date

1823. March 1. Greece. J.B. Observations
1823. March 1.

Greece. J.B. Observations on particular Articles

Division of power

True it is, that where, between one functionary or set of functionaries and another, a power which is independent of that of the people, is shared out, a case there is, in which such division, in so far as it has place, has a tendency to be productive of effects beneficial to the interest of the people. This is - where the power so divided is the Supreme power in the State, say the power of legislation in the highest grade, and the mode of division such, that no valid act can be performed by the one of these authorities without the concurrence of the other. In this case the power is fractionized: the whole power is the integer, and each of them has a fractional part of it. Thus in the English Government the whole of this power is divided into three fractions: to the King belongs one, to the House of Lords another, to the House of Commons another: In the case of each of these two Houses, the fraction is moreover further fractionized: to each Member belongs a fraction of that of the House he sits in: which fraction is thus a sub-fraction of the whole. In a case of this sort, this same good tendency which does it depend upon? It depends upon those disagreements and those contests which in such a case are so natural, and have been so universally exemplified. Every such contest having for its subject matter the obedience of the people, each party has at times found itself under a necessity more or less urgent of courting the good will of the people. The consequence has been that when between the parties so contending a cessation of hostility and a compromise in some shape or other has had place, they have both of them found themselves under the necessity of concurring in the establishment of some arrangement from which the interest and condition of the people has received some more or less beneficial service

Under the sense of this necessity it was that on the occasion of their contest with King John the Members of the great Aristocratical body of the time the Barons in the termination they put to that contest by the Charter which they succeeded in exacting from him, admitted the great body of the freemen into the benefit of some portion of the security, such as it was, which it professed to establish. But, what seems probable, is - that the portion of the population to which this security was on that occasion extended, formed in those days by far the smallest portion of the whole.

Thus again on the occasion of that conflict which in the year 1688 substituted one race of Monarchs to another when the Aristocracy of the country obtained for itself, not only security against arbitrary power in the hands of the Monarch, but the confirmation of a share coordinate with his own in the power belonging to the legislative and judicial departments, they could not altogether avoid admitting the great body of the people to the benefit of some share of the security obtained for themselves in respect of person and property. For their own share they gave themselves that security which was afforded by the undisturbed possession of their till then disputed and precarious share in the Supreme power as above: As To the people, their Masters knew better than to give to them any such security: in place of it, what they gave them was - that tissue of vague, unobligatory and ineffective generalities called the Bill of Rights. From men so situated how could any thing better have reasonably been expected? By a genuine representation of the people, the power of the people would have been encreased, whereby that of those their rulers would immediately have been diminished, and peradventure ultimately abolished. The system of sham representation as if it had been the peoples only safeguard, was therefore most carefully, and in all its plentitude, preserved.
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  • Title: [1823. Feb. 23 Greece. J.B. to Greek Legislators]
    Description: 1823. Feb. 23 Greece. J.B. to Greek Legislators Independence Division of power

    Better? Yes: but why? Only because, and in so far as when a mass of power which

    is thus independent of the people is thus divided, there is at all times a

    chance of disagreement as between the possessors, and in so far as such

    disagreement leads to /is productive of/ public discussion a certainty of a sort

    of appeal on both parts to the people In this /in which/ case though the people

    not being capable of acting in a body as the two contending parties are can not

    make formal demands for themselves nor therefore obtain contracts as between

    equal and equal, yet the two contending parties while contending or the

    predominant one at the close of the contest, may feel or fancy itself under the

    necessity of doing something even /though it were/ at its own expence for the

    benefit of the people, or of the most influential part of it.

    Thus it was that in the days of King John of England, the contest for power

    between the King /Monarch/ and the Aristocracy terminated in that sort of paper

    security so celebrated under the name of Magna Charta. At the close of this

    contest as neither party could have contended with the other or could see any

    prospect of contending with the other in future without the assistance that part

    of the great mass of the people which were in the state of freedom as

    contradistinguished from domestic or [...?] slavery: so the security such as it

    was was extended to all such freedom. Now then taking the people in a body

    consisting suppose of four millions it was better then that sort of security

    whatever it was that was enjoyed /possessed/ as against depredation and

    oppression at the hands of a single despot should be in possession of each one

    of the number of two hundred thousand than that it should be confined to no more

    than two hundred: and such /this/ was the utility of the division of power such

    as it was that had place in that state of things compared with unity of power in

    the hands of one single despot.
  • Title: [1823. March 1 Greece. Division]
    Description: 1823. March 1

    Greece.

    Division of power

    Any division which it might be proposed to make of the supreme power in the State, has it or has it not a tendency to lodge any part of that same power in the hands of the great body of the people? If not, in what way is it possible that by that same great body any benefit should be reaped from it? If yes, supposed such tendency ripened into act: the consequence is - a portion of the power but no more than a portion, becomes lodged in the hands of the people. But from this portion be it ever so considerable, how is it possible than any benefit can be reaped by them greater than or even so great as that which would be reaped by them from the whole? In a word how can a chance of a part be equal in value to the possession of the whole? Yet on this chance of a part, and it has been seen how feeble an one, depends the utmost benefit, which can ever have been supposed derivable by them from any division made of the supreme power in question, they by the supposition not having any share in it.

    Take now the converse of the above case. Suppose the whole of the supreme power to be already in the hands of the people: and then let it be seen whether any benefit could be produced to them by any scheme of division by which this or that portion of it were lodged in other hands. Take for example the Anglo-American United States. In that seat of good government and consequent felicity, the whole of the supreme power is in the hands of the people: the supreme Constitutive the hands of the greatest number: the supreme Operative, supreme Legislative and Executive included, in the hands of agents of theirs, placed by them some in an immediate others in an unimmediate way [...?], sooner or later, all displaceable, and those who have most power regularly displaced by them. Add now a King, with a vote upon every act of the legislative body, and the power of placing and displacing all subordinate functionaries belonging to the Executive department. Here then would be division of power: a division, so far as it went, agreeing with that which has place in England. To the people in question what would be the benefit of it? By the most anxious scrutiny could any the smallest possible particle of benefit be found derivable from it?
  • Title: [[clx. 323] 1823 Sept. 15 J]
    Description: [clx. 323]

    1823 Sept. 15

    J.B for Greece Constitut Code

    Ch.5 Short Rationale

    ?.3. In People the supreme and universal dislocative

    /Constitutives Dislocative Reasons./

    With the exception of the signing and sending in the necessary petitions a process altogether quiet and silent and quiet The process is no other than that which takes /has/ place of course on the occasion of every Election: by no tumult or disturbance in any shape is profit in any shape capable of being made by any body: therefore with no evil in any shape is the institution pregnant.

    IV. By no other mean at any expence could this same remedial effect be produced: much less at any less expence. On him who thinks otherwise it will rest to produce some such more eligible means.

    An ordinary expedient has been - the giving to some single functionary invested with the supreme Executive authority a negative in the acts of the so stiled legislative: that is to say a share in the legislative in addition to the whole of the Executive. What has been the consequence? As by the legislative so called nothing could be done without his concurrence, his concurrence must be bought at any price: so likewise by him, their concurrence. But by such mutual concurrence every thing can be done how prejudicial so ever to the people and without possibility of redress for the people The Executive Chief in virtue of his almost universal locative, gives valuable situations to an unlimited amount to the members of the legislative or what comes to the same thing to their connections: and that he may have the more of these desirable situations to give /good gifts/, they join with him in augmenting the number and value of them without end. To neither authority does that of the other act as a bridle to each of them the power of the other serves as a cloak

    The division of power is an effective conjunction of sinister interests. It creates a slight contest which is sure to end in agreement - an agreement never likely to be broken, and the perpetually encreasing expence of which is borne by the people for whose benefit is the pretended motive for the establishment of it.