâ fidé Defendant, none:- to d 0 of the bonâ fide Defendant, the same as to the Plaintiff. 2. As above. N o 1. 3. Mischief by deposition of the matter of satisfaction in the hands of the defendant himself to the prejudice of the Malâ fide defendant, none. &[?] contra, advantage in different shapes, according to the nature of his circumstances, and situation: viz: by the faculty of dissipating, concealing, exporting for future use, or carrying off, the value in dispute. To the prejudice of the bonâ fide Defendant, deposition of the matter of satisfaction (viz: for his costs of suit) in the hands of the Plaintiff. 4. Death of the Plaintiff. to the malâ fide Defendant, no disadvantage in the respect in question, but an advantage. To the bonâ fide Defendant, a disadvantage in respect of costs, as above. 5. Death of the Defendant. To the malâ fide Defendant far[?] as concerns exemption from the painful sensation of loss matter of a consolation: to the bonâ fide Defendant, matter of increased regret: viz. on the score of loss of satisfaction for vexation and expence of suit, at the Plaintiff's charge. 6. Ulterior Delay. to the malâ fide Defendant, so much advantage, to the bona fide Defendant, so much disadvantage as above. 7. Ulterior Expence as on the Plffs side. To the malâ fide Defendant over-ballanced by the delay and consequent chances of misdecision in his favour:- to the bonâ fide Defendant, uncompensated. 8. To the malâ fide Defendant, compensated, as above; to the bonâ fide Defendant, uncompensated.
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Title: [22 June 1807 4 Letter V]Description: 22 June 1807 4 Letter V II. Litigation III. Def t malâ fide Costs Forced disbursement, whether in the way of original disbursement or in the way of reimbursement - costs in English law the word used in both cases - this burthen though pro tanto, viz. according to the apprehended probable amount of it, the apprehension of it acts or helps to act in the character of a check upon litigation viz. upon litigation in whatever shape, and thence amongst others in the shape of litigation, though a malâ fides on the defendant's side yet beyond that amount, it is of course without action or without effect in that way or any other. If by factitious delay, continued for one, for two or for any other number of years, matters are so ordered that the defendant shall, clear of all burthen on the score of satisfaction, make a profit to the amount of £200, it is not the assurance of a burthen, though it were ever so strong, in the shape of costs amounting to £100, £150, no nor £199 that will have the effect of preventing him from bearing his part in the making of such delay: deduction made of the profit on one side counterballanced by the loss on the other, there will always remain in the three several cases a profit of £100, £50, £1, neat and without any thing to counterbalance it. In no case, let them amount to what they will, do costs paid by the defendant either in the way of original disbursement or in reimbursement of costs disbursed by the Plff. operate, as to any part of them, in satisfaction of the main demand made by him in and by the suit, unless in so far as gratification of enmity may have been the object of it: in no case does the expectation of any part of them which finds its compensation as above, in profit extracted from the delay, contribute to constitute in two[?] instances a check to the delay, contribute to lessen the inducement by which he is urged to bear a part in making it.
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