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22 Jan y. 1810
Parl y. Reform
Influence
Ch. Mischief
'.1.
3
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But in the assembly /legislative body/ in question it is never without the concurrence of a majority that any such sinister effect can be produced. and By this consideration /thereupon/ we are led at once to the enquiry what is or are the source or sources of influence (influence of will on will sinister influence), by which on that Assembly on any occasion a number of wills sufficient to constitute a majority can be influenced with effect?
In former days, viz. for some time after the Revolution the answer to this question might have admitted of some little complication: besides the Monarch on the throne, there was the head of the displaced dynasty, maintaining his pretensions to the throne, there were in a state of hostility declared or latent foreign powers, holding themselves in readiness to give him support: and by these hostile influences, during the reign of William majorities were every now and then actually produced.
For the last half century however, viz. ever since the accession of the present Monarch /King/ the state of things in this respect has been extremely simple.
During this period as during every other period, in this community as in every other community, sinister interests there have always been, sinister interests as many in number as there have been /the community has contained/ individuals in it. But sinister interest, provided with such means of sinister influence as to be capable /able/, in spite of every opposing force, to produce /command/ a majority there never has been any more than one, viz. that of the Monarch /King/, including that cluster of subordinate sinister interests the influencing force of which is derived from his.
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Title: [22 Jan y. 1810 Parl y. Reform]Description: 22 Jan y. 1810 Parl y. Reform Influence Ch. Mischief '.1. 4 4 On any occasion in the course of this same period, suppose, for supposition sake, any other sinister interest to have obtained /commanded/ a majority, and that by the means of sinister influence, of the influence of will over will, it can only have been by means of the secret support, or through the inadvertence or the negligence on the part of /of/ the possessors that irresistible and all-commanding influence. By means indeed of authority, viz. intellectual authority - influence of that sort which is exercised by understanding over understanding may to an indefinite amount have fallen to the share of this or that individual, or to each one of an indefinite number of individuals: and if on any occasion by that sort of influence which is exercised by will on will wills thus endowed /armed/ with a sufficient mass intellectual authority can be influenced with effect, and efficient majority sufficient to exercise /exercising/ the power of the whole assembly may in this way be got together /up/ and commanded by sinister influence in /even in/ individual /private/ hands. But under so predominating an influence as that of the King how rarely, if ever, exemplified such particular sinister influence can have been, may be left to any one to determine.
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Title: [18 Jan y 1817 Necessity Cat]Description: 18 Jan y 1817 Necessity Cat II. Application ยง.4. Constitution - present real state 12 5 Q. < > Corruptive influence sinister influence - want of freedom - all this while what I see is a number of words and phrases expressive of disapprobation and condemnation; with /and indeed not without/ a sort of suspension[?] of evil constituted of a substantial ground for that condemnation at the bottom of them. But what I do not yet see /as yet I have not as yet any very distinct view of/ is the particular shape in which this evil manifests itself; in a word how it is that the happiness of the whole community is lessened by it. A. It seemed pretty well agreed between us that under the best conducted Monarchy there exists a reasonable expectation that the happiness of the whole community should be as great as under the best conducted democracy: the evil then in question is - that, by means of the sinister influence of both kinds to which the Electoral bodies are in so large a proportion exposed, and that in such sort that by[?] majorities of votes, and thence Elections are determined by it, the Monarch when the deputies thus chosen come to sit and act in their Assembly finds himself by this exercise[?] on each occasion in such sort master[?] of the majority of the votes and thence of the acts of the Assembly, that while to appearance his will /conduct/ is determined by their will, in reality their conduct is determined by his individual will, and thence by his personal and sinister and adverse interest to which the universal interest of the whole community thereby, as often as it pleases have made a sacrifice.
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Title: [28 Jan y. 1810 Parl y. Reform]Description: 28 Jan y. 1810 Parl y. Reform Ch. J.B.s note-reform 3 So far as concerned influence, to produce an /any/ adequate demand for reform two things were /seemed/ necessary to it: that in its tendency /the nature/ it should be pernicious, and that the quantum /forces/ of its tendency should be great enough actualy[?] to produce the mischievous effect to the production of which it tended. In the character of evidence and that conducive of both these requisites, the constancy of majorities in favour of the crown was and argument /a consideration/ which I had seen to ever[?] to few[?] brought /urged/ to view. Had the state of things been such that no changes in administration contrary to the known[?] inclinations of the Monarch on the throne been in use to take place this /the/ argument might have passed with /upon/ me /been taken by me/ for conclusive. But of such changes several examples were to be found. Why then said I to myself is it that in the ordinary state of things there is a constant majority in favour of the Minister of the day of this constancy what can be the cause. It is not the strength of the King it is not the strength of his Minister: it is their weakness. It is because when ever a Minister sees a majority against him, so soon does he perceive that it is impracticable for him to continue any longer in his place. So much for the proof afforded by the habitual agreement[?] of the efficiency /supposed mischievousness/ of the influence.
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