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21 Jan y. 1810
Parl y. Reform
Ch.2.
'.2 Influence why
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Your object The /An/ object you have in view being to reconcile men to the practice of corruption influence is accordingly the name /appellation/ you take always to employ in speaking of it.
Under the name of corruption it would be hazardous and unecessary to speak any good of it, to say any thing betokening /that betokened/ approbation of it.
Under the name of influence you may say as much in defence and approbation of it as you please.
{Should an adversary should he take you up and say /ask/ to you -} What? Corruption? You do not mean to defend corruption, do you? Should any such question come across you, your answer is ready - Oh no: that is undue influence: what is undue it never is any purpose to defend. What? defend it the use not the abuse of influence. "the legitimate rights of influence." +
Should the question be - {Is it in any instance your meaning to defend} the conduct of him who being a Member of Parliament or a parliamentary Elector suffers in the exercise of such his function his will to be influenced by any other will - is this a conduct which in any instance you approve of and mean to defend? to a question put in those terms it might not be altogether so easy to you to find an answer. But in any such terms nobody has ever yet put it to you, and it is not any business of yours to put it to yourself.
+ Speaker p.867.
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Title: [11 June 1810 Influence Ch.]Description: 11 June 1810 Influence Ch. '. Influence convenient 6 Rule for the use of deceivers. When under its proper and specific name a thing which you mean /have occasion/ /propose to yourself/ to defend is too odious to be defensible, look up carry your eye over /take in hand/ that chain of generic and specific terms to which the word belongs, and carry your eye upwards till you find some word which together with the thing that is thus odious, /is understood to/ comprehends in its signification some other that is not odious. If not only not odious, but by reason of the /its/ innocuousness not capable of being rendered so, so much the better: so much the better still, if by reason of its beneficialness or from any other cause, it is positively popular - an object of general approbation. Enter this under Fallacies. Logical - high-fliers?
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Title: [20 Jan y. 1810 + '. Parl y. Reform]Description: 20 Jan y. 1810 + '. Parl y. Reform Influence Ch.2. '.3 "Influence" why used 1 Add " Influence" why better, why worse than preventive[?]. It inspires no terror: but experience provokes no resistance: is therefore more efficient. '. Use of the word influence: purpose for which it was invented /thus applied/. '. The word influence why employed. ' Cloak afforded to corruption by the word influence. Of the various fallacies which are in use among politicians there is one which is in use to be applied to this subject, and that to such effect as to be the basis of whatsoever by the influence of understanding on understanding has been done towards the upholding of the influence of will over will. {Of the fallacy here spoken of The description may be given in the form of a directive or recipe.} When you have got a thing to defend which by its proper name is indefensible, to its proper name, viz that which expresses /a name which presents to view/ that thing and nothing else, substitute another which along with that is capable of expressing something else which nobody can avoid approving of. (a) This done, so long as you call it by the /its/ ambiguous name you may say what you will in favour of it, and nobody cares /without fear of contradiction from any body/. To encrease your credit while you are defending and even commanding it under this its ambiguous name you may even join in the condemnation /[...?]/ passed upon it in its proper and unambiguous one. Note (a) (a) In this note shew the logical nature of this contrivance.
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Title: [21 Jan y. 1810 Parl y. Reform]Description: 21 Jan y. 1810 Parl y. Reform Ch.2. '. Influence 4 This however is a salvo: and not to be employed but in case of necessity, and /viz/ for defence against gainsayers. When the persons you have to do with are persons whom /whose obsequiousness/ you may depend, as being in the character of obsequious more disposed to acquiesce /[...?]/ in what you say, before such company /auditors/ or with a view to such readers you may go on to indulge yourself in your panegyrics without reserve. Where the ground is thus prepared, you come at last to the observation that notwithstanding all this some persons there are weak enough to suppose or insincere enough to affect to suppose in a constitution such as ours that influence is unnecessary or even pernicious. All this while there is one sort of influence which indeed is necessary, and another which so far from being necessary is pernicious. But so long as nobody makes /takes/ the distinction, and in the instance of every person who fails of making the distinction you succeed in impressing the persuasion that all influence without any distinction is necessary. At the same time Should any such suspicion present itself to any person as that there is a sort of influence which instead of being /is not/ necessary but is pernicious, still, so unless it has happened to him to [...?] upon the exact line of distinction, he does /gives/ not give you much trouble. On his part he observes that there is a sort of influence which is undue: on your part you accede to the /his/ observation. Your fallacy remains still unexposed: and he and you part good friends.
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