date

4 Feb y 1808 on L Eldons Bill
4 Feb y 1808

on L Eldons Bill

[...?] Appeals

1. Execution not possible

Of the above propositions, that which admitts the increase of paper money to be conducive to the increase of real wealth might it may perhaps be thought as well as hev been omitted: inas much as it operates as far as it goes against the practical conclusion respecting the stoppage of the increase; and thereby leads rather to perplex /produce confusion in the argument/ and thwart the above conclusion instead of supporting it.

But besides that truth on [...?] [...?] side it may be found to be is as it ought to be the object of my research, this /the/ admission[?] is if real service to the conclusion, by showing anticipating an argument which had it been left to present itself on the other side would naturally have appeared /have been apt to appear/ conclusive.

There remained, it is true another superior Equity Court, to which though co-ordinate with the Court of Chancery /sitting in the same [...?]/, the influence[?] of the cause which we have seen withdrawing that High Court from out of the power of the execution - suspending rule did not extend. But, compared with that of the Court of Chancery, the quantity of business done on the Equity side of the Exchequer has never been otherwise than very inconsiderable. After the Common Law practice of the Common Law Courts the Equity practice pf the Court of Chancery is /was/ comparatively speaking but one innovation: the Equity practice of the Court of Exchequer was an innovation still more recent. The Chancellor was from the very first a Giant: in comparison of that Giant the Barons of the Exchequer were but pigmies. The Giant of course, take the lead: the Pygmies, where they mustered up courage to ape him, trod of course in his steps.
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