31 July 1814 + '.5

Logic

Ch. │ │ Aristotle's Præcognita

'.5.II. End. Finis.

7

1

'.5.'II. End of Logic - Finis - according to the Aristotelians.

After the topic of the uses of Logic - the utilitatis,[?] and not before, comes in that list the topic of finis, finis ejus,[?] scilicet Logicæ, i.e. the general end. But of logic as of any thing else what are the uses but so many modifications of the general - the universal end, or so many means tending to the attainment of it? If so, first should have come the end, after that the uses: first the genus, then and not till then the species.

This end of Logic - this end when it does comes - what is

it? Is it the universal the sole universal end - actually as well as fitly and properly the universal end - well-being, i.e. the maximum of pleasures alloyed by the minimum of pains? Not it indeed: no such amplitude does it extend to. It is confined in the first place to mere knowledge. But except in so far as in some shape or other it leads to and is productive of well-being - a balance on the side of happiness - what is all the value of all the knowledge in the world worth? - Just nothing.

In the next place though the whole of knowledge it might be, and still be worth nothing, it is not so much as the whole of knowledge. Persons and things - under one or other of these heads may be comprized the subjects of knowledge: of the two persons, a man would be apt [to] think the most interesting: but to persons - to what belongs to persons - it does not so much as profess to extend: it confines itself and most pointedly to things - Finis vero unicus, Cognitio sciliect rerum.[?]

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     31 July 1814 - Make Arist.'s Præcognita a separate Chapter. It will come best when the whole of J B's Præcognita have been displayed.

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    1. As to the uses of Logic - viz. of their Logic - none though this topic is brought to view by them, have the Aristotelians been able to find: practice, they say, will bring them to view these uses. But if practice will, as they find it convenient to suppose, bring them to the view of the learner, why not to that of teachers: and if so it be that to his view it has brought them, why not particularize them here at once, as he has done in the case of all the other topics.

    Indistinct indeed must have been the notions attached by these logicians to the word utilitas. Else instead of referring under the name of practice to the casual observation of each Scholar, how could they have avoided referring to the indication which they themselves had but that instant been giving. Necessary is this art, say they, to the acquisition of every discipline: i.e. of everything that is or can be the subject of instruction, by which if they mean any thing, every thing that is or can be the subject of any thing that ever did go or ever can go by any such name as either that of art or that of science. So many disciplines, so many uses - for each discipline a distinct intelligible and undeniable use: subsequently to which in relation to each such disciplines might have come the enquiry into the particular mode in which it administers to well-being. How much more instructive and satisfactory would this indication have been - how much more commensurate with the truth - how much more honourable to the art would have been such an indication of the uses, than the vague and self humiliating put off - Go look for them - What they are we can not tell you: if you have good luck some time or other you may find them or some of them of yourselves.

    +  Use (most general) corresponds most to End. Uses particular may come at the end of the Præcognita.

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  • Title: [25 Sept. 1814 Logic Ch. │]
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    '.4{II and III Uses and} End of Logic, according to the Aristotelians.

    Knowledge of things - viz. either scientific knowledge alone, or this with the addition of unscientific - knowledge of things cognitio rerum, beyond this even, the pretensions of the Aristotelians - at any rate any distinct and explicit pretension, did not extend.

    Far indeed however were their actual attainments - far even their actual researches, from coming up to these pretensions.

    {The knowledge of} words - viz. the import of words, this was the utmost point - within this field was contained the sum total of their researches.

    A certain sort of coincidence. To exhibit a demonstration, so they termed it - was with them the great work - the object and if attained the fruit of all their ingenuity and of all their labours.

    This demonstration when it exhibited, what did it amount

    to? an indication of a certain mode and degree of coincidence between the import of the two words? this and nothing more.

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  • Title: [25 Sept 1814 Logic Ch. │ │]
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    Of this assuming science thus worthless was the end.

    In truth it was not simply worthless - it was positively pernicious. It was pernicious by drawing aside and keeping mankind for so many ages out of the only really instructive track of study as abovementioned and in this uninstructive one.

    But out of an ill-directed pursuit it will sometimes happen that useful results may collaterally - and as it were by a side wind be, brought to light.

    Though of all the propositions thus demonstrated or demonstrable the value was is and ever will be equal to 0 - though logical demonstration, the fruit of all this labour, was and is mere delusion, yet of the operations which had no other object than the formation and maturation of this fruit, many there are which have been and will ever continue to be found, applicable to and continually applied to real and most important uses.

    The demonstration of the Aristotelian may in this respect be compared to the philosophers stone of the Heraclitic philosophers. The stone was a non-entity: but in digging for this non-entity, real entities pregnant with real and important uses were discovered in no inconsiderable numbers.

    * Substances applicable to the purposes of medicine dying,

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