date

nd [wm 1813] Government 1 Monarchy
nd [wm 1813]

Government 1 Monarchy

Ch 1 Probity -

1

1

§ 1.

In the article of appropriate probity the deficiency essentially attached to this situation will be sufficiently manifest. But the cause of it is to be looked for - not so much in the strength of the sinister interests as in the strength of the situation by which in the pursuit of the correspondent gratifications a man stands exempted in so great a degree from all those checks which apply to inferior situations.

In this situation, as in every other, a man has two sorts of interest - one peculiar to himself, the other which belongs to him in common with all the other members of the community whatever it be: his private interest, & his share in universal d o. His private interest he can not pursue & promote in such sort as to obtain for himself a share in the good things /the matter of felicity/ of this world greater than the average share, otherwise than at the expence of the universal interest: - lessening thereby the average share of every other member.

He has therefore an interest which coincides with the universal {interest} and he has an interest which acts in opposition to, and leads him to make sacrifice of the universal interest.
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    In respect of his share in the universal interest it is his interest that in the whole community taken together the quantity of the matter of felicity shall be as great as possible.

    But, in respect of his private interest it is his interest that his own particular share in and of that matter shall be as great as possible: and so that this particular share do but receive increase, no matter to how small an amount it matters not to him to how large an amount the remainder and consequently every other individuals average share in and of that same matter is diminished.

    Proceed to particularise the element of felicity belonging to this situation and shew how by the augmentation of this aggregate y e d o of the remainder is diminished.
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    We come now to speak of the Monarchs share in the universal interest In his quality of Member of the community at large it is his interest that y e aggregate mass of the matter of felicity possessed and enjoyed by the whole community be as great as possible. This then were his private interest out of the question would be upon the whole his interest. For such in the case of every Member in the community is upon y e whole his interests supposing him to have no such private interest as, being adverse to the universal interest is of more value to him than his share in the Universal interest. But the value of the monarch’s private interest, such is the magnitude of the mass of the matter of felicity always heaped upon that one head, is in a vast degree superior to the value of his share in the universal interest: which being the case, so long as he adds any but the smallest part to the magnitude of that mass of which he has the whole it matters not to him in how large a degree he diminishes the magnitude of that in which he has but a proportionable share.

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  • Title: [1818 Sept. 29. Parl. Reform Bill]
    Description: 1818 Sept. 29.

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    But, under /on/ the here proposed system /plan/ of virtually universal suffrage no elector has any possible means of giving effect to this same propensity: he has no possible means of promoting in any case his self-regarding interest separately considered, and to the sacrifice or prejudice of the interest of any other individual or of that of the whole community: he has not any possible means of preventing self regarding interest in any shape other than that of his own share in the aggregate the universal interest.

    37. This then, with a degree of effect or at least of promise proportioned to that of his appropriate intellectual aptitude, is the interest and the only interest which in the exercise of the right in question it will be to his study and endeavour to promote.

    37. Thus then /under/ Monarchy and Aristocracy this predominance of personal /self-regarding/ over universal interest, and the consequently constant sacrifice of the universal to the particular interest, is altogether certain and impreventible: under Representative Democracy, in the situation of Representative, preventible; in the situation of Elector, impossible: that is to say the sacrifice of the universal interest notwithstanding the predominance of the self-regarding /personal/ interest.