date

1823 March 1 Greece. J.B's Observations
1823 March 1

Greece. J.B's Observations on particular Articles

Warning against latent Negatives

Mark now the secret perils, which every offspring of the wisdom of the so stiled Legislative Senate has to encounter and surmount before it can come into existence. Instead of birth comes abortion, if either to the so stiled Executive Council, that is to say to those out of its five Members, or to the President of the so-stiled Legislative Senate, or to the Principal Secretary of that same Legislative Senate, it has the misfortune to be an object of displeasure, or even of indifference.

But the list of its perils is not yet at an end. When it has passed through them, and (under Article 32) received existence from the hands of the so stiled Executive Council, if as affairs turn out so it happens that to three of the five Members of which the so stiled Executive Council is composed it afterwards ceases to be agreable, it is consigned to a sleep, to which there is no assignable termination. For, says Article 54, "The Council causes the laws to be executed by the Ministers." Suppose then a law, which, to the Minister, by whom execution and effect should be given to it happens to be disagreable or an object of indifference: if so it be likewise to three out of the five Members of the so stiled Executive Council, they have but to let the law pass unnoticed, and so long as this is the case with it it sleeps. Suppose it even to be agreable to the Minister, still if it fails or ceases to be so to any three of these five great functionaries, I would not give much for any benefit that rested upon it.

One concluding point is yet behind. Be the arrangement what it may, in vain might it suit the views of a majority of the so stiled Legislative Senate; in vain might it suit moreover the views of four fifths of the five Members of the so stiled Executive Council. If the President of this same Council is not one of them, he has but to withold from the Act his signature and there is an end of it. For, by Article 57, "Every Act and decree of the Council is signed by the President, countersigned by the Principal Secretary and sealed by Seal of the State."
Similar Items
  • Title: [1823. Greece. J.B's Observations on]
    Description: 1823.

    Greece. J.B's Observations on particular Articles

    Warning against latent negatives

    Now as to this or that operation /the several operations/ taken in detail

    1. By Article 30th "Every Act of the Senate is signed by the President and countersigned by the principal Secretary. Suppose then an Act the tenor of which does not suit his views: what is the consequence? He withholds his signature, and no such Act can come into existence.

    Moreover in this same power he has a sharer it has been seen in the principal Secretary.

    2. A second means of applying the President's particular Veto is put into his hands by the next Article, Article 31. "The President" (it says) "transmitts the Resolutions of the Senate to the Council" (meaning the Executive Council) and submitts them to its approbation." Good. But in the mean time though inexplicably they have not the less effectually been thus submitted in the first place to the approbation of this same all powerful functionary. Do they suit his views he transmitts them accordingly: do they thwart his views, he keeps them where they are. President of so stiled Legislative Senate to President or other most infuential member of the so stiled Executive Council - "You see this Resolution: what will you give me if I transmitt it to you? - what will you give me if I keep it back." The language will naturally be, the very quintessence of decorum: and so it may be, while this and nothing else is at the bottom of it.

    3. Article 36, after saying that "Every Member of the Senate may propose a project of law in writing, goes on and says "which the President refers to the examination of a Committee". Suppose then introduced in this manner a project of law which has the misfortune not to suit the views of this great functionary, what becomes of it? He receives it, omitts to forward it to any Committee, and there is an end of it. It is thus stifled in embryo.

    4. So much for the President of the so-stiled Legislative Senate. Now again for the Principal Secretary of that same body. In and by Art. 46 he is once more let in for an equal share with the President as above in the negative which we have seen the President put in possession of by Article 31 with regard to all Resolutions of that same Senate. "He" (the principal Secretary) says the Article "receives from the President the Resolutions of the Senate and transmitts them to the Council" - namely the so stiled Executive Council. Thus then, if it be the pleasure of the President not to deliver them to the Principal Secretary, or of the Principal Secretary not to transmitt them to that same Council, there is an end of these same Resolutions.
  • Title: [1823. Greece Warning against]
    Description: 1823.

    Greece

    Warning against latent negatives

    Now then for the instances.

    First as to all operations together, taken in the lump.

    1. By Article 24. "To the President, namely of the so-stiled Legislative Senate, it belongs to determine the day on which each Session of that Assembly shall commence; as also the day on which it shall terminate." If then he determines no such day, no such Session can have place: moreover if such having been his pleasure so it be that a Session having commenced and for a certain time continued, his pleasure in this behalf has changed, he declares such his pleasure, accordingly, and for that time a negative is put by him in the lump upon all such proceedings of the Assembly as would otherwise have ensued. True it is that by Article 17 to that same Senate itself it belongs to choose this same high-seated functionary. But, when the choice has been made, such, as above, is the state of dependence in which that body has been placed under this its own offspring: dependence for its very existence. Now then, an act of this sort of parricide suppose it to have been committed: the consequence is - that what is left of the powers of government falls of itself into the lap of the so stiled Executive Council with its five Members, acting as they are to do in a perpetually secret conclave.

    Supposing him to have, (under Article 24) put an end to the existence of these his creators, by Article 25 he is empowered to bestow upon them at any time a new existence. "In case of need" (says this 25th Article) "he may convoke the Senate to enter upon an extraordinary Session." Thus it rests at all times at his choice whether to sell existence to them at his own price, or to leave them in a state of annihilation. If and so long as they are sufficiently obsequious, he suffers them to act accordingly: if refractory, he lays them asleep: and so toties quoties. Thus far as to the latent negative or veto in the hands of the President, on the operations of the so-stiled Legislative Senate taken in the aggregate.
  • Title: [1823. Feb. 27 Greece. J.B. Observations]
    Description: 1823. Feb. 27

    Greece. J.B. Observations on particular Articles

    ?.3. III Grecian points unapt

    Be these rules what they may, I proceed to shew why in the first place this body is in my view of the matter useless.

    1. It is itself composed of five Members. By these five (per Article 20) are to be appointed eight other functionaries, under the name of Ministers. Number of functionaries thus belonging to the Executive Department, adding the two grades together, 13. To these same five belongs moreover (per Article 21) the power of placing functionaries in all the other employments of government, to which by Article 67 is added the power of displacing them.

    Now of these thirteen, eight at least are I say altogether useless. For proof I appeal as above to particular experience: the experience afforded by the only Constitution that ever really had for its object or end in view the greatest happiness of the greatest number: I mean the Constitution of the Anglo-American United States. Here at the head of the Executive Department you have a single person the President of the United States. To him alone belongs the direction of the whole business of that Department. To him belongs the direction to be given to, the command over, the whole Military force of the Country by Sea and Land. + To him belongs the placing and at his pleasure the displacing of the four Ministers stiled Secretaries by whom in subordination to the President and the Legislative Assembly stiled the Congress the whole civil power of the confederacy is exercised: namely 1 Secretary of State, 2. Secretary of War, 3. Secretary of Navy, 4. Secretary of Finance. If the business of the Greek Nation is but carried on with a degree of aptitude and success not very much below that with which it is carried on in that Confederated Commonwealth, the Grecian will be a happy people. Nothing approaching to it has yet been seen any where else; nor /no: nor/ ever will be, on any other condition than that of imitating it: Now then, supposing my advice on the subject asked for, it would be this. Take some one individual, for example the President of that same Executive Council give him the power possessed in the Anglo-American Commonwealth by the functionary whose title is President of the United States.

    Take

    + Constitution Art. │ │