7 July 1821

Logic

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4

An instance of a fictitious entity of the second remove is a quality. There are qualities that are qualities of real entities; there are qualities that are qualities of the above-mentioned fictitious entities of the first remove. For example, of motion, rectilinearity, curvilinearity, slowness, quickness; & so on.

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  • Title: [7 July 1821 Logic Section 5]
    Description: 7 July 1821

    Logic

    Section 5

    Of fictional entities

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    An entity, whether perceptible or inferential, is either real or fictitious.

    A real entity is an entity to which, on the occasion and for the purpose of discourse, existence is really meant to be ascribed.

    A fictitious entity is an entity to which, though by the grammatical form of the discourse employed in speaking of it, existence be ascribed, yet in truth and reality existence is not meant to be ascribed.

    Every noun substantive which is not the name of a real entity, perceptible or inferential, is the name of a fictitious entity.

    Every fictitious entity bears some relation to some real entity, and can no otherwise be understood than in so far as that relation is perceived, - a conception of that relation is obtained.

    Reckoning from the real entity to which it bears relation, a fictitious entity may be styled a fictitious entity of the first remove, a fictitious entity of the second remove, and so on.

    A fictitious entity of the first remove is a fictitious entity, a conception of which may be obtained by the consideration of the relation borne by it to a real entity, without need of considering the relation borne by it to any other fictitious entity.

    A fictitious entity of the second remove is a fictitious entity, for obtaining a conception of which it is necessary to take into consideration some fictitious entity of the first remove.

    11
  • Title: [1825 March 16 Language 9]
    Description: 1825 March 16

    Language

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    II. Fictitious entities of the second order, qualities.

    To substance we ascribe qualities. To motion also we ascribe qualities. It is by this circumstance, that of motion, the import is placed, as it were, nearer to that of substance than that of qualities. Substances have their qualities, - they are large, small, long, short, thick, thin, and so forth; motions have their qualities, - they are quick, slow, rising, falling, continued, discontinued, regular, irregular, and so on.

    Here then we have an additional class of fictitious entities - of fictitious substances. We have largeness, smallness, length, shortness, thickness, thinness; we have, moreover, quickness, slowness. We might have as well as rising, risingness; as well as falling, fallingness; as well as continued, continuedness; as well as discontinued, discontinuedness; we have as well as regular, regularity; as well as irregular, irregularity; attributes as well of substances as of motions.

    146
  • Title: [7 July 1821 Logic 3]
    Description: 7 July 1821

    Logic

    3

    3

    Considered at any two contiguous points of time, every real entity is either in motion or at rest.

    N.B. When a real entity is said to be at rest, it is said to be so with reference to some other particular real entity or aggregate of real entities; for so far as any part of the system of the universe is perceived by us, we at all times perceive it not to be at rest. Such, at least, is the case not only with the bodies called planets, but with one or more of the bodies called fixed stars; and, by analogy, we infer this to be the case with all the rest.

    This premise, considered with reference to any two contiguous points of time past, every perceptible real entity was, during that time, either in motion or not in motion; if not in motion, it was at rest.

    Here then we have two correspondent and opposite fictitious entities of the first remove, viz. a motion and a rest.

    A motion is a mode of speech commonly employed; a rest is a mode of speech not so commonly employed.

    To be spoken of at all, every fictitious entity must be spoken of as if it were real. This, it will be seen, is the case with the above-mentioned pair of fictitious entities of the first remove.

    A body is said to be in motion. This, taken in the literal sense, is as much as to say, here is a larger body, called a motion; in this larger body, the other body, namely, the really existing body, is contained.

    So in regard to rest. To say this body is at rest is as much as to say, here is a body, and it will naturally be supposed a fixed body, and here is another body, meaning the real existing body, which is at that first-mentioned body, i.e. attached to it, as if the fictitious body were a stake, and the real body a beast tied to it.

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