date

23 Sept. 1814 Logic Ch.1. Ontology
23 Sept. 1814

Logic

Ch.1. Ontology

Entities real fictitious &c.

'.1.

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5

Thus much concerning a non-entity.

Very different is the notion here meant to be presented by the term fictitious entity.

By this term is here meant to be designated a sort of object /one of those sorts of objects/, which in every language, must for the purpose of discourse be spoken of as existing - be spoken of in the like manner as those objects which really have existence, and to which existence is seriously meant to be ascribed, are spoken of; but without any such danger as that of producing any such persuasion as that of their possessing, each for itself, any separate, or strictly speaking, any real existence.

Take, for instances, the words motion, relation, faculty, power and the like.

Real entities being the objects for the designation of which, in the first place, at the earliest stage of human intercourse, and in the character of names, were employed, - between the idea of a name, and that of the reality of the object to which it was applied, an association being thus formed, from a connexion thus intimate, sprung a very natural propensity, viz. that of attributing reality to every object thus designated; - in a word, of ascribing reality to the objects designated by words, which, upon due examination, would be found to be nothing but so many names of so many fictitious entities.

To distinguish them from those fictitious entities, which, so long as language is in use among human beings, never can be spared, fabulous may be the name employed for the designation of the other class of unreal entities.

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