date

7 July 1821 Logic 3
7 July 1821

Logic

3

3

Considered at any two contiguous points of time, every real entity is either in motion or at rest.

N.B. When a real entity is said to be at rest, it is said to be so with reference to some other particular real entity or aggregate of real entities; for so far as any part of the system of the universe is perceived by us, we at all times perceive it not to be at rest. Such, at least, is the case not only with the bodies called planets, but with one or more of the bodies called fixed stars; and, by analogy, we infer this to be the case with all the rest.

This premise, considered with reference to any two contiguous points of time past, every perceptible real entity was, during that time, either in motion or not in motion; if not in motion, it was at rest.

Here then we have two correspondent and opposite fictitious entities of the first remove, viz. a motion and a rest.

A motion is a mode of speech commonly employed; a rest is a mode of speech not so commonly employed.

To be spoken of at all, every fictitious entity must be spoken of as if it were real. This, it will be seen, is the case with the above-mentioned pair of fictitious entities of the first remove.

A body is said to be in motion. This, taken in the literal sense, is as much as to say, here is a larger body, called a motion; in this larger body, the other body, namely, the really existing body, is contained.

So in regard to rest. To say this body is at rest is as much as to say, here is a body, and it will naturally be supposed a fixed body, and here is another body, meaning the real existing body, which is at that first-mentioned body, i.e. attached to it, as if the fictitious body were a stake, and the real body a beast tied to it.

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    Description: 1819 May 11

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    Of no objects but bodies is the reality the existence made known to us by experience or observation – and known to us by the impressions made by them is the reality – the existence made known to us: of no objects but individual objects such as this man, that dog, that horse: and one and the same mass of matter is considered as being but one body or as consisting of a number of bodies according to the occasion which we have to speak of it. Thus even the whole earth is frequently considered as but one body: the whole earth with all that therein is.

    In the whole field of discourse not a step can we take without a fiction of this kind. He is in motion we say of such or such a horse. But by saying he is in motion what do we do but speak of motion as being a body big enough to contain a horse, and of the horse as being in that body. He is at rest we say again suppose of a horse: he is at rest: in so saying we speak of rest as if it were a post or pillar, and the horse standing close to it.

    In this way we come to speak of motion as if it were a real thing separate and distinct from any thing /object/ that ever is in motion: and so real that we have /make/ sorts of motions as we make sorts of men, and dogs and horses. We speak of action which is but motion considered in a particular point of view. We speak of activity: the quality of activity: and thus we have a fictitious entity of another sort, still further from reality. we speak of activity as a quality which is in this or that man: we speak of laziness which is the absence of activity or the aversion /averseness/ to action: thus we form the fictitious entities called qualities: we speak of dispositions a class of fictitious entities still further removed from real ones: disposition to possess or manifest qualities: to posses or manifest for example activity or laziness.
  • Title: [28 Sept. 1814 + Logic Ch.2]
    Description: 28 Sept. 1814 +

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    Motion. That the entity designated by the word motion is a fictitious entity seems at least equally beyond dispute.

    A body the body in question is in motion: here unless in motion be considered as an abbreviated expression substituted for in a state of motion, as we say in a state of rest, motion is a receptacle, in which the body is considered as stationed. The motion of this body is slow or is retrograde. Here the body is a stationary object - a station or starting post, of or from which the motion is considered as opening /proceeding/.

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    case ? When having at or in one point of time been in any one place, at another point of time it has been in any other.

    Of any and every corporeal real entity a similitude is capable of being exhibited as well in the form of a body, for instance a model, as in the form of a surface - as in painting, or drawing, or engraving; which, in every case, is like the object represented, a stationary, permanent, and, unless by internal decay, or external force, an unchanging and unmoving object.

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    Even on the table of the mind, in imagination, in idea, in no other way can any motion be represented. There not being any real entity to represent, the entity cannot be any other than fictitious: the name employed for the purpose of representation cannot therefore be anything else than the name of a fictitious entity.

    42
  • Title: [7 July 1821 Logic Section 5]
    Description: 7 July 1821

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    2

    2

    An entity, whether perceptible or inferential, is either real or fictitious.

    A real entity is an entity to which, on the occasion and for the purpose of discourse, existence is really meant to be ascribed.

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    A fictitious entity of the first remove is a fictitious entity, a conception of which may be obtained by the consideration of the relation borne by it to a real entity, without need of considering the relation borne by it to any other fictitious entity.

    A fictitious entity of the second remove is a fictitious entity, for obtaining a conception of which it is necessary to take into consideration some fictitious entity of the first remove.

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