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1822 June 10
Economy
IV English Practice
In the English Government, the Monarch, mixt as is the Monarchy, is altogether
exempt from legal responsibility in every shape. Do whatever evil he will, he
can neither be punished nor so much as dislocated. What is the consequence? that
the doing of political evil in all manner of shape evil and nothing but evil is
in that Monarchy as in every other, the uninterrupted occupation of the Monarchs
political life
The King can do no wrong. By this phrase it is that his exemption from all legal
responsibility, the compleat licence for the operating of evil in every
imaginable shape is expressed.
Out of this real security pregnant as it is /it has been seen to be with absolute
and/ [...?] power by a forced construction, a sort of lawyers' will - an abuse
of words - has been deduced his alledged impotence. Be the thing what it may
that it is his desire to do, if it be wrong, power adequate to the production of
the effect, is not in his hands.
In fact however nothing can be more compleatly false
To any great extent it may be said it is not in this mans power - for it is not
in any man's power to do wrong - without instruments: and all but he being
legally responsible if the thing whatever it be which it is his desire to do
have any thing wrong in it, no such instruments will he find. Of this supreme
functionary no written act is valid without some appropriate counter-signature
Were this even true it would as above amount to nothing. But neither is it true.
For to him belongs the command of the whole army. With this instrument therefore
in his hands what need of any such thing as a counter-signature what act[?] is
there that can not be done by him?
Then as to the alledged responsibility of all other individuals - the highest
functionaries under this one not excepted neither in this is there any
truth.
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Title: [[clx. 344] 1822 July 11 Constitut]Description: [clx. 344] 1822 July 11 Constitut. Code Rationale Securities Counterforce 4 Legal responsibility 5. Moral responsibility Moral Responsibility Thus stands the matter in regard to legal responsibility responsibility to punishment at the hands of the possessors /administrators/ of the power of the legal sanction. Look now to moral responsibility - responsibility to the purpose of eventual exposure to the punitive power of the Public Opinion Tribunal, administrators /possessors/ of the force and influence of the popular or say moral sanction: the power that is to say /and in particular the power/ of the democratical sanction of that same invisible yet not the less efficiently /effectively/ operative tribunal: a tribunal like the Vehmic invisible; but, like that not the less operative. To responsibility /punishment/ to not altogether ineffective responsibility in this shape /punishment in a certain shape/, not only in representative democracy the possessors but even in an absolute Monarchy, the possessor of the supreme operative power are capable of being responsible /standing exposed/. In fact In this shape in this sense is /are/ the most compleatly absolute Monarchy the Monarch is always to a certain degree responsible, and feels himself so to be: though in some Monarchies at some times so faint /feeble/ has /such has been the feebleness of/ this responsibility been in the character of a counterforce to the powers of government in the highest grade, that the effect of it in respect of a cause of mitigation to the evils of misrule - of depredation and oppression - in experience has hardly been perceptible. has seldom in any determinate degree or shape been perceptible.
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Title: [[clx. 340] 1822 July 11 Constitut]Description: [clx. 340] 1822 July 11 Constitut. Code Securities 4 Moral responsibility 5 Legal responsibility ?. Expository matter Responsibility in the sense /to the purpose/ 1. of exposure /liability/. 2. of sufficiency Note Note To the word responsibility the sense /import/ thus attributed /attached/ is common to all languages which have sprung out of or derived supplies from a Latin stock In English attached to this same word is an /another/ import which requires to be distinguished from it. A person is said to be a responsible person not in virtue of his actual and effectual subjection to either tribunal, and in particular the legal, but in virtue of his being in such a situation, principally in respect of his pecuniary circumstances, that if it were the desire of government that by means of coercion he should be made to do or suffer so and so, he would accordingly be made to do so and so, namely by reason of his being in possession of benefits in particular either money or power or both, on which it would be in the power of government at large, and the judicial branch of it in particular to take hold, supposing it so disposed. /disposed to do so./ The distinction is a real and an important one In England the situation of King by the avowed state of the law is placed above the field of legal responsibility: to the purpose of exposure to punishment he can not be made to suffer nor consequently to do any thing that it does not please him to do or suffer In the other sense however he is in an abundant degree responsible - he has money enough for example by the seizure of which could it be got at without his leave he could be brought to do any thing which by any one it was desired he should be seen doing It is by the plenitude of his responsibility in this particular sense that he is eased of all responsibility in the general sense: so material it is that the two senses should be mutually distinguished. In general, from the top of the scale to the bottom the more abundantly responsible a man is in respect of sufficiency, the less responsible he in respect of effectual exposure. In respect of exposure to punishment the King is irresponsible by law. Other classes /situations/ there are that are so in effect, though by law and to outside shew responsible: witness the Lord Chancellor, his two immediate subordinates and the twelve paid Judges.
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Title: [[xxxviii. 22] 1822 July 13]Description: [xxxviii. 22] 1822 July 13 Constitut. Code Rationale Securities 5 Moral Counterforce Public Opinion Tribunal A few Articles Exposition and Rationale 1. Securities for Moral aptitude. 4. Moral responsibility 5. Legal responsibility 2. Moral responsibility what? Subjection to power of popular or moral sanction as applied by (Democratical Section of) Public Opinion Tribunal. 3. Legal responsibility, subjection to power of political (including legal) sanction, as applied by legal judicatories under the Government. 4. Public Opinion Tribunal, feigned for discourse sake, by analogy as applying the rewards and punishmts. of the popular or moral sanction. 5. Anglice Petty Common Jury a Committee of Public Opinion Tribunal organized. 6. Import from which this requires to be distinguished: belonging to him possessions whereby, for the purpose of punishment, Government may, if so disposed, take hold. 7. Real and important the distinction. Angliceā - in many a man responsibility by possession, without do. by effective subjection 8. Example. King: possession peculiarly ample: subjection by punibility none either in fact or by law. 9. Other situations responsible by law, not in fact. Witness 1. Chancellor and his Vices 2. Twelve superior Judges. 10. 1. Legal responsibility comes first to be explained: moral not clearly intelligible but by means of it. By punibility responsible: by law, conduct to any possessor of, or sharer in supreme operative power in a Monarchy absolute or limited. (Note case of Spanish and Portugueze Kings under the Constitutions. 11. I. Monarchy absolute. Under absolute Monarch no functionary unless Monarch pleases, whatsoever the evil of his misdeeds to the universal interest. 12. Thus far by no such responsibility of a subordinate is counterforce opposed to superordinate's power: self contradictory the supposition. 13. Not so Monarch giving consent, which by casual circumstances may be brought about. Supposed case - Finance Minister defending King, and prosecuted before a Judicatory. 14. II. Monarchy limited. Case here not materially different. Here too direct impunity may be given by law: but indirect is found commonly more convenient. Of limited Monarch, and his instruments, the proceedings are more exposed to observation: in public's eyes direct course suppose palpably opposite to received notion of justice, resistance might at length be produced, and by resistance trouble. If so, case requires that some indirect course be taken by vengeance. Slaughterers, for example, sent off or rendered undistinguishable: failing, sent physical means, legal are at hand so numerous and intricate that by explanation of them a volume might be filled.
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