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3 Dec r 1809 +
Parl y Reform
Influence
Ch.1. Explanations
'.3 Dependence most mischievous
3
{This[?] reason is an arithmetical one: if no dependence, no more than one instance of undue obsequiousness is produced by one complex operation: if dependence, as many instances as the nature of the case /situation/ produces during the man's continuance in it.}
dependence apart, the effect of the undue influence is but occasional and momentary: but, if dependence be the fruit of it, the effect is permanent, continuing as long as the dependence continues, and producing on the part of the corrupted trustee as many instances of breach of trust as the corruptor has occasion to call for during that length /span/ of time.
Of the two species of political trust viz. that of the member of parliament, and that of the parliamentary elector, it is in the situation of member of parliament that in which influence undue influence is beyond comparison in an almost infinitely greater degree most apt to be productive of this pernicious fruit. Why? - Because, a vote /the act of voting/ being in both cases /situations/ the act by which the power is exercised, the number of votes which within a given space of time it may happen to a Member of parliament to give is beyond comparison greater than the greatest number which it can happen to a parliamentary elector to give. Under the system of septennial parliaments, casualties apart, a parliamentary elector as such does not find it in his power to be corrupt /violate that his trust/ oftener than once in seven years,
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Title: [13 Dec r 1809 Parliamentary Reform]Description: 13 Dec r 1809 Parliamentary Reform Influence Ch.1. Explanations '.3 Dependence most mischievous 4 whereas in the situation of Member of Parliament, reckoning seven sessions in the seven years and in each session a hundred days, and in each day three votes, in the situation of Member of Parliament a man may by undue obsequiousness break his trust between two and three thousand times for once that a parliamentary Elector can in the same time break his. Nor would any practical result be varied, although from between two and three thousand reasons should be found for reducing the number to as many hundreds. [Marginal note:] {but take into cons'on y e mischievousness that may be produced by vote of Elector y e result of undue obsequiousness}
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Title: [12[?] Dec r 1809 Ch.1 + '.3 Parliamentary]Description: 12[?] Dec r 1809 Ch.1 + '.3 Parliamentary Reform Influence Ch.1. Explanations '.3. Dependence most mischievous 1 Influence therefore, though bad, is least bad, when it produces no dependence. '.3 Undue dependence the only considerably mischievous fruit of undue influence. When as here obsequiousness having place, the effects of it are to be considered as undue and mischievousness, the mischievousness of the obsequiousness will have of course for its measure the mischievousness of those effects and thence of the acts or acts in the performance of which the obsequiousness consists. Of the aggregate mass of acts, in the performance of which the habit of obsequiousness maintained during a given time consists, in the extent and importance of those several acts, that is of their respective consequences, being also given, the mischievousness will depend upon the number of those acts. In regard to obsequiousness What in the instance of one of the sorts of persons here in question viz. a Member of Parliament, as in the instance of any other sort of person may now and then happen, is - that obsequiousness as towards the will of the other correlative person viz. the King may continue but for one moment, becoming in the course of that one moment productive of but one such obsequious act. So, in regard to dependence considered as a cause of obsequiousness. What may now and then happen is that the duration of the dependence may be in a correspondent degree transitory, producing in the disposition of the dependent person a disposition sufficient in its continuance, under favour /with the help/ of such opportunities as present themselves to give birth to one such obsequious, one unduly and mischievously obsequious, act.
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Title: [3 Dec 1809 Parl y Reform Influence]Description: 3 Dec 1809 Parl y Reform Influence Ch.1. Explanations '. {Dependence} /Bribery/ 1 5 5 {whereas in the situation of member of parliament, if each session occupies /at a reckoning seven sessions in the seven-years, and/ a hundred days for each session, and three votes on each day, in the situation of member of parliament a man breaks his trust between two and three thousand times for one that the parliamentary elector can break his.} In a word {Corruption} without bribery is it may thus be seen, in general beyond comparison /in a prodigious proportion/ more mischievous than corruption by bribery. Corruption in the situation of member of parliament is moreover in a still greater proportion more pernicious than corruption of /though it were in/ the same shape, on the part of a parliamentary elector. But this is but one out of several accounts in each of which corruption meaning passive corruption of the passive kind in the higher situation is in a vast degree more pernicious than corruption also of the passive kind on the inferior situation. Further on An occasion will present itself for summing up the several efficient causes by the concurrent power of which the aggregate disproportion /ratio/ is produced.
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