JB_102_478.xml

Title: [[Copyist's hand] Jan y 1811 Copied]

Description: [Copyist's hand]

Jan y 1811 Copied

Logic Ars traditiva[?]

Ch.│ │ Subjects, viz. Entities

6. Real entities are either, 1. such as have existence and that a separate existence - viz. substances. 2. Such as have an existence but not a separate one, viz. motions and situations. 3. Such as have no real existence: viz. qualities &c.}

7. Abstract entities can no otherwise be expressed than by fiction. Thus a billiard ball is said to be in motion, or motion in a billiard ball; or two billiard balls in a situation.

8. Two objects - two billiard balls considered in successive moments, have been either at different distances from one another or at the same distance: in the first case, they are in motion, in the second case, at rest.

9. Motion can no otherwise be defined than by diversity of distance, the portion of matter interposed between them being at one time of one length, at another time of another. Different distances are judged of by a comparison which is simultaneous; one moment I can place no more than one piece of wood of an inch long between the two balls, the next moment I can place two such pieces.

Language.

10. In a direct manner, words can not in any direct way represent any other events than what are quiescent: motion they can not represent. It is with Language in this respect as it is with Painting.

11. In all propositions, composed of or concerning fictitious and abstract entities, there are two events concerned: 1. the real event typified. 2. the fictitious event which is the archetype. The former is typified, i.e. indicated, denoted, by the analogy which the latter has with it.

12. The proposition which announces the event typified may be termed the plain or unfigurative proposition: the other, the figurative proposition.

JB_102_477.xml

Title: [[Copyist's hand.] Jan y 1811 Copied]

Description: [Copyist's hand.]

Jan y 1811 Copied

Logic - Ars

Ch. 2 Characteristic

Ontology

Ch.2. Subjected [...?]

Ontology

Genl. Clarification

1. Terms are either names of real entities, or names of fictitious entities. (a) (See Note p.3)

2. Names of fictitious entities are no otherwise to be understood than by the relation which their import bears to that of real entities. v.5.  This belongs to tit.- Exposition.

3. Every proposition predicates the existence, past, present, or future, i.e. (future certain or future contingent) of some state of things which is either motional or quiescent. A motional state of things is an event.

4. (To predicate for instance the existence of a quality in a subject is to predicate the existence, viz. past, present, or future, certain or probable, of the events which are the manifestations of that quality.)

5. A proposition containing the name of a fictitious entity predicates indirectly some event as if it were real concerning the fictitious entity: at the same time, this event, being referred to an entity which is not real, can not itself be real. And this is done by means of a distant and fanciful analogy which there is between the event typified and the real event made use of for typification. Qu?- how is this analogy established? Ex.gr. between high in rank and high in place? Suppose it actually established, the one idea brings to view the other on the principle of association: but what brought it about at first? Fibres of of[?] the brain affected the same way?

JB_101_231.xml

Title: [10. the fictitious entity the space]

Description: 10.

the fictitious entity the space that John occupies.

And besides this it is very difficult nay almost impossible to circumscribe any place so exactly as that no other real entity can be conceived to be comprised in it.- How can we describe the place that John is in so nicely as to be certain that no particle of air for instance is comprehended or even if we describe him as an animal, how can we so fix our circumscription of the place so as to exclude any ants or fleas that may be crawling over his body ? As to the degree of generality of the aggregate to be mentioned no universal rule can be given, as it must vary in each individual instance.-

Place may be taken in the figurative as well as in the original sense.- The designation of an official situation of an operation performed on or by the entity in question, will frequently suffice.- George III is the man who was king of England in the year 1800. Jane is the horse which I rode yesterday.- The book I mean is the one you inked this morning. These expressions may in many cases be compleat expositions by individuation.-

All the above examples refer to the exposition of real individual entities. A similar operation might be applied to a number of fictitious entities particularly to those which belong to the classes of notions and operations and which may always be individualized by the expression the noise I heard at such a moment, or the noise that you made at such a moment. As to the names of relations or states of things I do not for the present see any use in individualizing them at all, if there be any occasion for so doing, it must also be by individuation of the real entities to which they refer.-

Paraphrasis

I have stated that there are several general terms which may be more satisfactorily expounded otherwise than by definition and that in one instance that of the word entity it is not even susceptible of definition per genus et differentiam having no superordinate genus.- In these cases Paraphrasis is the mode which will take the place of definition.-

Exposition by paraphrasis of the name of a fictitious entity is the combining the word in question with others so as to make up a compleat proposition, and then translating that proposition into an equivalent one

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