date

28 Jan y 1808 Appeals Of the
28 Jan y 1808

Appeals

Of the instances in which the decision of the supreme local judicatory has been affirmed[?] purely and simply in and by the superior[?] impersonal judicatory the number is about four times as great as that of the instances in which it has either been reserved or held back to undergo a change. Taking then the [...?] of the supreme impersonal judicatory for the standard of rectitude[?], and judging by that criterion, the number of instances in which it is certain that the stoppages thus put to execution has been productive of injustice is four times as great as the number of those in which it is possible that the arrangement may have been preventive of injustice /the same undesirable consequence/.

By the light of the same wisdom, but to a still superior degree of certainty, in the case of the Appeals (Anglo- jurgonci Writs of Error) presented to the three[?] abovementioned intermediate Chamber of Review from the immediate judicatores Judging by Common Law, the instances where /in which/ to a certainty the stoppage pf execution was productive of injustice was or was not produced by it, were on an average of the above three years as 89 to 1. for it was in one instance only out of 90 that in the opinion of the Appellant himself his Appeal had /presented/ any such colors of justice as to enable the [...?] of an Advocate to find any thing to say in favour of it.
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  • Title: [24 May 1807 D 2 Letter V]
    Description: 24 May 1807

    D 2

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    IV. Uses

    1. Effects in respect of the malâ fide appeals.

    1. The malâ fide appeals may be all of them stopped without any Chamber of Review. They owe their birth to that arrangement of Scottish law, by which Appeal is made a bar to execution: which thereby gives the Appellant, when in the wrong a profit by the delay and such a profit as is in some cases a real one. Take away this profit, this proportion of the actual appeals to the House of Lords will disappear without any intermediate Chamber of Review.

    2. I have stated that the arrangement which makes Appeal a bar to execution as an arrangement pregnant with injustice: uncompensated injustice in the shape of delay, vexation and expence and that the instances in which injustice is produced by it are naturally and at all times and in all places in a very high proportion vastly more numerous than those in which it is saved: and in particular the instances in which injustice is done to the good people of Scotland in the persons of those suitors whose adversaries, in the character though not under the name of malâ fide appellants, present appeals in the House of Lords.

    3. Of the malâ fide appeals presented from the Court of Session, undivided or howsoever divided, the number will be encreased, by the Chamber of Review: increased to a certainty, if the application of the proper and natural remedy so often spoken of - viz. cutting up by the roots the profit by the delay, be avoided, with that anxious care with which it seems hitherto to have been avoided: encreased to an amount depending on unforeseen contingencies, but of which some loose conjecture may be formed, from the relative amount to which we have seen it raised by the fostering care of the English Judges: viz. in the proportion of 89 to 1 to the bonâ fide appeals.
  • Title: [24 Dec r 1807 Scotch Reform]
    Description: 24 Dec r 1807

    Scotch Reform

    4[?]

    Letter V

    Ch. │ │ Omission Causes

    Were the ends of justice, and its subserviency to those ends the objects really in view, the true criterion and index of judicature absolutely considered so far as Appeals are concerned - the number presented respectively from the supreme local judicatory: relatively and comparatively considered it would be the numbers respectively presented from the several co-ordinate local judicatories in the three kingdoms: whether, after passing from their respective subordinate judicatories, the supreme judicatory to which the Appeals respectively went, even of this or that description - whether to the House of Lord for example or to the King, would to this point make no material difference.

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  • Title: [29 Jan y 1808 Appeals In 1708]
    Description: 29 Jan y 1808

    Appeals

    In 1708 came the first Union: the Union between England and Scotland and with it the Appeal from the supreme local judicatory of the minor nation national to the supreme impersonal judicatory. On this occasion, without any body, intending it is thinking of it (great minds do not stoop to such trivial considerations) the reward to merit[?] /of official/ flowed in a spontaneously increased stream /an augmmented stream/ into the pocket of the Officers of the House. The influx of Scotch causes to the impersonl judicatory wa accompanied as of course with /by/ the rule by which its [...?] quality was in so considerable degree derived /to which it was in so considerable degree indebted for/. Ostensible grounds /reasons/ were not wanting. In the case of the English Appeals called Writs of Error such was the established practice: and upon the subjection of the minor kingdom to a new dominion was not a period /an occasion/ in which the [...?] by which it /the subordinate judicatory/ was to be [...?] to its superior could safely /consistently with the rules of human //political/ prudence/ be relaxed.