16 Aug. 1814 '.2

Logic

Ch. Clearness Exposition

'.2. Subject of Exposition

3

1

C.7.

'.2. Subject of Exposition - subjects of /to/ which it is susceptible /applicable/.

Be the exposition itself what it may, a subject it can not but have - a subject to which it is applicable.

This subject - what may it be ? - what are the modifications /variations/ /diversifications/ of which it is susceptible ? - a question to which in the first place an answer must be provided. Why ? because on the nature of the subject will depend the nature of the sort /mode/ of exposition of which it is susceptible.

In relation to the subject of this instrument of clearness two propositions /axioms/ /aphorisms/ /observations/ may be laid down /require to be brought to view/ in the first place.

1. The subject of exposition viz. the immediate and only immediate subject is in every case a word.

2. That word is in every case a name: i.e. a word considered in the character of a name.

Exposition supposes thought. A word is a sign of thought: How imperfectly so ever - in a manner how deficient so ever in respect of clearness - thought, it is true, may be expressed by signs

other than words - by inarticulate sounds, by gestures, by deportment. But, as often as any thing /object/ has been considered in the character of a subject of or for exposition, that object has been a word. (a) The immediate subject of the exposition has been a word - whatsoever else may have been brought to view, the signification of a word - of the word in question has been brought to view: the word is not only a subject, but the only physically sensible subject, upon and in relation to which and upon which the operation, called exposition has been performed.

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    '.4.2 Definition etc.

    The genus represented by a word which is the name of that aggregate, in which all the other aggregates of the nest to which it belongs are contained and included, has no genus which is superior to it; it is, therefore, in its nature incapable of receiving a definition; meaning always that mode of exposition which, in modern practice, seems to be universally understood by that name.

    Meantime the class of words which are in this sense of the word incapable of receiving exposition in that shape are among those, in the instance of which the demand for exposition is the most imperious. For these then that mode of exposition is necessary to which, by the description of succedaneous modes of exposition, reference has just been made, and of which an account will presently be endeavoured to be rendered.

    Yet of these words which are all of them incapable of receiving a definition, in effect definitions are very generally, not to say universally wont to be given with a degree of unconcern and confidence, not inferior to that with which the operation is attended, when the subject upon which it is performed, is with the strictest propriety susceptible of operation in that shape /mode/. Of the sort of shape in which these abstruse examples shew themselves /make their appearance/ an account will be given presently.

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  • Title: [16 Aug. 1814 Logic Ch. Clearness]
    Description: 16 Aug. 1814

    Logic

    Ch. Clearness. Exposition

    '. 4.2. definition etc.

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    '.4. Modes of Exposition where the subject is a class.

    C.7. '.6.

    1. Definition, meaning the sort of operation and correspondent work ordinarily understood by that name. 2. Operations and works incidentally employed as preliminary and preparatory to that of definition, say preparatory operations. 3. Operations incidentally employed as subsequential and supplementary to that of definition, say supplementary operations. 4. Operations which, in certain cases in which the purpose cannot be accomplished by definition - understand by definition in that same form, require to be performed in lieu of it, - say succedaneous operations. By one or other of these subordinate appellations may the operation of exposition, in every shape of which it is susceptible, it is believed, be designated.

    137
  • Title: [16 Aug. 1814 Logic Note]
    Description: 16 Aug. 1814

    Logic

    Note

    Ch. Clearness Exposition

    '.2. Subject of Exposition

    4

    2

    Note (a) to p.1.

    (a) On this subject, for the purpose of exposition, i.e. for the purpose of ensuring clearness, the Aristotelians have given us a distinction which may be seen to be itself a source of obscurity of unclearness viz. of that sort which is termed obscurity. For the purpose of exposition one of the instruments or operations they employ is definition to which again they apply another instrument viz. division. A definition (say they) is either a definition of the name, or a definition of the thing: meaning evidently of the thing - of the object, of which the word is employed as a name. But /Now/ in the account thus given of the matter, a proposition is implied which is not true; viz. that where the definition is a definition of a thing, it is not /never is/ was the /a/ definition of the name: whereas in truth it always is.

    Of the distinction which they had in view, the terms /form/ which they should have employed seems to be this - A definition is called a definition either of the word alone, or a definition of the thing by means of the word, or by means of the word, a definition of the thing signified meant to be expressed by it.

    126