date

28 July 1814 23 July 1814 Logic
28 July 1814 23 July 1814

Logic

Note ( ) ?

Ch.3. Aristotle's Præcognita

'.3 Aristotle's Definition

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1

{Relation to all disciplines - 1. Happiness - the end. 2. Language, the instrument. Thence[?] speak of language, 1 o. considered in its application to all disciplines; 2. in d o. to each particular description.}

{'. │ │ Aristotelian larger sense of the word Logic.}

Happiness, composed as it is of pleasures and exemptions +[1] from pain - Happiness, including every thing that for its own sake is worth having - every thing that in itself is of any value - logic, to be of any value, must in some way or other be in every part conducive to happiness - and it is only in so far as it is so conducive that it is worth knowing - that an acquaintance with it is of any value.

Logic, according to the definition given of it by Aristotle and his followers, +[2] is an art the effect or at least aim of which is to lead a man to the knowledge of all things intelligible. By Aristotle and the Greek philosophers in general, knowledge taken in the aggregate was an object, on which, [to] judge from the comparative degree of attention paid to it, and of that from the comparative quantity of discourse bestowed upon it, a greater store was set then upon happiness itself: (a) and as to its connection with happiness either it was regarded as something more valuable than happiness, or as something from the possession of which in whatever part or shape, an at least equal quantity of happiness would follow as of course.

Knowledge, or something that with them passed for knowledge was the prerogative possession of these teachers and their disciples: for happiness,- at least in so far as it was composed of pleasures and exemptions - a capacity at least was shared with them by the vulgar herd: hence the transcendant and independent value ascribed be[sic] them to every thing that went by the name of knowledge, or afforded any thing like a prospect of leading to it.

+[1] See Table of Springs of Action.

+[2]  Search and quote Aristotle.

(a) Note about the summum bonum - its nonsensicalness.

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