date

28 Sept. 1814 Logic 1
28 Sept. 1814

Logic

1

Ch. Ontology

Entities classed

15

9

Relation

No two objects /entities of any kind/ can present themselves simultaneously to the mind; no, nor can so much as the same object present itself at different times, without presenting the idea of relation. For relation is a fictitious entity, which is produced, and has place, as often as the mind, having perception of any one object, obtains, at the same, or at any immediately succeeding instant, perception of any other object, or even of that same object, if the perception be accompanied with the perception of its being the same - diversity is in the one case the name of the relation, Identity in the other case. But, as identity is but the negation of diversity, thence if, on no occasion, diversity had ever been, neither, on any occasion, would any such idea as that of identity have come into existence.

Whatsoever two entities real or fictitious come to receive names, and thus to receive their nominal existence, relation would be the third; for between the two, they being by the supposition different, and both of them actual objects of perception, the relation of difference or diversity would also become an object of perception, and in the character of a fictitious entity, a production of the acts of abstraction and denomination, acquire its nominal existence.

Next after matter and form the fictitious entity relation, or the class of fictitious entities call relations might therefore have been brought to view. But not only between matter and form but also between the one and the other respectively, and the fictitious entities designated by the words quantity, space, and quality, so close seemed the connexion as not to be, without sensible inconvenience, broken by the interposition of any other.

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    Thus much concerning a non-entity.

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    Time. Be it as it may in regard to Place, that the entity designated by the word Time is but a fictitious entity, will it is believed be sufficiently manifest.

    Different altogether from each other are the perceptions or ideas presented by the word place and the word time. Yet as often as time is spoken of it is spoken of as if it were a modification of, or the same thing as, place.

    Like place, time - or at least any /any given/ portion of time is spoken of in the character of a receptacle. As at /in/ such or such a place things are done in such or such a time - things are done at such a time. As portions of space or place are long or short, great or small, so are portions of time. In the same sense we say a quantity of time or a space of time. As things /bodies/ are considered /spoken of/ as going to and /or/ from such or such a place; so operations are considered as /spoken of/ as going on from and to such or such a portion of

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    {But} of every receptacle all the several parts are coexistent; of any portion of time no two parts how small soever, are co-existent. Of any given portion of time, no two of the parts are coexistent with relation to each, all are successive. By /In/ the very time /import of the/ term co-existent the idea of unity /identity/ in respect of time /of the portion of time supposed to be occupied/ as by the word succession that of diversity is by necessity implication /of necessity/ implied.

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    Existence, and the several classes of fictitious Entities related to it.

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