5 Aug 1814

Logic

Ch. 1. Logic, what

10

5

Qualities desirable in language 8 or 9: Clearness one of these metaphysics i.e. reflection of these all comprehensive terms. one means of securing clearness.

Of the art and /or/ science of logic one prime use and that the most immediate is the establishment of clear and determinate ideas: the attaching /in relation/ to each /whatsoever/ discourse we employ the taking care that to such discourse as on any subject of importance we employ, the ideas we attach shall be clear and determinate ones { Distinction /Methodization/ - Definition - Division Methodisation /exposition in all its shape/ - all these functions /operations/ have these for their direct object }, and in so far as in the discourse /language/ employed in the course of their converse with us by other men /others/ any deficiency in this essential quality becomes observable, to employ our endeavours by apt questions, to clear it of /dipell from it/ whatever clouds /traces/ /marks/ of obscurity or ambiguity in what it may happen to be involved /enveloped/ in.

The terms /words/ employed, and the propositions formed out of them /and the compounds formed of them in the shape /form/ of propositions -/ in one or other of these articles /classes of objects/ may be found /seen/ the sourse of every instance of error or perplexity every cause of deception to which discourse can give rise; if it be in the notion /structure/ of the propositions, or in the sort of connexion given to them that the mischief /imperfection/ /malady/has or is thought /supposed/ to have its sourse, logic, (in which Grammar may be considered as included) is the name of the art or science, from which /by which alone/ the remedy /cure/ if obtainable is /can be/ /must be/ /will be/ obtained, if it be in the import attached to the terms, taken singly, sometimes it is to logic, sometimes it is to metaphysics that the /any/ endeavours employed to remedy it are referred.

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