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1823. March 1
Greece.
Division of power
Any division which it might be proposed to make of the supreme power in the State, has it or has it not a tendency to lodge any part of that same power in the hands of the great body of the people? If not, in what way is it possible that by that same great body any benefit should be reaped from it? If yes, supposed such tendency ripened into act: the consequence is - a portion of the power but no more than a portion, becomes lodged in the hands of the people. But from this portion be it ever so considerable, how is it possible than any benefit can be reaped by them greater than or even so great as that which would be reaped by them from the whole? In a word how can a chance of a part be equal in value to the possession of the whole? Yet on this chance of a part, and it has been seen how feeble an one, depends the utmost benefit, which can ever have been supposed derivable by them from any division made of the supreme power in question, they by the supposition not having any share in it.
Take now the converse of the above case. Suppose the whole of the supreme power to be already in the hands of the people: and then let it be seen whether any benefit could be produced to them by any scheme of division by which this or that portion of it were lodged in other hands. Take for example the Anglo-American United States. In that seat of good government and consequent felicity, the whole of the supreme power is in the hands of the people: the supreme Constitutive the hands of the greatest number: the supreme Operative, supreme Legislative and Executive included, in the hands of agents of theirs, placed by them some in an immediate others in an unimmediate way [...?], sooner or later, all displaceable, and those who have most power regularly displaced by them. Add now a King, with a vote upon every act of the legislative body, and the power of placing and displacing all subordinate functionaries belonging to the Executive department. Here then would be division of power: a division, so far as it went, agreeing with that which has place in England. To the people in question what would be the benefit of it? By the most anxious scrutiny could any the smallest possible particle of benefit be found derivable from it?
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Title: [1823 Feb. 19 Greece Beginning]Description: 1823 Feb. 19 Greece Beginning At the first step we had an operative power acting in subordination and in the strictest possible subordination, for such it was necessary it should be or the end in view could not be accomplished © in the strictest possible subordination to the constitutive power. At the second step as above we have now a detached hand or set of hands to which by the operative power a portion of its functions is committed: on the part /conduct/ of which delegate or delegates of the second order the strictest subordination as towards the will of its immediate principal and thereby towards the will of the original principal is for the like reason indispensable. The portion of power thus detached from the operative power call it the Executive. But while by the operative power a certain portion of its functions is thus detached and committed to a delegate or set of delegates of its own appointment, at the same time whatsoever is not thus detached from it is of course reserved by it reserved to be exercised by itself The portion of operative thus detached being termed the Executive power call the portion thus reserved the Legislative power. Here then we have the division of the whole mass of operative power in the community into two portions: in the supreme Operative power, ordinarily in use to be designated by the denomination /appellation/ of legislative power or supreme legislative power; and the Executive power. As the /this/ supreme legislative power though with reference to any other power in the state supreme is with reference to the Constitutive power no other than subordinate, so the power just now termed Executive howsoever supreme with reference to any power which there may be occasion to detach from it is with reference to the power stiled supreme legislative in a state of correspondent subordination: at any rate it ought to be, that is to say /namely/ for the same reasons.
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Title: [1823. Feb. 21 Greece Beginning]Description: 1823. Feb. 21 Greece Beginning The greatest happiness etc /principle/ requires that the power of the Executive department be lodged in a single hand. Reasons © 1. Certainty of the conformity of the functionary's conduct to the will of the Supreme Operative /Legislative/ maximized. 2. Promptitude of execution, maximized: 3. Responsibility to legal and popular sanctions maximized: 4. Expence minimized. The greatest happiness principle requires that the immediate displacing of this functionary be at all times in the power of the Legislative. Reason. Certainty of conformity as above. By no other means could any such certainty be produced, or any approach to it made. If for a day together it were in the power of this functionary to resist the declared will of the supreme Legislative, he would thereby for and during that time be in possession of an equal share in the legislative power in addition to the whole of the Executive.
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Title: [1823 Feb. 16. J.B.'s Articles and]Description: 1823 Feb. 16. J.B.'s Articles and Reasons Division of Power, none The use of the supreme executive power is to be give execution and effect to the /in detail to the more extensive/ arrangements made by the supreme legislative. It is therefore but an instrument in the hands of the supreme legislative: the fitter instrument the fitter the more [...?] obsequious to the will of the legislative The good done by the separation made of the executive power from the legislative consists not in the setting up a separate will to act in any case in opposition to that of the supreme legislative. The sole reason for the separation consists in the impossibility which the possessors of the supreme legislative acting as they must do in a body are under as to the finding time sufficient for the adding to their own functions those of the executive. If by any means the possessors of the supreme executive can give execution and effect to a will of theirs which is in opposition in any respect to the will of the supreme legislative, or which comes to the same thing prevent a will which is the will of the legislative from receiving its execution and effect, it thereby exercises a controul over the legislative, and by sharing with it in its powers adds to the whole of the Executive a share in the legislative The people have nothing to gain from any such controul: and they have every thing to suffer from it. They have nothing to gain. For the will of the Executive can not be more perfectly subject to theirs than the will of the legislative is, as above. For reasons that will be seen presently they would gain nothing by being in an immediate way the electors of the Members of the supreme Executive: and in an unimmediate but still sufficiently effective way they are masters of the Executive by being masters of the legislative, if the legislative are masters of the Executive.
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