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31 July 1814 + '. 4
Logic Sect. 4
Ch. │ │ Aristotle Præcognita
'.2 Uses Utilitates
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31 July 1814 - Make Arist.'s Præcognita a separate Chapter. It will come best when the whole of J B's Præcognita have been displayed.
Say Ch.1. Præcognita for descriptive delineations concerning Logic, according to the present work.
Ch.2. Præcognita concerning Logic, according to the Aristotelians.
'.I. Uses of Logic - Utilitates, + according to the Aristotelians.
1. As to the uses of Logic - viz. of their Logic - none though this topic is brought to view by them, have the Aristotelians been able to find: practice, they say, will bring them to view these uses. But if practice will, as they find it convenient to suppose, bring them to the view of the learner, why not to that of teachers: and if so it be that to his view it has brought them, why not particularize them here at once, as he has done in the case of all the other topics.
Indistinct indeed must have been the notions attached by these logicians to the word utilitas. Else instead of referring under the name of practice to the casual observation of each Scholar, how could they have avoided referring to the indication which they themselves had but that instant been giving. Necessary is this art, say they, to the acquisition of every discipline: i.e. of everything that is or can be the subject of instruction, by which if they mean any thing, every thing that is or can be the subject of any thing that ever did go or ever can go by any such name as either that of art or that of science. So many disciplines, so many uses - for each discipline a distinct intelligible and undeniable use: subsequently to which in relation to each such disciplines might have come the enquiry into the particular mode in which it administers to well-being. How much more instructive and satisfactory would this indication have been - how much more commensurate with the truth - how much more honourable to the art would have been such an indication of the uses, than the vague and self humiliating put off - Go look for them - What they are we can not tell you: if you have good luck some time or other you may find them or some of them of yourselves.
+ Use (most general) corresponds most to End. Uses particular may come at the end of the Præcognita.
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Title: [25 Sept. 1814 Logic Ch. │]Description: 25 Sept. 1814 Logic Ch. │ │ Aristotle's Præcognita '.5 End - Finis End 8 2 '.4{II and III Uses and} End of Logic, according to the Aristotelians. Knowledge of things - viz. either scientific knowledge alone, or this with the addition of unscientific - knowledge of things cognitio rerum, beyond this even, the pretensions of the Aristotelians - at any rate any distinct and explicit pretension, did not extend. Far indeed however were their actual attainments - far even their actual researches, from coming up to these pretensions. {The knowledge of} words - viz. the import of words, this was the utmost point - within this field was contained the sum total of their researches. A certain sort of coincidence. To exhibit a demonstration, so they termed it - was with them the great work - the object and if attained the fruit of all their ingenuity and of all their labours. This demonstration when it exhibited, what did it amount to? an indication of a certain mode and degree of coincidence between the import of the two words? this and nothing more. But this exploit, what did it require? It required that to all the several words employed the same import be annexed by the disputing parties. Suppose this identity to have place, then if the demonstration was correct, the opponent could not deny it without falling into a contradiction in terms. But this necessary condition suppose it in any part wanting: in this case no demonstration could take place: not so much as this faint semblance of, and spurious substitute for real knowledge. Observation - experience, experiment, experience: these were the only processes by which real knowledge could be attained: and by the boasted art of logical demonstration, to what extent so ever employed, not a particle of knowledge was obtained through all or any one of these sources.[?] 81
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Title: [31 July 1814 + '.6 Logic Ch]Description: 31 July 1814 + '.6 Logic Ch. │ │ Aristotle's Præcognita '.6.III. Functions. Uses. 10 1 '.6.III Functions of Logic - Officia according to the Aristotelians. Of these no unapt description is given: it is by these functions, as by so many means that Logic labours towards the attainment of that end. According to this account these Officia - these functions seem to coincide with sufficient exactness, at least as far as they extend with the articles herein above brought to view by the name of Operations:- operations of the human mind or rather of the whole human frame mind and body together to all which, in some way or other logic is or is capable of being rendered subservient: all of them by some course or other directed to and leading to the universal end, to which by the guidance it is capable of affording to them, Logic itself may be and ought to be made to lead. Thus much for the general nature of these functions - these means - these operations. But [the] list, the particular list, any particular list - any thing approaching, or so much as pretending itself to be, or to lead to the finding or formation of any thing approaching a compleat list, where shall it be found? - not assuredly in the custody or power of these philosophers. Of these functions, some there are - what or so much as how many, they can not tell? Three however, but no more than three, are what they know of: viz. Definition, Division and ratiocination. Concerning these several functions of Logic or mental operations, how indistinct and inadequate were the notions of these logicians will be seen in another place. 83
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Title: [23 July 1814 Logic Ch.1. Logic]Description: 23 July 1814 Logic Ch.1. Logic what 4 4 3 Aug 1814. Postpone this to Chr [?] of Unstudious pursuits /occupations/ and Disciplines In speaking of logic as an art in the language /according to the definition/ of the Aristotelians, I find /feel/ myself obliged to add to the word art the word science. For the truth is that howsoever clearly distinguishable in idea, the two objects - art and science - in themselves are not in any instance found separate. In no place is any thing to be done, but in the same place there is something to be known {and understood}; in no place is anything to be known, but in the same place there is something to be done. For /To the/ presenting in conjunction with each other, as well as either of them without the other, the idea which the word art is employed to signify, and the idea which the word science is employed to sigify, the latin word discipline, is, as has then been seen, correctly and admirably well adapted. Unfortunately, though so perfectly coincident in respect of its original, and so near to perfect coincidence in sound and appearance, yet, in respect of its established and already /at present/ customary import the correspondent English word discipline presents no equal aptitude. (a Great however would be the convenience - strong the light thrown upon the whole field of art and science /human power/, if instead of the compressed and tedious /composite and frequently perplexing/ locution art and science, or art and sciences, [?] men /the men of modern times/ could prevail upon themselves to employ the simple as well as classical term discipline. (a) From signifying instruction itself or the subject of it, in English as well as in French, and probably because so it was seen to be in French, it came to signify along with, and frequently instead of it, the means employed in the administration of instruction, viz. in so far as they consist of coercion and punishment: in the first instance, on the occasion of education at large: and thence in the military department of government. 6
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