131-649.xml

Title: [1819 Oct. 13 Parl. Reform Bill]

Description: 1819 Oct. 13

Parl. Reform Bill

Reasons Prel. Obs.

§.2 Electors who

3

Here it may be observed – but under the Constitution as it stands it may be said /says somebody/ neither is it Monarchical ascendancy, nor Aristocratical ascendancy, nor the ascendancy of Monarchy and Aristocracy (that has place) but the ascendancy of Monarchy Aristocracy and Democracy conjoined that has place – and accordingly it may be asked the ascendancy of Monarchy, Aristocracy and Democracy conjoined as under the Constitution as it stands is it incompatible with good Government.

The answer here too is in the affirmative. See another N o in the Appendix N o | | Title Aristocracy and Democracy conjoined as under the Constitution as it stands is incompatible with good Government.

[marginal heading:] Superseded

{But even admitting that these forms are every one of them incompatible with good government, it will not absolutely follow it may be said either that Democracy or Democratical ascendancy in any form or at any rate in the form of radical reform as you present it or in one word radicalism is preferable and eligible. For any government, how bad so ever is better than none. And under /of/ radicalism as you present it would not the effect be the destruction of government, and there with the destruction of every good thing which it is the use of government to preserve?}

Here the answer is in the negative. See another N o in the Appendix. N o | |. Title Radicalism not dangerous.

JB_129_265.xml

Title: [1820 Feb. 20 Necessity of Radicalism]

Description: 1820 Feb. 20

Necessity of Radicalism proved from the Radical Principles of Constitutional Law

Heads proposed

1

Topics 20 Feb. 1820

{ §.1. Governors interest every where opposite to governed’s d o –

self regard g interest predominate: one requires maximum of

inequality the other of equality

§.2. This applied to the several repeated instruments of falsity, not dependent upon

common self. 1 in the case of Monarchy: 2 In the case of Aristocracy. 3 In the case

of Democracy

§.3. Opposite to the assumption made by all advocates of all governments but

democratical – by writers in general – The notion a vulgar error – the dissemination

of it a fallacy

1 Causes of the error and correspondent fallacy

§.5.2 Consequences in regard to 1. Political Institutions

promoting misconduct in all public functionaries: by sinister application of the 3

Sanctions

§.6. – 2 – National intellectual strength and moral purity.

§.7. Practical result.

1. In new communities representative democracy

2. In Britain, democratic ascendancy

§.8. Course to be taken for counteracting the effect of the vulgar error and

correspondent fallacy}

{§.4. Origin of the vulgar error and correspondent fallacy}

{Title proposed 20 Feb. 1820

Necessity of Radicalism proved from the radical principles on the field of

Constitutional law, as deduced from experience.

Ch.1.* Equality – its subservience to general felicit[?]

§.1. + Sole justifiable end of government – greatest happiness of

the greatest number

§.2. Maximum of equality the tendency measu}

§.1. Sole justifiable all-comprehensive end of government – greatest happiness of

greatest number

§.2. Distinguishable particular ends, subsistence abundance equality, security –

their relation to each other. See Dum.[?] Princip.

§.3. Subsistence and security obtained, equality the leading means of happiness –

happiness so far as depends on things exterior to man, is in proportion to it

§.3. Means of {happiness} /{felicity}/ exterior to a mans self, d o interior: - exterior, the d o instrument of felicity.

§.4. Instruments of felicity

1. Common to governors and governed: 1 matter of wealth (i.e. of subsistence and

abundance) and 2. natural power

§.5. Instruments of felicity created and reserved to themselves by government 1

factitious dignity. 2 privileged vengeance. 3 factitious ease.

§.6. Maximum Equality in respect of wealth in so far as consistent with security and

abundance – its subserviency to general felicity.

§.7. Equality in respect of power, its subserviency to general felicity abstraction

made of the effects on government

§.8. Equality in respect of the powers by which government is constituted – its

subserviency /necessity/ to good government. (Reasons follow.) Sole good form of

government representative Democracy.

§.9. Cause of the bad side[?] of every other form of government. Necessity of

predominance of self-regarding interest over social in every human breast: consequent

propensity in governors to engross as much as possible the whole mass of the exterior

instruments of felicity, at the expence of the governed.

§.10. Consequence – under every form of government, sacrifice of the interest of the

governed to their own carried by the governors to the highest pitch possible.

Effect of the corresponding propensity since[?] on the severally[?] part[?] of

govern. what?

§.11/ 2/. Use made by them if to this purpose of the several

sanctions or sources of inducement by which human conduct is influenced and

determined: viz. 1 the physical. 2. the retributive. 3. the political including the

legal. 4. the popular or moral: 5. the sympathetic. 6. the super-human or religious.}

§. 13 Opposite Assumption made {to the opposite of fact} by all

governors, and their supporters in every government but a democracy. – its absurdity

and extravagance vulgar error contained in it. – fallacy employed in the

dissemination of it.

1820 Feb. 20

Necessity of Radicalism proved from the Radical Principles of

Constitutional Law –

Heads proposed

2

§. 14 Causes of the rise and predominance of this error – craft

on the one part intellectual weakness on the other

§. 15 Consequences of this error – means by which it produces

misconduct on the part of governor, infelicity on the part of the governed.

§. 16 In all contests between governors and governed, the

greatest pox[?] only blames his […?] on the part of the governors.

§. 17 Application made of the error in the case of the English

Constitution – ways in which it produces misconduct in necessary official situations

– depradation – oppression – waste.

§.17* Continuation – Ways in which it gives birth to needless useless and pernicious

situations – religious establishments

§. 18 Blindness /Insincerity/ and mental weakness produced by it

in all minds of the Representative democracy and democratic ascendancy – democracy

the sole eligible government in a new-formed state – democratic ascendancy preferable

in the United Kingdom – why

§ 20 Objections to representative democracy and democratic ascendancy, their futility

– confutation given to them by experience. See Radicalism not dangerous.

§.21 Course to be taken for eradicating the radical /vulgar/ error the prevalence of

which is thus incompatible with good government.

Inserenda 24 Feb. 1820

§ In a mixt Monarchy, corruption is effectual, inseparable and all-pervading.

§.18* or 13*. Groundless and ridiculous laudation and adulation produced by it (Every

thing most religious – Portraits in the Liturgy like Portraits and Plans and Views in

old Chronicles

§.17* English Constitution By what accidents the good there is in it was produced.

King and Barons found more[?] money could be got from people by cajolement than

force.

King and Barons mutually called on the people.

When nothing could be done without people’s representatives – they found it

necessary to let in Lords – they and Lords to let in People’s representatives for a

share of the plunder.

§. Of Distant Dependencies sure effect preponderate evil in the governing and

governed states. Yet by accident the only good form of government was the result of

Colonization

§.9*. or[?] Every man[?] has its price no more than are imperfect rudiments of the

essential[?] […?]

§. For the same reason that English mixt Monarchy is good as compared with pure

Monarchy it is bad as compared with Repres. ve Democracy

Inseparable from such mixture is the growing worse and worse.

§. Among the power rulers a universal error or pretence is that {for} the[?]

political power[?] men are exempted from moral obligation: that by such hands

whatever is done is right.. On this need[?] /ground/ the language of England can not

be outstretched /outstripped/ by the language of Spain.

§.21. If each Monarch & Aristocrat is in the right in maintaining[?] the

inequity each individual of the subject many is not the less in the right in

endeavouring to release himself from under it: he is not only […?] to himself but to

all others who are in his case.

§ Nobilitas sola atque unica virtus.

104_169.xml

Title: [1819 Aug. 25 Fallacies 3 Ch | | Cause]

Description: 1819 Aug. 25

Fallacies 3 Ch | | Cause and Obstacle Confounders

Considered in respect of their conduciveness to an end objects of any kind may be termed good or bad either with reference solely to the end, or with reference to and in comparison with one another, but still with reference to the end.

The English Constitution, in the opinion of Englishmen, with few if any exceptions, has been regarded as better with reference to the end in question than that of any other Government ever known, laying out of the question the recently established governments of the several American United States: in particular better than any one /other/ of the European Monarchies. Upon examination, upon the distinction made between causes on the one hand, and uninfluencing circumstances and obstacles on the other, this persuasion will /would/ it is believed be fully confirmed. receive full confirmation. But in proportion as these circumstances are distinguished by which it is rendered better superior and more conducive to the end than are the Constitutions of those several Monarchies in that same proportion will it be seen to be inferior as compared with that of any one of the United American States.

Ask the cause or reason what the Constitution of the English Government is better than that of any one of those Monarchies, the answer can be no other than this /to this question there can be but /can not be more than/ one answer/ - namely that in /under/ the English Constitution the great body of the people /the people/ have some share, while /whereas/ in those other Governments, the people either have no share at all or have not so good a share.