1
results found in
19 ms
Page 1
of 1
3 March 1808
Letter V
§.4 Reasons
In one of the two assemblies of which the legislative body is composed - in the House of Lords, when on the comparatively minute scale of an individual question arising out of an individual suit, concerning the property of some individual object such as a piece of land, a decision comes to be pronounced, here at any rate reasons, and under the very name of reasons, and those rendered by the operations of the press to a certain degree public, are not grudged.
If these reasons were so many reasons framed and delivered by the Judges of which that highest of all judicatories is composed, they would by the degree of publicity given to them, the practice of thus delivering them, might in a certain degree be productive of the advantages abovementioned as resulting from the practice of annexing reasons to the text of a law such as explanation, controul, and so forth, and of the corresponding portions of jurisprudential law - viz. the general propositions capable of being distilled out of the respective decisions were imaginary, the words of them being left to be chosen by each reader of the reasons for himself - the reasons at any rate, being expressed by so many determinate assemblages of words, would make but some thing real, a sort of tangible and comprehensible mass from which the volatile and incoercible vapour would be to be distilled.
Similar Items
-
Title: [16 March 1808 Letter V §.6]Description: 16 March 1808 Letter V §.6. Reasons Ends of Justice Misdecision In the case and to the extent, of jurisprudential law this standard is [in] respect of its source spurious, in respect of its existence imaginary and fictitious. Spurious, because whatsoever may be the will expressed by it, is the will not of the sovereign but of the Judge: imaginary and fictitious, it being the characteristic and distinguishing property of the rule of action in so far as it is in this form to have no determinate and assignable assemblage of words belonging to it: In this case, the nature of the case affording no fixt standard of rectitude, every thing being fictitious, it is only in the way of fiction, and by pursuing the original fiction, that any such terms as rectitude of decision or misdecision can be employed. Not that by the unreality of the standard, the mischievousness of the decision, is, in case of misdecision, that is of a bad decision, in any respect a degree lessened. In the form of vapour, a sort of succedaneum to a fixt standard of rectitude is as it were distilled, from a sort of waste, of which particular decisions compose the principal part of the ingredients.
-
Title: [PRIVATE 3 March 1808 + A]Description: PRIVATE 3 March 1808 + A On L d Eldons Bill 34 Letter V §.4. Reasons Precedents Jurisprudence Of the aggregate mass of the entire rule of action, or compleat body of the law, appearing part of it in the shape of statute law, the remainder in the shape of jurisprudential law, the articles which (in so far as existence can be predicated of this subject) exist in the shape of this imaginary sort of law, without any determinate set of words for the expression of them, are, in tenor[?] and [...?] an instance, provided with an accompaniment of reasons: of reasons, or at least assemblages of words on which, by curtesy[?], that denomination is bestowed. Jurisprudential law - i.e. whatsoever part of the rule of action happens to have made its appearance in this phantasmagoric shape, is a sort of law made or rather supposed to have been made by Judges, of a certain rank, on pretence of declaring it. The conjuncture on which a fragment of the sort of which it is composed comes to be made is that of an individual decision pronounced in the course of a particular cause. Propositions of a general nature being delivered by some Judge at the time when this individual decision comes to be pronounced, to these propositions all or some of them, it happens now and then either in tenor or in purport, under a favourable concurrence of circumstances, to be made public: and these propositions, of which it is known or not known in what words delivered, by whom, in what place, at what time delivered, have the force of real law, for which they are regarded by lawyers as constituting a very advantageous substitute.
-
Title: [3 March 1808 40 Letter V]Description: 3 March 1808 40 Letter V §.4. Reasons 2. As little can I take upon me to recommend the practice or a precedent of the course proper to be taken in the collection and preparation of the facts or other considerations brought to view in the character of reasons. In the case of a mass of statute law, ere yet the proposed law has been ventured to be introduced into either House, each House has frequently its Committee occupied for weeks or months in the collection of facts which when brought together and generalized, are to furnish, in debate at least, the matter of reasons. The declarers of Jurisprudential law, exercising those attributes of omniscience and infallibility with which the curtesy of lay-gents[?] has invested them, turn aside with generous disdain all such tedious courses, such superfluous and frivolous inquiries. On the question about the slave trade, years not weeks were employed, a library not a volume was collected, by unlearned legislators: a dictum out of Littleton or L d Coke, distilled or presumed to have been distilled from some assignable or unassignable decision or decisions, would have sufficed for giving a decision on this as on any other subject to the King's Bench or Common Pleas.
1
results found.
Page 1
of 1