date

2 Oct. 1814 Logic 1
2 Oct. 1814

Logic

1

Ch. Ontology

Entities classed

52

1

Existence, and the several classes of fictitious Entities related to it.

Existence is a quality; the most extensively applicable, and at the same time, the most simple of all qualities actual or imaginable. Take away all other qualities, this remains: to speak more strictly, take any entity whatsoever, real or fictitious, - abstract the attention from whatsoever other qualities may have been found belonging to it, this will still be left. Existence is predicable of naked substance.

Opposite to the idea of existence is that of non-existence. Non-existence is the negation of existence. Of every other entity, real or fictitious, either existence or non-existence is at all times predicable. Whether such other entity be real or fictitious its existence is of course a fictitious entity; i.e. the word existence is in all cases the name of a fictitious entity.

The idea of non-existence is the idea of absence extended. Take any place, and therewith, any real entity - any body existing in that place, suppose it no longer existing in that place, you suppose its absence, its relative non-existence; expel it in like manner from every, from all, place you suppose its absolute non-existence.

It is through the medium of absence - the familiar and continually recurring idea of absence, that the idea of non-existence, the terrific, the transcendant, the awful, and imposing idea of non-existence is attained.

It being as above a species of quality, existence is itself a fictitious entity; it is in every real entity: every real entity is in it.

In it, the man the object of whose appetite is the sublime, and he the object of whose appetite is the ridiculous, may here find matter for their respective banquets. Nothing has been laughed at to satiety. The punster who has played with nothing till he is tired may renew the game with existence and non-existence.

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    Thus much concerning a non-entity.

    Very different is the notion here meant to be presented by the term fictitious entity.

    By this term is here meant to be designated a sort of object /one of those sorts of objects/, which in every language, must for the purpose of discourse be spoken of as existing - be spoken of in the like manner as those objects which really have existence, and to which existence is seriously meant to be ascribed, are spoken of; but without any such danger as that of producing any such persuasion as that of their possessing, each for itself, any separate, or strictly speaking, any real existence.

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