date

28 Sept. 1814 Logic Ch.2. Ontology
28 Sept. 1814

Logic

Ch.2. Ontology

Entities classed

19

13

Time. Be it as it may in regard to Place, that the entity designated by the word Time is but a fictitious entity, will it is believed be sufficiently manifest.

Different altogether from each other are the perceptions or ideas presented by the word place and the word time. Yet as often as time is spoken of it is spoken of as if it were a modification of, or the same thing as, place.

Like place, time - or at least any /any given/ portion of time is spoken of in the character of a receptacle. As at /in/ such or such a place things are done in such or such a time - things are done at such a time. As portions of space or place are long or short, great or small, so are portions of time. In the same sense we say a quantity of time or a space of time. As things /bodies/ are considered /spoken of/ as going to and /or/ from such or such a place; so operations are considered as /spoken of/ as going on from and to such or such a portion of

time.

{But} of every receptacle all the several parts are coexistent; of any portion of time no two parts how small soever, are co-existent. Of any given portion of time, no two of the parts are coexistent with relation to each, all are successive. By /In/ the very time /import of the/ term co-existent the idea of unity /identity/ in respect of time /of the portion of time supposed to be occupied/ as by the word succession that of diversity is by necessity implication /of necessity/ implied.

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    Place. Of the species of relation designated by the word place, a /the most perfect/ conception may be easily formed by taking into the account the species of relation designated by the word time.

    Necessary altogether is the relation which the species of fictitious entity called place has on the one hand to the fictitious entity called body on the other hand to the fictitious entity called Space.

    Space has already been distinguished into absolute and relative. To absolute space there are no conceivable bounds; to relative space, i.e. to portions of space separated from one or other by bodies, there are, in every instance, bounds, and those determinate ones.

    As to the word place, whether it be considered as the name of a real entity or as the name of a fictitious entity, would be a question of words, barely worth explanation, and not at all worth debate.

    Considered as a modification of space, it would, like that, stand upon the footing of the name of a real entity; considered as a species of relation, it would stand upon, the footing of a fictitious entity. But in this latter case comes an objection: viz. that the relations which on that occasion are in question, are not place itself, or places themselves, but such relations as belong to place.

    Be this as it may place is a relative portion of space, considered either as actually occupied, or as capable of being occupied, by some real entity of the class of bodies.

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  • Title: [26 Sept. 1814 Logic 1]
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    Space is the negation or absence of body.

    Of any determinate individual portion of space, as clear an idea is capable of being formed as of any body, or of any portion of any body; and besides, being equally determinate as that of body, the idea of space is much more simple.

    To space it is difficult either to ascribe or to deny /refuse/ existence without a contradiction in terms; to consider it as nothing or as distinct from nothing.

    Body /Of body/ that is of all bodies, whatsoever, - the annihilation may be conceived without difficulty. Why ? Because, in whatsoever place, - that is, within whatsoever portion of space, within whatsoever receptacle, composed of mere space, any body is, at any given time conceived to be, it may thenceforward be conceived to be removed from that place, and so successively from any and every other portion of space.

    Of Space - that is, of all portions of space whatever, indeed of so much as any one portion of space, the annihilation cannot easily be conceived. Why ? Because in mere space there

    is nothing to remove; nothing that can be conceived capable of being removed. In so far as matter is annihilated, there is less matter than there was before. But, suppose space to be annihilated; is there less space than there was before ?

    As /accordingly/ taken in the aggregate no bounds no limits can be assigned to space, so neither can any form or any quantity. It cannot be removed; it cannot be moved; for there is nothing of it or in it to remove; there is no place to which it can be removed.

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  • Title: [26 Sept. 1814 Logic 2]
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    So much for space taken in the aggregate. But take this or that individual portion of space, the properties of it are very different. Conceive it, as in innumerable, instances it really is, enclosed in bodies, immediately it is, and unavoidably, you conceive it to be endowed with many of the properties of bodies. Of limits it is susceptible, as body is; in point of fact it has limits; and, having these limits, it thereby has not only form but quantity. It not only has limits as truly as body has limits, but it has the same limits.

    Having limits, it thereby has form, quantity, and even motion: along with the terraqueous globe, - i.e. with the whole matter of it, - all the portions of space enclosed in that matter describe round the sun, and with the sun, their continually repeated and ever varied round.

    Substance being a real physical entity perceptions real psychical entities, - matter, form, quantity, and so on, so many fictitious entities, both descriptions being in part applicable to space, neither of them applicable entirely, - space may be regarded and spoken of as a semi-real entity.

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